



EUROPEAN LIBERAL YOUTH
LYMEE

EU DIPLO- MACY

fit for the

FUTURE

Edited by Antonios Nestoras and Laia Comerma

EU
DIPLO -
MACY
fit for the
FUTURE

Edited by Antonios Nestoras and Laia Comerma

EU Diplomacy Fit for the Future

PUBLISHER

European Liberal Forum
Rue d'Idalie 11-13, boîte 6
1050 Ixelles, Brussels

EDITORS

Antonios Nestoras and Laia Comerma

DESIGN

Daneel Bogaerts

ISBN

978-2-39067-011-7

DOI

10.53121/ELFPUB0621

Published by the European Liberal Forum in cooperation with LYMEC - European Liberal Youth. Co-funded by the European Parliament.

The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) alone. These views do not necessarily reflect those of the European Parliament and/or the European Liberal Forum.

© ELF

JULY 2021

CONTACT

+32 (0)2 669 13 18
info@liberalforum.eu
www.liberalforum.eu

ABOUT THE PUBLISHERS



The European Liberal Forum (ELF) is the official political foundation of the European Liberal Party, the ALDE Party. Together with 46 member organisations, we work all over Europe to bring new ideas into the political debate, to provide a platform for discussion, and to empower citizens to make their voices heard.

ELF was founded in 2007 to strengthen the liberal and democrat movement in Europe. Our work is guided by liberal ideals and a belief in the principle of freedom. We stand for a future-oriented Europe that offers opportunities for every citizen. ELF is engaged on all political levels, from the local to the European. We bring together a diverse network of national foundations, think tanks and other experts. At the same time, we are also close to, but independent from, the ALDE Party and other Liberal actors in Europe. In this role, our forum serves as a space for an open and informed exchange of views between a wide range of different actors.



The European Liberal Youth (LYMEC) is a pan-European youth organisation seeking to promote liberal values throughout the EU as the youth organisation of the ALDE Party and the Renew Europe parliamentary group in the European Parliament. LYMEC is made up of Member Organisations (62) and Individual Members, and it is active across the breadth and diversity of the European continent. LYMEC's central aim is the creation of a liberal and federal Europe.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

The EU's balancing act in Central Asia 8

Ilhan Kyuchyuk, MEP, and Valentin Tonchev

About the Authors 12

INTRODUCTION

The quest for consensus and resilience in EU Diplomacy 14

Antonios Nestoras and Laia Comerma

SECTION 1

Institutions and Values 19

The European External Action Service: What is the point? 20
Christopher Jefferies

Conceptualizing EU actorness through mediation: The Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue 24
Eleni Siapikoudi

NATO's Five Threats: Internal and external diplomacy implications 28
Oriol Marín Subirà

Walking the walk and talking the talk: The #strajkkobiet phenomenon and the case
for consistency between internal enforcement and external promotion of EU values 32
Ioana Pavel

SECTION 2

Partners and Regions 37

LGBTQIA+ Rights in the EU and Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq 38
Jēkabs Kārlis Rasnačs

The Battle for Africa: How the EU can prevail over an ambitious China 41
Kasper Langelund Jakobsen

EU and ASEAN: Pacesetters for Security, Free Trade, and Climate 44
Rhea Csordas

EU–Russia Relations: Perspective for the Future Christine Khomyk	47
The EU and its Southern Neighbourhood: The Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa George Meneshian	51
SECTION 3 Topics and tools	57
Renewable Hydrogen in 2050: Between sustainable necessities and geopolitical challenges Felix Sebastian Schulz	58
Right to Asylum: Procedures and Obstacles in the European Union Anna Komziuk	62
Can the EEAS be an effective force for crisis management and peacebuilding? Ahmed Mehmedov	65
Strengthening the External Dimension of the EU's Counterterrorism Approach Ulla Lovcalic	68
What's the Social Purpose of it all? Strategic Partnerships fit to shape the future of the EU's liberal engagement Sascha Lucas	72
Conclusion	77
Marina Sedlo	
Bibliography	80

FOREWORD

The EU's balancing act in Central Asia

**Ilhan Kyuchyuk, MEP,
and Valentin Tonchev**

We welcome the initiative of the European Liberal Forum (ELF), with the support of the European Liberal Youth (LYMEC), to focus on EU Diplomacy, and to make an ambitious attempt to shape decision-making and promote structural reform in the field, to make it fit for an ever-changing, volatile, and challenging future.

