How is a waning liberal order shifting the ground beneath Europe’s feet?What does Russia’s aggressive revisionism mean for the future […]
How is a waning liberal order shifting the ground beneath Europe’s feet?What does Russia’s aggressive revisionism mean for the future of European security?How is Turkey leveraging cooptation to play global powers against each other?Can Europe successfully navigate an increasingly intense strategic and economic rivalry with China?
Leszek Jazdzewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks with Dimitar Bechev, the Director of the Dahrendorf Programme at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, as well as Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe. His latest book is “The Scramble for Europe: Russia, China, and Turkey Challenging Regional Order” (Oxford University Press, 2026). Tune in for their talk!
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Watch the video of the conversation: youtu.be/Cm6X9RyBiso
This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with the Movimento Liberal Social and the Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.
Leszek: Hello, this is Leszek Jażdżewski. Welcome back to Liberal Europe. I’m very glad that today we will discuss the whole European project, but especially the peripheries and the challenges to the European order. I have a great guest today and a good friend as well: Dr. Dimitar Bechev, a Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe, where he focuses on EU enlargement, the Western Balkans, Russia, and the Black Sea. He is also the director of the programme on Europe in a Changing World at the European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He has written many books, including the one that just came out: The Scramble for Europe: Russia, China, and Turkey Challenging Regional Order. Dimitar, very welcome to Liberal Europe.
Dimitar: Thank you for having me here, Leszek.
Leszek: So let’s start with the nature of the challenge you are describing. What are the challenges? Because there are different challenges that Russia, China, and Turkey pose to Europe and the regional order.
Dimitar: You’re right that there are challenges in different ways. But maybe before I get to the challenge, briefly, let me explain to listeners what I mean by regional order — and I promise I won’t be too academic about it. The European regional order is obviously a subset of what people have been writing about as the liberal international order. It’s based on American hegemony, and on the idea of open borders, democracy, and multilateral institutions. But there are some specifics about Europe. First, the boundary between international politics and domestic politics in Europe is blurred because of European integration. What happens in Brussels has a knock-on effect domestically, and what happens in one member state spills over to another. Second, this order is expansionist. People in Poland and Bulgaria — where I come from — Norway, and Ukraine do this as well. Once you’re a neighbour, there is this magnetic effect. It spills over because you have an interest to gain access to the institutions and resources. And on the power side, you have an interest to have a say in how those decisions are made. That’s pretty distinctive about Europe. Now, all three players we mentioned started off in the post-Cold War era as either benign or co-optable into this order. Turkey is the best example, because it was seeking membership and was really serious about it in the 2000s. Russia had a modus vivendi with the European order — you could see its role as a partner, on its own terms of course, but not as an adversary. And China was benefiting from trade and from integration in the global economy, and specifically with Europe. Now fast-forward to where we are today, and you see those three pushing against various aspects of the order — or all the aspects, in the case of Russia. Russia wants to smash this thing apart, essentially. It wants Europe as EU, NATO, and the rest of the institutions to disappear. It might not have the capacity, but it has the will and the intention. China wants to diminish Europe and to co-opt it, to make it dependent economically and to a lesser degree politically. And Turkey is very different — and there is quite a bit of pushback by Turkish colleagues at putting them in the same bracket. But Turkey doesn’t sign up to the European script anymore, definitely not in domestic politics. Externally, it wants a better deal. It wants to renegotiate the deal it has with Europe. It wants better access, it wants to be treated as equal — not unlike Russia in the good old days. So Europe used to believe that the world could be changed in its own image. But more and more, certainly after the last decade, it has found itself in the receiving position. It’s defending, trying to sustain what it already has. And it has three or more players playing against it. Maybe you should ask me about the US, because it’s the disruptor in chief. I’m getting ahead of myself, but just to say: the US is much more of another challenge, because it’s not an external actor — it’s part of the internal. The US anchor was the structural condition that made EU integration possible. The pushback against Europe coming from the Trump administration belongs in the same bracket as the full-blown forces within Europe: the populist insurgency against integration, against Brussels, and against the liberal consensus. So I see the US as part of the family, not as an external actor like Russia, China, or Turkey.
