What should we know ahead of the 2027 presidential election in France? What topics will likely dominate the political debate ahead […]
What should we know ahead of the 2027 presidential election in France? What topics will likely dominate the political debate ahead of the election? What has recently changed in terms of Marine Le Pen’s candidacy for the president? Where does the enormous support base for the Rassemblement National come from? And what is the legacy of President Emmanuel Macron?
Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Blanche Leridon, Director of French Studies at Institut Montaigne, specializing in democratic and institutional issues. Tune in the for their talk!
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Leszek: Hello, this is Leszek Jażdżewski, welcome to Liberal Europe. Today we are going to talk about the French presidential elections and French politics. And I have a great guest today to discuss those issues: Blanche Leridon, Director of French Studies at Institut Montaigne, specialising in democratic and institutional issues and one of France’s leading political commentators. Welcome very much to Liberal Europe.
Blanche: Hi, good afternoon, and thank you very much for your invitation.
Leszek: I was hoping we might have a sort of turning point in the French saga of whether or not Le Pen is going to be a candidate. But I think the verdict of the French court was a little bit of a surprise — perhaps not the verdict itself, but the fact that Le Pen is actually running. Can you tell us more about what happened and why it is important that, after all, she is heading the nationalists in the elections?
Blanche: Yes, it was indeed a big surprise here in France. A big surprise, but at the same time, it was the real start of the presidential campaign for 2027. Let me say a few words about the Court of Appeals ruling, because the court found her guilty of the same charges as the lower court. She is still convicted for embezzlement. However, it reduced her sentence in light of, and I quote, “the voters’ freedom of choice” — shifting the responsibility back to her to decide whether or not to run for president. And she decided that she would run. The key to this decision is that the Court of Appeals decided to reduce her ineligibility. So because her ineligibility has been reduced, she can run for the presidency. She decided quickly — she announced it the very same day as the Court of Appeals decision, on the TF1 evening news. Yeah, this was a surprise, because we were all thinking that her protégé, Jordan Bardella, was going to run for the presidency for the party. There was this little music in the French public debate. We were sure that it was the end of Marine Le Pen. But she didn’t say her last words. Actually, she built a new narrative around her candidacy — like a martyr candidate, a phoenix rising from the ashes, returning like a redeemed Christ. It’s really visible in her slogan, which is Renaissance, and in her campaign poster — she wants to embody this kind of martyr candidate. The campaign has really started, and it’s going to be super interesting to follow here in France.
Leszek: Blanche, I think it’s not very clear for people who might not be watching French politics as closely as you are: how come Le Pen — a name that used to be an outcast in French presidential elections — even though she got over 40% last time, is now the favourite, at least in the first round? Whatever polls we can trust that far from elections, which will be in April and May, it’s quite a surprise that the nationalists are now, if you will, de-diabolised or detoxified — that she is really in a position to win those elections. What happened in the last five years to put her in such a position?
Blanche: Actually, I think we have to be honest: the rise of national-populist parties is not a French exception. It would be unfair to lay the blame solely at Emmanuel Macron. If you look at the UK, at Italy, Germany, or even Poland, national-populist ideas are gaining ground everywhere in Europe. This trend, especially in France, is fuelled by deep-seated anxieties — economic worries, inflation, a sense of social decline, and the fear that our children will live worse lives than we did. There is also this growing feeling of global insecurity, including the risk of war, with everything that’s happening in Iran and in Ukraine. When people are afraid, they naturally turn to anti-system parties, because those parties offer simple, ready-made answers. This is especially the case with the National Rally, because they haven’t governed in the last 20 years. So for a large part of the public opinion in France, they are the last chance, and people want to try them. They will say: all the others failed before them, so why don’t we try the National Rally? That’s a key way to explain their popularity. There is also another thing. Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella now form a ticket, which is quite new in French politics, because presidential campaigns are usually all about one man — this idea of a meeting between the man and the people. A part of the French population is tired of this, after 10 years of Emmanuel Macron and his Jupiterianism, his way of behaving as president. Now there is a duo, a couple embodied by Marine Le Pen on one hand and her protégé Jordan Bardella on the other. And they are really complementary. Marine Le Pen is more statist and more appealing to social voters, to middle-class voters. Jordan Bardella embodies something else — more liberal on the economy, pro-business, and more attractive in the economic environment. So they both form a really appealing duo for a large part of the French population. This explains why, even though Marine Le Pen has been convicted — and we know it can be a risky bet to run for president when you are convicted — and even though Bardella is really young (let’s recall, he is only 30, has never been a minister, and has never held any important public function), they are still the most popular political figures in the polls. Just after the court gave its conclusion last week, it was incredible: the day after, when you looked at the polls, Marine Le Pen was between 36 and 39%. That is huge — she has never been as high in the polls as she is after the sentence of the Court of Appeals. So this has had absolutely no negative effect for the moment. It’s really important to recall that a presidential campaign is very long. It’s a marathon, and everything can happen. We know that in France, because we have a rich history with this, and it never happens quite as we imagine. But at this precise moment, they have never been this high in the polls.