As one of the young liberal authors points out, "Member States are used to having the power to conduct their foreign policy in their own interest. Now, they have acknowledged that the world (and the nature of the EU) is changing, so they set up the EEAS." The EU is changing with the world, and its foreign affairs have to, as well. Let us discuss this process in light of recent developments and take into consideration a relevant selection of foreign policy areas and geopolitical actors.

The EU opened its last European External Action Service (EEAS) delegation in Turkmenistan last year, the only diplomatic representation that was still missing in Central Asia and a definite signal of an increasingly closer relationship with the region. Even if the five 'Stans' haven't always figured as priorities atop the European foreign agenda in the past, as the closer neighbourhood currently faces big challenges, the EU hasn't overlooked the opportunities to cement a stronger Eurasian relationship.

Increasing its diplomatic presence signals an important trajectory towards the region, complementing new and recently negotiated trade agreements as well as the 2018 Connectivity and 2019 EU Central Asia Strategies.

The latter strategy consolidates new foreign policy objectives, ranging from preventing radicalisation and developing people-to-people contacts to energy, cross-regional cooperation, and border management. For most Central

Asian republics, the EU's 450-million-consumer market remains an attractive and important single destination for energy exports and trade. Similarly, the EU continues to play a key role in development aid and foreign direct investment. For Kazakhstan alone, the EU represents its biggest trading partner in terms of Kazakh exports. Currently, the country exports \$10.3 billion to Italy, followed by \$6.4 billion to China, \$6 billion to the Netherlands, \$5.2 billion to Russia, and \$3.9 billion to France. EU priorities linked to democracy and human rights continue to represent an uphill battle in Central Asia, yet some countries have started a slow path of socio-economic liberation, also supporting the EU's increased levels of investment and sustainable economic development across the region. Taking shape as large-scale infrastructure projects related to energy efficiency and natural resources management, the EU has materialised an impressive investment package over the years through the European Investment Bank and Commission assistance. Despite large-scale EU economic efforts in the region, Russia's sizable labour market for Central Asian migrants and China's investments continue to represent a considerable portion of the region's economic activity and energy relations. Yet, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Central Asian countries have been severely impacted—both in terms of employment and, equally, due to a slowdown in remittances, foreign direct investments, production rates, and trade overall, as well as border closures tied to migratory work. Under such difficult circumstances, the EU decided to support Central Asians by providing a solidarity package of €124 million in response to COVID-19. This simultaneously shows the EU's interconnectedness to the region and re-establishes its role as the primary donor of development aid in Central Asia.

Ten years ago, the EU prioritised poverty reduction, intra-regional cooperation on energy supply chains, higher education, and environmental protection. As of 2020, these development goals have been achieved in part, while others will

We strongly recommend readers to take this publication as an opportunity to think beyond traditional foreign policy approaches and dive into a more policy-oriented and surprisingly comprehensive analysis of the EU's role in the world as a global actor, especially when it comes to the innovative recommendations formulated by youth—they will, after all, shape the future of EU diplomacy.

necessitate further efforts. Transport and energy play key roles in the green transition while digital connectivity and furthering people-to-people contacts represent vital and new objectives. These two new dimensions connect loose dots that are much needed to further advance prosperous partnerships that can be visible to the population.