Leszek: Yeah, I think it makes sense to bring the US into this equation. It seems that what we call the regional order — perhaps a part of the global international order you described at the beginning — has been very much sustained by the perception that the US is willing to sustain this order by force if necessary, even if they decide to break their own rules. And I think since the Iraq war and the failure of that war, it’s been obvious that the US is less and less capable or willing to sustain the regional order. The intervention in Georgia by Russia was actually one of the first signs of that. Since then, we see the collapse of this order because Europe is both unwilling and unable to sustain any sort of order beyond its own borders. And Europe is struggling to sustain its own liberal democratic order inside, by making deals — such as with Turkey — about migration. But what I wanted to ask you is: it seems from your book, indirectly, that Europe as a whole… and that’s another question — should we treat Europe as a whole political player in the same way that we treat Turkey, Russia, the US, or China? Perhaps keeping that for later — do you feel that these outside powers see Europe as an equal potential partner or even adversary, or do they see Europe in a more predatory way, like a predator looking at a herbivore, just looking for ways to exploit the weaknesses, but never seriously considering it as a potential partner? I think that’s quite true for Russia. Russia never really accepted the EU as a partner. They prefer to deal bilaterally, and they thought the whole of Europe was under NATO-US influence. But how is Europe reflected in the eyes of the three powers you describe?
Dimitar: That’s a great question, and there’s so much to it, so let me try to unpack some aspects. I intentionally avoid speaking about Europe as a single actor, even in the normative sense, which is the case with many books. Using “regional order” allows for fragmentation and multiplicity, because there are various stakeholders: the member states, the European institutions. The UK is not an EU country, but it’s a stakeholder nonetheless — especially after the early stages of Brexit, and clearly after Rishi Sunak came to office, we have the re-engagement. By the same token, the US is a stakeholder too. Order allows you to allow space for all kinds of different agents operating under the same conditions, principles, and so on, and avoids the question of when will Europe finally get its act together and be a great power — which, I don’t think, is that helpful. Now on your question about Russia, and then I’ll say a few words about the other two: yes, I do believe Russia saw itself as a stakeholder in the European order, but a very different one than the actual existing order, to use a Marxist term. The Russian vision of Europe was a flashback to the 19th century, where you have a couple of big guys — not just the US, but also Germany, France, and the UK — and you can do business with those and ignore the institutional overlay, and definitely not pay attention to the smaller countries involved, because they are secondary. The first time that became evident was in the Yugoslav Wars in 1994, when the Contact Group emerged around how to manage the siege of Sarajevo, and Russia got recognition as part of this Contact Group of great powers — a repetition of the Concert of Europe, if you will. That was very much support to Russia’s quest for status in Europe — but Europe of states, of regional powers. Another case in point is energy, where Russia went bilateral and exploited fragmentation. The German-Russian connection was key there, but not only. The Russians all the way to Putin’s return to power in 2012 could see themselves as a partner, as co-opted or co-optable, could strike a deal with the Europeans — and the key European players had the same perspective on Russia. That was the essence of the deal in 2008 in Bucharest, when Ukraine and Georgia were promised membership but Germany and France essentially blocked the Membership Action Plan. It was the case when Sarkozy went to negotiate a ceasefire in Georgia in 2008. It was even the case with the Minsk agreements, where Russia was acknowledged as a legitimate player, and the differences were papered over. The Germans would invest also in Nord Stream 2, economic interdependence, where Russia could be co-opted into the European order. The problem with this approach on both sides is that it ignored what the European regional order is about. And definitely ignored the pulling effect of Europe. Those negotiations could not cancel the willingness of other players to push for their own interests. When Yanukovych decided not to sign an association agreement, the next thing you saw was a domestic crisis in Ukraine, because a sufficient number of people pushed back. Ukraine had agency, because a subsection of Ukrainian society wanted to be integrated in Europe — and since Poland joined in 2004, Ukraine was much more closely integrated in the economic and social sphere of this European regional order. So neither European policymakers at the top, nor certainly Putin, foresaw that those bottom-up dynamics operate in a very different way than in the 19th century. It was not a time of great powers anymore, and this magnetic suction effect would apply. And belatedly, I think the Russians came to realise that the EU and European integration matter, having been oblivious. Brussels doesn’t play a role — it’s all about Berlin and Paris and London. Well, they discovered that it does play a role. And that’s pretty much a key driver of what we see now with the tragedy in Ukraine, despite all the obsession about NATO involvement. But I’m going deeper and deeper into this rabbit hole.
