How can the European Union project continue to be built in a secure and democratic way? In this episode of […]
How can the European Union project continue to be built in a secure and democratic way?
In this episode of the Liberal Europe Podcast, Ricardo Silvestre (Movimento Liberal Social), welcomes Strahinja Subotić, Programme Manager and Senior Researcher at the European Policy Centre and think tank in Belgrade (EPC-Belgrade), to talk about some of the work done by EPC-Belgrade and himself on the topic of staged accession to the EU, conditionality mechanisms and veto limits proposals.
This podcast, as well as previous episodes, is available on SoundCloud, Apple Podcast, Stitcher and Spotify.
Also, as Strahinja mentioned, EPC-Belgrade is very active on YouTube and has its own podcast.You can read more about these topics, ranging from a Template 2.0 for Staged Accession to the EU, Making Conditionality Stick after Accession, a focus on the Western Balkans, a Veto-limitation Proposal, or Putting Gradual Institutional Participation into Practice, among others, at the EPC- Belgrade website.
The blog post that Ricardo mentions during the conversation, written by Davor Nadi, Alva Finn, and Emil Kirjas, can be found here.
Ricardo: Welcome to the Liberal Europe podcast. I’m your host, Ricardo Silvestre, and thank you so much for listening to today’s episode. I’m sure you’re aware that we here at the European Liberal Forum are quite focused on how to continue the European Union project in a secure and democratic way. We just had a blog post titled “Saying Goodbye to the Union of Haiti with Pooled Veto Reform,” so I’m very happy to bring you today Strahinja Subotić. Strahinja is Programme Manager and Senior Researcher at the European Policy Centre (CEP), a think tank in Belgrade. I invited him to talk about the work being done by him and by the Centre on staged accession to the EU, conditionality mechanisms, and veto limit proposals. After our main conversation, please stay to hear a little more about the path Strahinja chose before I got him on the podcast. But now, without further ado, it’s my great pleasure to bring you Strahinja Subotić.
Ricardo: I’m here with Strahinja Subotić. Strahinja, thank you so much for coming to the podcast.
Strahinja: Thank you for the invitation.
Ricardo: It’s great to have you here. You have a lot of work on streamlining accession to the European Union, particularly the Western Balkans — and of course, naturally, your own country, Serbia. But you also make the argument in your writing about the need to safeguard the Union. So let’s start with that. Tell us a little about your mindset when you’re thinking about these two tracks running at the same time: having more countries in the family of the European Union, but also making sure that the Union functions properly.
Strahinja: For a while now, we’ve been advocating for out-of-the-box thinking. This included the development of our Model for Staged Accession, which, when it was published in 2021, was based on the premise that we need to overcome the binary approach that dominated enlargement policy at that time. Back then, you were either a member state or not. Given the specificities of our region — the slow pace, dissatisfaction among people, and autocratic tendencies — we argued that we should not wait for full membership, or integration to take place. That’s why we proposed that the Union should develop the notion of gradual integration, which it did and endorsed in 2022 when the European Council took the relevant decision. Since then, we’ve seen the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which on the one hand provides an increased financial carrot, but on the other hand incentivises reforms by linking increased funds to the fulfilment of concrete reform steps. Second, we proposed that officials and administrations from candidate countries should be allowed to build bridges with their EU counterparts in EU institutions — either by having observer status or by being invited more frequently for exchanges of views. Of course, in a merit-based manner, so that this institutional carrot can, on the one hand, allow both sides to get socialised, get to know each other, and exchange views on important topics, and on the other, serve as another means to incentivise reforms. This gradual institutional participation is now part of the Franco-German non-paper. They argued that in stages, or phases, candidate countries should be increasingly involved in the work of institutions like the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council of the EU. This was important because the process was stalling, and more tangible results were needed to keep EU membership prospects alive — in the eyes of EU citizens, but also of Serbian and regional citizens, and among policymakers. What made our model stand out is that it took into consideration the needs and concerns of member states. Even as early as 2018, we argued that even if a country or two are ready for EU membership, what if the EU is not ready to absorb those countries? Because with newcomers, there would be new veto players, and those veto players could turn out to be a sticking point when it comes to adopting decisions — since many important decisions in the EU are still made based on unanimity. That’s why we proposed that, once a candidate is ready, there should not be a shortcut — but unless the EU conducts its internal reforms in time, the EU should consider using the acts of accession to introduce temporary veto limitations in specific areas. This way, it could enlarge without fearing that enlargement could pose a threat to the Union’s functionality. Of course, this was a controversial idea at the time. It still is in the eyes of Montenegro, which says: we are such a small country, we have a good rule-of-law record, the EU doesn’t need to limit our veto rights. But I think many would rightly reply that Montenegro’s veto has the same weight as France’s veto in the Council. It doesn’t matter how big you are — the idea is to set a precedent, so that with Montenegro and other