Leszek: It’s worth also talking about the other contenders. At this moment, I think Jean-Luc Mélenchon on the far left was the first one to start, some time ago, with a huge rally. At least for now, he was polled second, but below 20%, I think, most of the time. There’s Édouard Philippe on the centre-right, and Gabriel Attal, who I think is behind him in most polls. Bruno Retailleau from Les Républicains. Raphaël Glucksmann on the moderate left. And I think we can expect many more candidates to emerge. Broadly speaking, who do you think might have a chance to become the main contender against Le Pen? And is it not, in a way, working in her favour that she faces such a divided crowd of politicians who cannot unite against her? Or do you think it might be that, for now, everyone is against Macron as long as he’s still there, but after some time it will become everyone against Le Pen again? How do you see this presidential campaign developing over the next few months?
Blanche: As you just said, the starting line is crowded — perhaps more crowded than at any point in recent memory. Across the political spectrum, we have between 30 and 40 contenders positioning themselves. They are testing messages, holding rallies, publishing books. So it’s really a messy and crowded starting line. But in today’s fragmented political landscape, there is one assumption increasingly shared across the political spectrum: the National Rally is expected to reach the second round of the presidential election. So the strategic question for almost every other political actor is no longer whether the National Rally will be present in the second round, but who will face it. There are many hypotheses. On the left, the challenge remains fragmentation. Jean-Luc Mélenchon continues to dominate the political space to the left, and remains the only candidate with a clearly defined political machine and programme. As you said, he is polling between 12 and 15%. He has a level of organisational discipline that his competitors often lack. The rest of the left remains trapped in an endless debate about unity. Nearly a dozen potential candidates are currently manoeuvring for position, and there is a growing impression of confusion on the left at a moment when clarity is desperately needed. The centre also faces its own dilemma, because there are two contenders — two former prime ministers of Emmanuel Macron: Gabriel Attal and Édouard Philippe. Both men are products of the Macron years, yet neither wishes to campaign as Macron’s direct heir. They are trying to strike a delicate balance: benefiting from the experience and credibility gained in government, while distancing themselves from the weariness and fatigue associated with a decade of Macronism. Gabriel Attal presents himself as a candidate of generational renewal, while Philippe seeks to embody experience, stability, and presidential stature in an increasingly turbulent world. So it’s really hard at this stage to say who will be in the second round with Marine Le Pen, if it goes that way. But what we can say is that the multiplication of candidates reflects what might be called the Macron precedent — the belief that a determined outsider can still emerge, disrupt the established order, and capture the presidency, as Macron’s victory did in 2017. That continues to shape political imagination, and it encourages ambitious figures across the spectrum, because they all think they can do it themselves, without a party, without being elected. This is why we have so many candidates. This won’t hold for the whole campaign. At some point it will become clearer, and we won’t have 30 or 40 candidates. But at the moment, the programmes that are clearest and the candidates that are best backed by their teams are Jean-Luc Mélenchon and La France Insoumise on one side, and the National Rally on the other. The National Rally embodies unity, while every other party is stuck with the poison of division. So the key word for the next few weeks is going to be “union”: union on the traditional left, union in the centre, union on the right — to have one defined candidate able to win against Marine Le Pen in the second round. But again, it’s a presidential campaign. Everything can happen. This is just my comment at this key moment. Everything, even on the Le Pen side, can evolve one way or another in the coming weeks and months.