Leszek: Right. Well, we need our listeners to get the book to get all the details — we can’t do it in 25 minutes. But I wanted to ask you about a not-so-obvious case to put together, as you mentioned: Turkey. Because I think the nature of the challenge from Turkey might escape some of our listeners. Turkey is mostly perceived through the lens of being an authoritarian country that sometimes can influence Europe through managed leaks — or spills, rather — of migrants. Although that hasn’t happened in recent years. They might be considered an important player in terms of military, as a balancing act in the Black Sea region. But Turkey, despite being in NATO, is dealing with both sides of the conflict, with Russia and Ukraine. And obviously there is the outsized role of Turkey in the Middle East. Can you explain a bit about your perspective, coming from Bulgaria, on the role of Turkey? We know Turkey is quite active in the Western Balkans — for example in Kosovo — and they seem to be replacing the US as a security actor. And also the role they play in the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and elsewhere. Something that might be better seen from the Southeastern lens than from a Northern or Western one.
Dimitar: I think this is the wrong way to approach the conversation — to ask ourselves, what is Turkey doing to disrupt our influence? The conversation has to start with Turkey itself and not with what Europe wants to do. When you look from the domestic perspective, the Turkish society, you can see the profound change. Because historically, since the early 19th century in Ottoman times, Europe has been a model, a standard of civilisation. Turkey had to conform with Europe to catch up — not unlike countries in Eastern Europe in many respects. Turkey is an Eastern European nation. This has changed now with the AKP rule, because there is a whole new discourse about the civilisational uniqueness of Turkey — being its own master, having historical roots, not having to be dictated terms. Very much the Russian conversation as well. Recovering its own cultural appeal and uniqueness. Some of that is obviously fake, but it’s a different change of tone. It’s a long conversation because even the pro-Western people or elites in the past had a bit of a love-hate relationship with Europe and the West. But now under the AKP, this is going in the other direction. Turkey sees itself as a leader of the wider Islam, a middle power, a potential hegemon in the Middle East — although this is not a given. But clearly not a country that desires recognition by Europe.
Leszek: Can I ask you one more question about Turkey? Do you see that this process has been inspired internally, or do you think it was more a rejection — or perceived rejection — by the EU?
Dimitar: It has deeper roots in Turkey. To answer your question: it’s both. And the rejection doesn’t start in 2011 or 2009. The rejection was felt from the 1960s, even before — that Turkey would never be accepted because of Islam, essentially. But it also has deeper ideological roots in Turkish Islamism, and in Turkish nationalism more broadly. Like I said, there’s a love-hate relationship because Europe is the standard you want to conform with. But also Europe has been the other that undermined the Ottoman Empire. The war of independence in the 1920s was fought against European powers. Turkey managed to revise the post-World War settlement, had to fend off the Brits and the French in the Middle East. There’s this underlay of thinking about the world outside as a source of threat, which feeds into the Islamist version of nationalism and brings cultural uniqueness — Turkey being unique, not having to follow the lessons and precepts, not being a student of the West anymore. Going back to your original question: Turkey is an alternative pole. It’s not a revisionist, but certainly a rival, another centre of power in thinking, in its own self-conception. Now, on the level of policy, it becomes trickier — because many policies, you’re right, are in line with European preferences. It’s not that investment in Kosovo or contributing troops to EU peacekeeping missions in Bosnia is against your interests. It’s in line with your interests. Even helping Ukraine, despite keeping the options open and talking to the Russians — Turkey is trying to be helpful there as well. That’s why the Turkish position on the level of policy, not the level of ideology, is to demand better conditions, better treatment, a better deal from Europe — as opposed to subduing Europe or destroying it altogether. That’s not really the policy. And that’s why the response by the EU to Turkey is trying to cooperate as much as possible. It might differ from member state to member state — Hungarians, Poles, and Bulgarians see it one way; Greeks see it another. But overall, I believe Turkey is still in the eurosphere and not a revisionist in the full sense of the word, as the Russians are, and not willing to take geopolitical risks. But if the question is: can Turkey re-commit to the liberal democratic credo of the European Parliament and European NGOs? The answer is no. It follows its own way, and that will be the case going forward.