countries onwards, the EU can know it can enlarge without fearing that its functionality might be put in danger. This proposal has now become mainstream. We’ve seen it become part of a new non-paper produced by the Benelux countries, France, and Germany — all of them have put on the table this possibility of temporarily limiting the veto rights of newcomers. Importantly, they have also adopted another proposal related to post-accession arrangements: our idea to introduce enhanced post-accession safeguard clauses. Now we see that Marta Kos keeps talking about those, which we are happy to see, given that they have been applied in the past. What we did was to dust off the safeguard clauses, since they were used in the past but were treated as a technical add-on. We wanted to give them more political weight. How? First, we said the scope should be increased — in the past, only limited areas had safeguard clauses applied. Second, we argued that corrective measures should be spelled out, so a potential violator of EU rules would know in advance what sanctions might follow. And third, we proposed extending the duration of the safeguard clauses. In the previous acts of accession, they could only be applied within three years after accession. We said this should be much longer, so the Union has an extended grace period, essentially — a way to test the newcomer and apply safeguards in case of backsliding. All these ideas, to conclude, are now part of ongoing policy thinking, part of many non-papers, and we’re happy to see it. And as Montenegro’s act of accession is currently being drafted by the Council’s Ad Hoc Working Group, these ideas will become even more important going forward.
Ricardo: I have a couple of follow-ups. One has to do with exactly this debate about veto reform. We just published — and I’m not going to ask you to comment on this specific blog post — but one written by a good friend from North Macedonia, Emil Kirjas, and by Davor Nadi, director of ISC in Croatia, on a system with a pooled veto, or the kind you just described. Tell us a little about why, for those of us already in the European Union, this is something we have to follow and understand — both the internal concerns and the external ones. Why is this such a focus of attention right now?
Strahinja: It is a high focus of attention because Montenegro is expected to become a new member state soon, and member states do not want to miss the opportunity to set important precedents with Montenegro.
Ricardo: Let me interrupt you. There’s also the discussion — as you mentioned correctly a second ago — that this could create, if you will, second-class citizens in the European Union, even if that’s not the right term. We would have countries with full rights, and others who have to prove they are worthy of them. Do you think that creates any tension in the region where you live, and in other countries that may want to be on the EU track? Or is this something people are comfortable with?
Strahinja: I don’t think so. It might have been the case before — the perception was very prevalent. We engaged in advocacy by visiting 25 member states and speaking with their ministries, prime ministers, cabinets, and assemblies. At that time, the key concern was: what if this creates second-class membership? But we explained — and we’ve seen that our explanation worked — that it wouldn’t create second-class membership, for a couple of reasons. First, we wouldn’t have second-class citizens, because new member state citizens would have equal rights. Once Montenegro becomes, under these arrangements, the 28th member state, its citizens would have an EU passport of equal value to any other EU citizen. They would have access to all the programmes, the EU budget, the institutions, EU finances, and agencies. The only exception would be that the new member state would be required to temporarily renounce its veto rights. It would be a political compromise that would automatically expire — you wouldn’t be able to renew or extend it in the future. Second, we just had a discussion with civil society from Brussels and the Western Balkans, a couple of days ago, and I ran a poll asking the same question you did. Two-thirds argued that yes, temporarily limiting veto rights might indeed be a necessity, so we can avoid a member state or two vetoing the accession of a new member state. It’s important to remember that ratification needs to take place in all member states. In particular, France is important, since there is a requirement to have a referendum each time there is a new member state, or three-fifths approval in the Assembly. I can assure you that France is quite keen on those veto limitations, because it could be a strong selling point to its citizens and to policymakers — that a new member state would not risk turning into a new Hungary. To conclude, when I was visiting member state capitals, they were asking: what if it causes backlash among candidate countries? Well, we’ve seen that’s not the case. Edi Rama, the Prime Minister of Albania, essentially embraced the proposal, saying it doesn’t really matter if it’s five years or seven — it would be a guarantee that, over time, we get all rights, including veto rights. Macedonia expressed a similar view. Serbia was even constructively interested. Bosnia as well. I don’t have information about Kosovo, but it’s far down the line, given that its application is still in a drawer. So only Montenegro is a tough nut to crack — understandably so. But given the wider interest, it is expected that Montenegro shows some solidarity and understanding that this issue is very important, because it also buys the Union more time to continue its internal reforms while having newcomers on the inside. This way we prevent the scenario where the Union says: Montenegro, wait outside while we resolve our internal affairs. Taking everything together, citizens of new member states, even under this regime, would not feel any difference when it comes to the rights and obligations they would have as citizens of the Union. And that is very important.
