How could the EU be a strong security player? – Conversation with Dr Gerlinde Niehus
Over-fragmentation of the European defense market is a major issue that weakens the EU’s military capabilities and efficiency. The EU […]
Over-fragmentation of the European defense market is a major issue that weakens the EU’s military capabilities and efficiency. The EU […]
Over-fragmentation of the European defense market is a major issue that weakens the EU’s military capabilities and efficiency. The EU countries have too many different weapon systems, national procurement processes, and military standards, making interoperability difficult and reducing cost-effectiveness.
To be a stronger security player, the EU must reduce fragmentation, develop a more unified defense market and significantly increase defense investments to provide at least half of NATO’s conventional capabilities.
In the new episode of the Liberal Europe Podcast, our host, Ricard Silvestre (Movimento Liberal Social), speaks with Dr. Gerlinde Niehus, an independent NATO and international security expert, about NATO’s evolving role in European defense, the EU’s military ambitions, and the ongoing threat posed by Putin’s Russia.
This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with Movimento Liberal Social and Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.
Play the episode on Spotify or SoundCloud, or read the full transcript below.
Also a big thank you to our friends at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that provides uncensored, trusted news to audiences in 23 countries where a free press is under threat, and with a number of award-winning journalists in its team, the Georgian service of RFE/RL, Tavisupleba [meaning`Freedom` in Georgian], provides politically and financially independent journalism. They did a wonderful job in welcoming us to their studio and let us record with their equipment.
Welcome to the Liberal Europe Podcast. I’m your host, Ricard Silvestre, and thank you so much for listening to today’s episode, continuing our series of conversations to start to 2025 with influential people. It is my great privilege to bring you today Dr. Gerlinde Niehus. Dr. Niehus is now an independent NATO and international security expert and before that she was a Deputy Director, Defence and security cooperation at NATO. I’ve been trying to get Dr. Niehus on the podcast for some time now, as we have been crossing paths, often being on ELF events, all the party meetings, Freedom Game in Lodz.
And this time we were able to make it happen during the Black Sea Security Conference organised by our friends from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, South Caucasus, also the Europe Georgia Institute and the Conrad Adenauer foundation in South Caucasus. Regular listeners of this podcast know that we had two very important conversations on that event, particularly with members of civil society in Georgia that are fighting for democracy and freedom in their country.
But for this conversation, Dr. Niehus and I go into the role of NATO on European and European Union security. How can a European Union security force relate to NATO? And also, how to deal with threats of Putin’s Russia. I take this opportunity again to thank Radio Liberty in Tbilisi for allowing me to use their facilities, but also our friends from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, South Caucasus, and from the Europe Georgia Institute, part of the ELF family. You guys are doing a tremendous job. Keep it up. And that’s our main conversation. Please stay to know a little more about the path that Dr. Niehus took before we had it in the podcast. But now, with no further ado, it is my privilege to bring you Dr. Gerlinde Niehus.
I’m here with Dr. Gerlinde Niehus. Dr. Niehus, thank you so much for coming to the podcast. It’s a pleasure.
Thanks for having me.
Oh, it’s great to have you here. And I must say to our audience, I’ve been trying to get you into the podcast for some time now, but finally it happened. It happened here in beautiful Tbilisi, where we are at the Black Sea Security Conference. You just came out of your panel participation, which was brilliant. One of the arguments that you made on the panel that you were, it has to do with Russia and the way that Russia, and particularly Russia under Putin, watches this processes of countries trying to join the European Union, trying to join NATO and how then he reacts to that in particular ways where he tries to destabilise those countries. Please go a little bit into that.
Thank you. I think Putin is waging an open war against Ukraine, but he is waging a shadow war against many other countries, meaning NATO countries, EU countries. And in many ways, I think we often, also our political leaders, are often misunderstanding Putin because they think he is operating on an escalation. De-escalation letter. He’s not. He respects strength and he exploits weaknesses. So wherever he sees weaknesses, that’s where they are going, that’s where his regime is going and he is widening them. He is derailing our nations, he is exploiting our internal divisions, he is trying to foster them. So in that sense, it’s opportunistic, if you wish. I think that’s the starting point and that in my mind, needs to the need of changing the strategic approach.
We need to get away from the current escalation avoidance strategy, or escalation avoidance practise we have seen over the past years to really formulate a coherent containment strategy against Russia, because only that will be something which ultimately will make a difference, and which will have an impact.
And that brings us to the speed of processes, because one thing that you mentioned was the lack of vision more in the political action that resulted on the Bucharest conference in April 2008, where some overtures were made and then they will never, until now, they haven’t been materialised. So tell us a little bit, how can we have this soft spot between the speed of processes to have this family grow and at the same time to have it grow in a very sustainable and strong way?