Leszek: It seems very much that the radical right and radical left are focused on the campaign, while the centre-right and the left are focused on themselves. I don’t think that’s really helping. You mentioned briefly the issues, or at least the social interests, that favour the emergence of the populist nationalists as a leading force. In your opinion, what will be the leading issues of the campaign? We’ve seen, for example, the recent heat wave become an issue of discussion within the presidential campaign. But I’m sure there are some deeper concerns — affordability, or the pension system. What do you think will be the defining issues, and how favourable is it for the National Rally to position itself on those particular issues?
Blanche: I think purchasing power will be a key topic for this election, because it is both a really domestic topic and one linked to the geopolitical situation — and I think the French people understand this very well. We cannot separate what is happening on the domestic side from what is happening on the international stage. We always say international affairs don’t count in a presidential election, and that French people care about what’s happening in the country. I don’t think that will be true for this election, because French people understand that what is happening in Iran, what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz, has an impact on their purchasing power, on their capacity to go on holiday, and on other things. So purchasing power, with this dual explanation — national on the one hand, international on the other — will be absolutely key. And this may be a difficulty for the National Rally, because even though they are really popular, they are weaker on questions of international affairs. We still have in mind the proximity between Marine Le Pen and Vladimir Putin, and her proximity with Russia. That is really not popular in French public opinion. And she doesn’t have the international posture that someone like Raphaël Glucksmann or Édouard Philippe can have. So this is maybe a weak point in her candidacy. Other topics: purchasing power is absolutely key, as I said. Then there is the healthcare system. How do we finance our healthcare system? How can we address new challenges like an ageing population? This is going to be absolutely key. And of course, pension reform. It was a key topic during the two terms of Emmanuel Macron, but it hasn’t been resolved. French people know that, and they know we have to find a solution because the system is not affordable at all. So this will be a huge topic in the campaign. And it’s also a potential weak point for the National Rally, because Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella were not perfectly aligned on this question, and it was heavily commented on in France before the Court of Appeals decision. Jordan Bardella said in the press that he was in favour of scrapping the retirement age, and in favour of a more flexible system. That is really different from Marine Le Pen’s position, which is 60 or 62 for the retirement age. So there is going to be some debate inside the National Rally on this topic, and I think they will have to reach a conclusion quickly, because it will be a key topic in the campaign.
Leszek: You wrote yourself in Decoding France — the column you write monthly for Institut Montaigne — that whoever might win the presidential elections might not actually be able to govern France, because you still need a majority in parliament. And we’ve seen recently, that’s not very easy to get. First of all, how do you see this developing? And second, assuming the favourite wins, how likely is it that she will introduce her programme? Because she has been quite radical — at least in terms of the European stage, she wants to cut French contributions and make France a net recipient of funds. She’s not going to cooperate on many issues. She wants preference for French people over European citizens inside France. She wants preference for French industry over other products. It doesn’t seem compatible with EU law. And I wonder about the domestic agenda as well. How likely is she to introduce her programme, and where do you see the most radical possible challenges to the status quo?