Ricardo: Indeed. I’m going to take my privilege as podcast host and editorialise a little of my own opinion: I think we should get rid of the veto entirely and make it democratic — closer to what we see in traditional liberal-democratic Western countries. All right, let’s move to another topic where you’ve also done important work: clusters and chapters. It sounds like I’m presenting a book, but I’m not. Tell us why closing clusters instead of chapters matters.
Strahinja: That’s one of the ideas we also proposed recently. Of course, we’re not adamant that this will solve everything — but it came about as our attempt to streamline the entire process. There is a consensus that there are too many interim steps, and that member states are required to vote on each and every decision. When the revised methodology was introduced in 2020, instead of voting 35 times for each chapter, the opening stage was simplified, so member states now vote six times. Chapters were grouped into six thematic clusters. My proposed idea was: why not reduce the number of voting opportunities for the closing stage of the process as well? This way we would have six votes to open clusters and six votes to close them — 12 voting points instead of 35 plus 35, so 70 in total had we not had the revised methodology. So the idea was, on the one hand, to simplify and reduce the number of times a cluster or chapter is voted on. And on the other, to increase the political weight of each decision. Currently, in the case of Montenegro, Croatia is blocking a chapter due to some unresolved issues related to foreign policy. But if Croatia knew it would need to block an entire cluster, the weight of that decision would be much bigger. My argument was that member states who prioritise enlargement would be more incentivised to push that one country not to misuse its veto right. Of course, it’s not an ideal proposal. There are downsides too — for example, a country would need to wait longer for a cluster to be opened. Now, every other day, we hear that a chapter has been closed, because there are so many of them. So there are ups and downs, but this was part of creative thinking, really trying to answer the need to streamline the process. Of course, it requires a continuation of thinking. But the idea that is now even more important — and one we’ve argued for, along with some member states in their non-papers, such as Slovenia and Germany — is to introduce qualified majority voting for some interim steps of the accession process. We calculated that there are dozens and hundreds of steps. That’s really damaging and reduces the predictability of the negotiation process. This idea would, at least in the first stages of negotiations, avoid or reduce the risk of the process being misused by EU member states. And this is actually being considered. We saw Austria, for example, changing its mind. It was adamant on keeping its veto rights in the area of enlargement. Now it has endorsed this idea. So it’s not impossible, but it will take some time.
Ricardo: Strahinja, you’re so close to this process of seeing countries trying to fit the mould to get into the European Union, and to this very necessary debate on how to make it more streamlined. I think we may have a flurry of countries trying to join the European Union — from Norway to Iceland, naturally the Western Balkans, and some really fun conversations I see online about Canada. Who knows, maybe it can expand even more. So all the work you’re doing is not for nothing — there is a need to make things not only more transparent but also quicker.
Strahinja: Yes, Iceland is actually very important. In August, there will be a referendum on whether Iceland should resume its accession talks, which it froze more than 10 years ago. Now we have the European Commission saying that Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Iceland could be the next ones to join.
Ricardo: Exactly. Let’s see about Albania, though.
Strahinja: Yes, there are many issues, but let’s see what happens. With Iceland, this increases the willingness of EU citizens, I believe, to become more open to enlargement. That’s why they’re betting on Iceland — because it would give more weight to the EU itself, and show it’s a project that draws attention from so many different countries, from the north to the south of Europe. I hope Iceland gives a positive answer at the referendum.
Ricardo: Naturally. Now let’s end with your country. A couple of considerations — I’m not going to ask you to speak for all your fellow citizens on the political system, but what is needed to have Serbia also as a full member, in its own right, in the EU family?