Leszek: Right. We don’t have much time to discuss China in such detail, but I wanted to ask you at the end about the way China approaches Europe. In the past, there was the European quest — maybe not to change, but to conquer, or in a way use China for European interests. Then China became extremely isolated, but now China plays this ambivalent role. It’s in their interest to sustain the global world order because they are beneficiaries. But at the same time, this China 2.0 threat seemed as an unlimited potential for exporting goods — including very high-tech goods — from China. Since the US is behaving in such a way towards Europe under Trump, there is a question whether this is sustainable. There is also talk that China could become a European partner in looking for the way to gain European sovereignty, especially in the digital dimension. And we’ve got the direct Chinese investment and dealings in the 16+1 format — 17+1 format, now, I think, slightly less possible. How do you see this changing relationship, and is there a way Europe can behave differently than the US expects it to, and gain something from this relationship? Or are we doomed to try to isolate ourselves from China because they are going to conquer us the way Europeans conquered China in the 19th century?
Dimitar: It’s good that you mentioned the US, because there’s this misconception — held here in China in good faith or otherwise — that whatever problems and frictions there are between Europe and China are down to American influence in Europe. Left to their own devices, those two would have a harmonious relationship. Which couldn’t be more far removed from the truth. China is, first of all, supportive of Russia in the war of conquest of Ukraine. The economic lifeline has helped the Russians wage the war, and it impinges on key strategic interests of the EU and Europeans more broadly. Second, there’s the China shock, as you rightly pointed out — China is undermining the viability of key sectors of the European economy because of unfair trading practices. The trading surplus is just the indication of that, but the issues are structural. Even the German carmakers, who were among the top beneficiaries of the opening of China in the 1980s and onwards, are now bearing the brunt of the competition. But it’s also the case that some of what China is saying has an element of truth — because China is a stakeholder in an open multilateral order, and we have interest to cooperate with China on green technology. If you want to build a zero-emission economy, Chinese technology — solar panels and batteries — is essential. So we have to find a way to maximise the benefits of dealing with China and minimise the disruptive effect. It’s also important to understand that China has global ambitions. It wants to be the next hegemon, to replace the Americans. It might not do it the way the Americans do it, projecting military power — but it is interested in deepening European dependency on technology and on trade, and in making sure that in case there is a global clash with the US, Europe stays neutral and doesn’t take a side. Any policy vis-à-vis China has to account for that as well. It’s not an easy policy to craft, because there’s mixed motivation, and there are 27 member states. But it’s a major challenge — and it’s not going away in any shape or form, because the sheer weight of China in the global space, in economy and technology, means that even people like myself, ten years ago, didn’t pay that much attention. I have to now, and I think it applies to any policymaker or thinker these days. The way we tended to always be mindful of America — its politics, institutions, and leadership — we have to pay attention to Beijing and to China because of its global weight and impact in Europe.
Leszek: Well, I think it’s a good place to end — your book is actually forthcoming for those who want to understand the challenges that might sometimes be escaping us, especially in nature and this geopolitical and historical dimension. It’s the long-term history shaping the actors and the political and geopolitical culture. Thank you so much, Dimitar.