Look, the topic of today’s morning’s conference was to talk about enlargement as a security tool. NATO has used that tool in past decades, be this in the Black Sea region, but also in other regions. Also, because the countries concerned first and foremost wanted to come under the NATO umbrella. So, it’s not that we obliged them to join, it was them wanting to join. And it was largely done, I think, also from an understanding of geostrategic thinking, because in international power relations, there is no such thing as a vacuum. When you leave a vacuum or a grey zone or a vacuum, somebody else will fill it.
So, coming back to what you referred to, 2008 NATO’s Bucharest summit, in light of the diverging views within NATO, but also in light of a furious President Putin present in Bucharest at a time NATO did not decide to give the Membership Action Plan for eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine, but rather decided to say Georgia and Ukraine will become NATO members of the alliance, with the Membership Action Plan being the next step but the summit declaration never said when this step would actually be taken.
So ultimately what we ended up with is that we signalled to those nations the carrot: you will become a member. And that motivated them, clearly, although at Bucharest it also heavily disappointed them. But perhaps more importantly, we signalled to Putin that, okay, we’re going to bring them under the NATO umbrella at a foreseeable future which we do not define. But in the meantime, they are out there, and you get ample opportunity to mess with them. And he took the opportunity, and he messed with them. And he continues to mess with them. So, I think we have to see the Russia-Georgia war from 2008, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and ultimately also now the full out war of Russia against Ukraine in this perspective. So again, he is exploiting the weaknesses, the unwillingness to be decisive in his favour.
And against that background, as I’m speaking in a personal capacity, absolutely. I’m one of those – I’m not the only one – but I am one of those advocating for inviting Ukraine to start accession talks. Accession talks. I think it’s long overdue because that would be not only a very good signal to the Ukrainians because it would show them that we do believe in their Euro-Atlantic future. It would be an even better signal to President Putin.
Also, you mentioned something that I want to bring to our conversation, which is banging the drum and this is an expression of yours, I’m stealing your expression here, which is to give the conditions needed for Ukraine to win the war and not just only survive. And then you went into a domino effect. So please get into that.
Yes, I mean, Ukraine is, for many years, nearly decades, I would say, very close to my heart because I’ve been working with Ukraine also before I joined NATO in my European Commission incarnation. So, I remember Ukraine struggling with all these reforms and various orientations. So, to come to the current situation, since the war broke out in February 2022, allies and many partners organised in this Ramstein Group under the leadership of the US have certainly given unprecedented levels of support to Ukraine, military support, also economic support from the European Union in order to allow Ukraine to continue fighting. Having said that, it kept Ukraine in the fight, but at the same time, these countries, these coalition partners, have not given Ukraine enough to really win the war on its own territory. So, in many ways what has happened is that the international community has given too little and too late.
And what they are given is then often linked to all sorts of caveats. The weapons they are given to Ukraine, the Ukrainians can’t use as they deem fit because donors connect them to certain conditions. In my mind, if a weapon has been given to Ukraine, this becomes a Ukrainian property, a Ukrainian weapon. So, Ukraine should be in a position to decide how to use it. And Ukraine has made it clear ever so often that they will do this according to international law. And Ukraine also attacking military targets in Russia is covered by international law. A country being attacked as Russia is attacking Ukraine has the right to defend itself. And that right to defend itself alone or with partners, does not stop at the border. So, it can also target the aggressor in the areas from where the aggressor stems. So, where they have their missile bases, where they have the ammunition depots, where they have logistic hubs, etc. These are legitimate targets. In my mind, what we are doing is we give Ukraine these tools, but then we tie both of their hands behind their back and say, well, now you try to use them, which is, in my mind, well, counterproductive.
But the broader situation, I think, or the broader question is, I think of strategic relevance, because if we are ending in a situation where Russia wins this war, and that is by no means out of the possible, if Russia were to win this war, the level of insecurity this would trigger not only for Ukraine but then also across the globe, will be, well, of a historic dimension. So, I think in many of our nations, I don’t think that there is sufficient realisation of what’s at stake here. I mean, we really have a historical constellation here where we must do everything, we can to allow Ukraine to win, because that will be such a win-win for all of us.
As an expert, and this is, I share your frustration because it’s not only we’re not giving enough weapons, but when we give them, as you mentioned, they have to be used in a certain way, while Russia does not respect the same rules and attacks from their side of the border. And then when we say to Ukrainians, well, you cannot hit those targets, I’m like, it’s quite an imbalance here. But with that, with all this consensus, because I follow a lot of European and US media, the consensus that we have to do this, which is to give the weapons and have, as you said very correctly, so the Ukrainians, once they have their weapons, it’s their weapons. We don’t have to worry that Russia will retaliate against NATO because it’s not NATO weapons anymore, it’s not NATO actions. Why don’t we see that happen? Why is this resistance of, for example, leaders in Europe? I see some of not going then of this win-win scenario that you mentioned. What is your assessment on this?