The EU wants to appeal to the younger generations who want to be part of an international community placed between Asia and Europe—the ones who don't want to choose between East and West. This comes with smart communication strategies not only towards governments but also towards citizens, private entrepreneurs, and civil society at large. Civil society is at the heart of this strategy and should not be seen as running counter to government-to-government strategies. On the contrary, it is complementary and will ensure stability by fostering economic

growth and the effective management of new socio-economic challenges. The EU's strongest asset is where other international actors are absent: from education and academic exchange programmes like Erasmus, media literacy, and preventing radicalisation to civil society training, job skills, development aid, and other expert areas. In a future of rising climate change, disinformation, and lower employment levels due to automation, it will be young activists, entrepreneurs, and citizens who benefit from new skills, preparedness, and solid partnerships across Asia and Europe. Keeping a strong grip on the fight against violent extremism while moving towards a stable and free society will become the priority of all developed and developing countries. A gradual alignment with international human rights conventions and free-thinking should allow for innovative business and improved living standards. This is particularly relevant because decreasing numbers of Central Asian youth will be interested in migrating to Russia.

The EU offers something very different from China, and it isn't mutually exclusive. As EU Special Representative Ambassador Peter Burian recently put it: "China is coming with an offer nobody can refuse, while the EU is coming with an offer nobody understands". To be clear: the EU's role will be one of compromise and balance in order to counteract the previous White House's disruptive commercial strategies on the world stage and moderate China's often one-sided and debt-driven Belt & Road Initiative. Additionally, against the backdrop of weakened American interest in a multilateral global order, the EU's more cautious approach should be revised. Despite the recent US Central Asia Strategy, followed by China's promise to work towards the Sustainable Development Goals in the 20th EU–China Summit in July 2018, both the US and China remain 'ambiguously committed' to the Central Asian region. The EU continues to support a wider strategy of regional interconnectivity, as Europe and Asia are neighbours and therefore mutually benefit from regional peace, economic

The EU offers something very different from China, and it isn't mutually exclusive. As EU Special Representative Ambassador Peter Burian recently put it: "China is coming with an offer nobody can refuse, while the EU is coming with an offer nobody understands".

opportunity, and fair interconnectivity or trade. This simultaneously supports the improvement of societies, with 21st-century economies changing fast in terms of green energy, societal innovation, digitalisation, and how we consume information. Many Eurasian countries will face the risk of falling behind in respect to these societal ideas and concepts of the future unless more attention is given to multilateralism, Eurasian connectivity, conflict prevention, and increased people-to-people communication and exchanges.

Energy relations have also become a growing and converging point of interest between the EU and Central Asia over the past decade. Through the White Stream and TCP, complementing the Southern Gas Corridor, the EU has worked towards diversifying routes for gas to reach Central and Eastern Europe via Romania while supporting new European infrastructure like the Bulgaria–Romania–Hungary–Austria (BRUA) Pipeline. The completion of the TANAP gas corridor, which goes through Turkey, has also allowed for additional gas transportation to take place between Europe and the Caspian Sea area.

Energy-related challenges and opportunities are one of the many topics addressed in this publication. But our young authors go beyond this, discussing the European External Action Service (EEAS), the role of values in the external relations of the EU, crisis management strategies, asylum, counterterrorism, and relations between the EU and China, Russia, ASEAN, and even the Middle East.

We strongly recommend readers to take this publication as an opportunity to think beyond traditional foreign policy approaches and dive into a more policy-oriented and surprisingly comprehensive analysis of the EU's role in the world as a global actor, especially when it comes to the innovative recommendations formulated by youth—they will, after all, shape the future of EU diplomacy.

Enjoy reading this publication!

Ilhan Kyuchyuk,

MEP, Renew Europe Group and Interim Co-President of the ALDE Party

Valentin Tonchev,

Parliamentary Advisor at European Parliament, Assistant to Ilhan Kyuchyuk MEP, Renew Europe Group

About the Authors

Rhea Csordas has been a member of the Young Liberals (Germany) and LHG since 2019. She is currently completing her Bachelor's in Political Science with a focus on international relations, for which she spent a year in the Erasmus+ programme studying at Sciences Po Paris. This experience initially motivated Rhea to get involved in the European Liberal Students Network.