Strahinja: The Union has been more than clear: if Serbia wishes to join, it can join. If Montenegro can do it, there is no reason why Serbia couldn’t. The only specificity is the foreign policy issue, which Montenegro has not had, including the Kosovo issue — the normalisation agreement. Even with those issues sticking out, the bigger problem is rule of law. It is quite evident — all the institutions have pointed this out, including European Commission reports, the European Parliament report. Even beyond EU institutions, the Council of Europe has produced reports with a unified view that Serbia is in a tough spot. I’m afraid we’re gearing up for an even worse situation, given that we have presidential and parliamentary elections ahead of us. Turbulent times are ahead. If the worst scenarios continue developing, we will miss the train. We will end up stuck together with North Macedonia, which is being unjustly vetoed by Bulgaria; with Kosovo, which doesn’t have a membership perspective; and with Bosnia, which is stuck for its own complex reasons. From the original idea of our president to have Open Balkans, we’ll end up being part of closed Balkans. This is very damaging, because Serbia is the biggest, most important country in the region. Whatever good or bad happens here will have positive or negative spillover effects across the region. So my prediction is that, moving forward, the closer Montenegro gets to Union membership, the more Serbia will become panicky and aggressive. We’ve already seen it becoming very aggressive vis-à-vis Montenegro, which actually demonstrates an envy of sorts — quite petty and unfortunate.
Ricardo: As you said, Serbia’s importance is significant. Serbia could be a great example, creating the regional dynamics needed to give the Western Balkans more direct and easier access. Unfortunately, we’re not there yet — but we hope things will change. Hope springs eternal. And with people like you doing such magnificent work, let’s see if we can also have that internal change. Strahinja, in these last few seconds, tell us where people can follow your work online. I’ll put the links in the podcast show notes. But where can people find you and CEP?
Strahinja: Thank you very much for the promotion. We have a great website — I invite your audience to visit: European Policy Centre Belgrade. We sometimes get mixed up with our Brussels colleagues, but we are in Belgrade. We also have our own podcast, European Talks.
Ricardo: Very good.
Strahinja: Today, for example, we have an event on the Council presidency handover. Listeners can find those on YouTube as well. We’re very present on all social media, including Instagram, and we publish our work in English. Although we’re based in Serbia, English is our working language, so we really try to make sure we reach a wide audience.
Ricardo: Well, you’re always welcome to come here and promote the podcast — that’s what we’re here for. But as I mentioned, I’ll put all the links in the podcast show notes, so people can follow the work being done by the Centre. Strahinja, this was great — for the second time. That’s a private joke. Thank you very much.
Strahinja: It’s my pleasure. I really enjoyed it.
Ricardo: Again, I commend the work you do, and I hope to have you back on the podcast soon — with not only more interesting conversations, but hopefully with good news too.
Strahinja: Yes, let’s hope.
Ricardo: So Strahinja, tell us a little about your background. What path did you take before I got you here on the podcast?
Strahinja: I’ve been around for at least 10 years, working at the European Policy Centre — having the pleasure to work at the best possible place for a political scientist in Belgrade. I say it’s the best possible place because, throughout the past decade, we’ve managed to build real bridges with Brussels and other EU capitals, and to translate our findings into concrete action. By combining research and advocacy, we see many of our ideas now floating around in EU circles and non-papers, but also in concrete policy development.
Ricardo: Where did your interest come from — to work in this area, particularly on Serbia in the European Union? Is it something that was always with you, or did it come later in life?
Strahinja: I think it’s been with me from the beginning, since the topic of EU membership has always been present in our public life. Since 2003, Serbia has had this prospect of EU membership, and all governments since then, to varying degrees, have had EU membership as strategic goal number one. But in practice, we’ve seen how far that goal has been and still is from being reached. That, of course, sparked my curiosity: why are we unable to reach the goal, even though it’s been declared the strategic priority of basically all our governments? That’s why I was curious about learning it from a theoretical, but also practical, perspective — and about seeing to what extent civil society actors like us can play a role without getting our hands dirty by entering the political sphere.
Ricardo: Why not? That’s the follow-up question immediately. Do you think you’re more valuable doing this kind of think tank work and research, or could we have you as an MEP for Serbia in the European Parliament?
Strahinja: That’s a good question. But as you know, Serbia is a hybrid regime with increasing autocratic tendencies. When you have an uneven playing field, rationality and fact-based policy development don’t really play a big role overall. I always place a strong emphasis on political science — I’m doing a PhD in political science. I thought entering civil society was the best fit for my character, abilities, and expertise. And I think I haven’t made a mistake.
Ricardo: Okay, we’ll be following your career closely here on the podcast.