Well, if I put it in very simple terms, is because too many of our political leaders are afraid. We are lacking courage, we are lacking determination, we are lacking somebody of the calibre of a Churchill,
Because there is the argument about the economic relationship and in Georgia, and that is a factor for them. But for example, we saw Germany trying to decouple, we see the Eastern Europe trying to decouple. So unless it’s that and that no leader wants to have their name as the person that triggered some kind of mass death conflict. But on the other hand, do we see really Russia doing that? Because they’ve been threatening that for like two years now. Oh, if you do this, we will use nuclear bombs if you do that. And then it never comes through.
As you say, so far nothing has happened. Russia, at least that’s all the signs and indicators which are observable, is provoking NATO is trying to exploit the weaknesses we refer to is trying to destabilise. But there is no intent to openly attack any NATO nation for now. So, I think that’s to be borne in mind. But again, I think we’re coming back to this escalation avoidance practise which we have seen over the past years, and the need to shift to a coherent containment strategy.
So I think that’s to be borne in mind. But again, I think we’re coming back to this escalation avoidance practice which we have seen over the past years, and the need to shift to a coherent containment strategy.
And with that, I mean that we need to, at least from a NATO angle, we would need to see what is required from our defence, deterrence and defence posture. Certainly a further investment, a further solidification, further investment in defence, a further investment in boosting resilience of NATO nations. And resilience then also concerns things like critical infrastructure, resilience against disinformation, resilience against sabotage, resilience against economic coercion.
Yeah, as well. And indeed, we should try to push countries which are still dependent on Russian economic ties further away from them. This can never be black or white, it will always be many shades of grey, but we should at least try to go in this direction. So, the whole area of defence and deterrence needs to be looked into there.
But then also areas such as NATO’s, if you wish, partnership work, cooperative security needs to be looked at. In which way can we more strategically approach our partnership, NATO’s partnership relations?
Give you one example, Russia is not only a threat from the east, Russia is equally a threat from the south, because Russia is very present in Africa as it’s China.
Exactly, the Global South.
Yeah, the Global South. So be, in my mind, together with the EU, much more present in the Global South in order to engage those countries there. NATO has currently cooperation programmes out of the 54 African countries. We have cooperation programmes of more an intensive nature with 2 out of 54. So that’s why I’m saying if we want to have a strategic approach, this would look different, not two. So cooperative security would need to really be seen as a crisis prevention, which could be the key form of the key purpose. But you don’t do crisis prevention if you do it too piecemeal.
And then of course, we would need to also see that we bring the cooperation with the EU to a further level of even higher quality. That also requires political leadership, because clearly there are diverging memberships on both sides. NATO, Turkey, the EU, Greece and Cyprus. Those countries are typically those who are putting sands in the wheels.
Indeed.
So, it would require some creativity to say, well, what is it required to overcome these cooperation blocks which we constantly run against? And I really hope that the new NATO Secretary General and reappointed Commission President von der Leyen, will take this on as one of their key jobs. So, just to say, if we want to have a coherent containment strategy, we need to really think about it strategically and not piecemeal.
And you just mentioned the President of the EU Commission, and it’s quite interesting because you’re mentioning increasing resilience, increasing the capability of deterrence. How do you see, as an expert that was so closely associated to NATO, this race now from the European Union to be more militarily powerful, like, for example, joint procurements for military material or, for example, an EU army? What is your feeling on that?
Look, I think from the NATO side, there is a lot to go in favour of having a more robust European defence and security capability, if you wish. Having said that, I think we also need to get some of the basics. We need to just remember it’s been agreed between both the EU and NATO that NATO is the cornerstone for collective defence of nations belonging to both organisations. So, the EU, I think, has to then think in terms of what would a higher degree of or more responsibility in defence and security mean from the European side in complementarity and as added value to what will be done by NATO under the collective defence mandate.
But there are certainly areas, important areas, where the EU has a role to play, just to mention a few. We touched upon the resilience aspect which is arguably a whole of society endeavour. And the EU has many areas which can feed into that. The aspect of military mobility. The EU has the tools and the funds to really get that to new levels of relevance. And we do need it, because if we need to deploy forces to the east, we need to make sure that these forces are actually getting there.
So that means the bridges which troops have to go need to be strong enough so that heavy tanks can cross them. Railways need to be in such a way that trains can carry heavy equipment. The same goes for streets. Communication systems need to be secure. Command and control systems need to be effective under heavy cyber attacks. There is a lot which is connected to mobility which the EU could do a lot.