Blanche: As you said, in today’s fragmented political landscape, victory in the presidential election may settle only part of the question. The legislative elections that follow could prove just as consequential in determining whether the next president will actually have the means to govern. Since 2022 — and this was worsened in 2024 — we no longer have an absolute majority in parliament in France. That is really new. During the Fifth Republic, we almost always had an absolute majority for either the president or the prime minister when it was cohabitation time. So this is a really key moment for 2027. Today, France is split into three, maybe four distinct political blocs: the sovereignist far-right bloc led by the National Rally and its allies; the left-wing coalition, which is now really divided between the moderate left and the radical left embodied by Jean-Luc Mélenchon; and lastly, the centre-right centrist bloc. There is no reason — if the French people have to vote again for legislative elections in a year — that this distribution would totally change. Regarding the National Rally, if they win the presidency in 2027, and even if they also have an absolute majority — because everything is possible, as you said — many of the things they propose in their programme are against our European commitments, and even against our own constitution. So they would need to reform our constitution. And we know this is really hard under the Fifth Republic. You don’t change the constitution that easily. It’s going to be a huge challenge for them if they want to add national priority into the constitution. They will have to do it by referendum. And it is absolutely not certain that the French people will adopt such an important text. So there are many question marks. Are they going to behave like Giorgia Meloni — meaning being gentle with Europe, trying to embrace a more normal kind of policymaking? Or are they going to become radicalised if they have power and an absolute majority? It’s really hard to answer at this time, because the programme of the National Rally hasn’t been published yet. Because of the uncertainty over whether it would be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella running as the candidate, there is no programme for the moment. It will be easier to answer when the programme is published, and then we will be able to say how difficult it will be to implement it in the country.
Leszek: As we’re getting to the end of the podcast, I wanted to ask you about the legacy of outgoing President Emmanuel Macron. I think he might be remembered as a reformist who partially failed to reform France, but also as the person who opened the gates for the Rassemblement National and nationalist rule in France — the person who destroyed the existing political system and replaced it with his own movement. That movement might not survive him at all. How do you think the French will remember Emmanuel Macron?
Blanche: This question of legacy is absolutely key, and I think the president is obsessed with it. There are two ways to address it. First is his promise of breaking traditional partisan divides. What is happening 10 years after this promise? Things have changed, but not exactly the way people expected. His presidency certainly weakened the traditional left and the traditional right — you can see it in the polls today. But to be fair, they were already declining. Macron just accelerated a political realignment that we also see elsewhere in Europe. As I said, the real turning point was 2022, and then 2024, with the disappearance of the absolute majority in parliament and the major gridlock. Unfortunately for him, that snap election — and this understandable decision he made in 2024 — will remain in his legacy. But there is another way to answer your question, more in terms of political legacy. Emmanuel Macron is obsessed with two dimensions: innovation and European sovereignty. On the international stage — France recently hosted the G7 Summit in Avignon, which was an opportunity for him to recall his commitment to major issues like strategic autonomy, European defence, and the need for greater continental resilience. So the European sovereignty piece, being really present in international affairs, is absolutely key for Emmanuel Macron. This is a block that works for him. There is the same desire to shape his legacy in another aspect, which is more about the competitiveness of France and the attractiveness of the country. I mentioned the G7, but there was another key moment this year — the tenth year of his presidency: the Choose France Summit. Choose France is an initiative created by Emmanuel Macron during his first mandate. It was held at Versailles in early June. Few initiatives encapsulate Macronism more clearly than Choose France, because it is a pro-business showcase designed to attract foreign investment and project an image of economic openness. By that measure, the policy has delivered tangible results — France has become Europe’s leading destination for foreign direct investment. Even many of Macron’s critics acknowledge the success of this aspect of his record. This year, the president announced a record 93 billion euros in investment commitments. But to conclude, on economic issues the record is much more mixed. Unemployment is on the rise in France. He has failed to reform the pension system, as we just said. And most importantly, public deficits and debts have reached record levels. Many other challenges await the next president: an ageing population, education, access to healthcare. It’s a mixed legacy — but he still has 10 months.
Leszek: All right, I think that’s a good place to end. I think Macron’s perspective will very much be shaped by whoever becomes president after him. We’re going to see, and perhaps discuss this many more times in the future. Thank you so much for being with us at Liberal Europe today.
Blanche: Thank you for your invitation. It was a pleasure to have this discussion.
Leszek: Thank you, our listeners. This is all for today. Please tune in for Ricardo and Sebastian next week. Until then, goodbye.