When it comes to the area of, let’s say, procurement in the broadest sense, the EU can give incentives and also frame, if you wish, the defence industry market to move away from the strong fragmentation of the European defence market.
Because fragmentation of the defence market also means that we are losing efficiency. We have too many weapon systems, especially in comparison to the US and the more weapon systems we have, the more complicated is interoperability. The higher production costs are normally, so getting more away from the fragmentation. I’m not saying going to a monopoly, that’s not the point. But avoiding the over-fragmentation of the EU defence market and then first and foremost simply also invest more in conventional capabilities. I mean the current situation is that non EU allies are investing close to 80% of NATO’s defence expenditures. Close to 80%. From these close to 80%, 67 come from the US followed by the UK and Turkey. So I think the benchmark in my mind for the EU, and that’s not only me saying this, is also set by probably much more senior people, Former Deputy Sec. Gen Alexander Vershbow and others.
So I think what the EU should aim for as a benchmark is to invest in having at least half of the capabilities, the conventional capabilities which are required to meet a peer adversary, that is Russia, and invest in the military capabilities which are required to handle crisis management operations in the European near abroad, I mean Western Balkans for example, but ultimately also a situation such as Ukraine.
And so far the EU is, EU member states or European member states, are far away from that capability.
Also, you dip your toe by invitation more into the political realm. You and I, we were in the same room for a workshop that was promoted by the ALDE Party to prepare for the manifesto for the European Union elections. How much that interests you, how much that takes of your time to think more like in a political way for, for example, a political family like the Liberals and Democrats?
Look, I mean, I’m a convinced transatlanticist, but at the same time, I’m a very convinced European. One thing doesn’t exclude the other. So, I’m all in favour of Europe, the European Union for that matter, taking up more responsibility for its security. But—there’s always a but—but it needs to be done in complementarity with NATO, so that it is a win-win for both organisations and not a situation where we end up competing. This is nothing we can afford, this is nothing we should do because both institutions share the same values and principles. We are in this together. So, I think we have to forge this strategic unity and I think we have made immense progress over the last years, but we have a way to go.
You’re now a free agent, you’re in the market. So, tell us where can people just follow your work and who knows, maybe some requests for contributions on your near future. I’m sure you’re going to keep banging the drum for more time now.
Yeah, I mean, I will try my best to push the agenda in what I believe in the direction it needs to go. Currently, the easiest way to get in touch with me is via LinkedIn or Facebook, but I’m mainly active also with sharing content on LinkedIn, so that’s the easiest way. In the near future there will be a dedicated website, but that’s work in progress.
Very good. I’m going to put these links on the podcast show notes, so that people can continue to follow your work and then when the website is active, join you there also.
I’ve been talking with Dr. Gerlinda Neues. Finally I have you on the podcast and it was as good as advertised. Thank you so much for spending some time with me.
Thanks for having. And it was a very good conversation. Thank you.
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Tell us a little bit about yourself. What was the path that you took to the point that we’re now talking on the podcast here in Tbilisi?
Yeah, thanks. Look, I’ve been at NATO for 25 years, so until very recently, so I was considered amongst the resident dinosaurs, if I can use this term. But at NATO I had various very different incarnations. I mean, for the five past years I was in charge of the practical cooperation with partner countries, clearly commencing with Ukraine, also Ukraine at war which clearly complicated the cooperation, but in many ways added its urgency.
Georgia clearly is one of the key partners there and many others. So that was what I did in the past five years, largely in that directorate for Defence and Security Corporation where I’ve been the Deputy Director for the past five years.
And then in earlier incarnations in NATO. I was in charge of NATO’s cooperation with civil society, meaning then also institutions such as a broad variety of think tanks, universities, NGOs, both in NATO nations and in partner countries that also brought me to Georgia and Ukraine and many other countries.
So I did that for a number of years and prior to that I was responsible for, if you wish, NATO’s public communication to audiences worldwide. So that included the website and its various products on the website, NATO Review, an online magazine, the NATO Handbook and many also publications at a time.
So anyhow, each job very, very busy, busy jobs with a full agenda.
And before Joining NATO in 99, in the past century, I was for close to eight years at the European Commission in largely in two areas. In the external relations area, in the context of the EU’s relations with the then newly independent states, and then in the area of telecommunications, new media, information society, so very, very distinct areas in the European Commission.
So altogether, I mean, I have a background in international relations, so international policy is kind of my DNA and international security has become my DNA.
So that’s in a nutshell about me.
This is all for now. I’ll be back soon with more podcasts. You can always visit the website liberalforum.eu to know more about the activities of the European Liberal Forum. Until the next episode, let’s keep making the world a better place.