Kasper Langelund Jakobsen holds a Master's in International Security and Law and has been active in international politics for six years. Today he is part of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation Defence Expert Group and The Social Liberal Party of Denmark.

Christopher Jefferies is a Canadian-Italian living in London. He is a trainee lawyer in England and is qualified as a lawyer in Canada. His interests are in international legal matters, trade, and foreign relations.

Christine Khomyk is a PhD student in Public Administration

at the National Academy of Public Administration under the President of Ukraine and accredited parliamentary assistant to MP Sofiya Fedyna in the Parliament of Ukraine. She has two years of experience in different groups of the European Parliament working with foreign affairs and security and defense in the Eastern Partnership region and Russia.

Anna Komziuk is a lawyer working with refugee issues for the UNHCR implementing partner in Ukraine. She is a PhD student at Mykolas Romeris University (Vilnius, Lithuania) and European Officer of the Liberal Democratic League of Ukraine.

Ulla Lovcalic, the defence and security spokesperson for Liberal Youth of Sweden (LUF), is currently studying in the Master's programme in Politics, Security and War at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU) and working as a project leader for the Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association (SOFF).

Sascha Lucas is a graduate student of International Studies/Peace and Conflict Research at the Universities of Frankfurt and Darmstadt. His focus is on European security and the interdependencies of global order. He is an individual member of LYMEC.

Ahmed Mehmedov currently holds the post of deputy mayor in the town of Sevlievo, Bulgaria. He holds a Bachelor's in Automation Engineering and a Master's in Innovation and Industrial Management from the Technical University of Gabrovo. Ahmed is interested in European politics and has supported and followed liberal politics in Bulgaria since university. He is a member of the Youth Movement for Rights and Freedoms (YMRF).

George Meneshian is a member of Young Liberals Greece and has been selected as one of the editors of *Libertas*, the online magazine of LYMEC. He is currently a postgraduate student at the University of St Andrews (MLitt Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia Security Studies). He holds

a Bachelor's in International, European and Area Studies from the Panteion University of Athens. He is a Research Associate at the Institute of International Relations and has published several articles and minor studies in various academic publications, newspapers, and blogs. He is co-author of the book *Greek-Albanian Relations: problems and perspectives*.

Ioana Maria Pavel was born in Bucharest, Romania, a few years after the fall of the communist regime. She studied liberal arts in the Netherlands and human rights in Sweden, where she returned for her Master's in Global Politics. Via the European Solidarity Corps, she traveled to Poland and Cyprus to work with children. For the past two years, she has been working in politics as a communications assistant.

Jēkabs Kārlis Rasnačs is a politically active person living in Riga, Latvia, board member of Transparency International Latvia, and parliamentary assistant for two MPs in the parliament of Latvia. He is

completing a Bachelor's in Political Science and has participated in two Erasmus+ intersectional feminism and LGBTQIA+ rights programmes. He is currently the International Officer of Movement For Youth Latvia.

Felix Schulz has been a member of the Free Democratic Party (Germany) since 2015 and the Young Liberals since 2020. He is currently working for a German liberal MP, and he focuses on transport and EU policies. At the same time, he is doing a PhD in Political Science at TU Darmstadt, where he is looking into the German Hydrogen Strategy.

Eleni Siapikoudi has a Bachelor's in Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies and a Master's in Politics and Economics of Contemporary Eastern and Southeastern Europe (University of Macedonia) and in International Politics (Newcastle University). She works at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and she is the president of Young Liberals Greece.

Oriol Marín Subirà has been a member of Catalan Nationalist Youth (JNC) since 2014. He holds a Bachelor's in International Business and is currently living in the Northern Coast of Barcelona and working in a venture capital firm. His areas of interest are climate change, minorities, and the defense of freedom of speech.

INTRODUCTION

The quest for consensus and resilience in EU Diplomacy

Antonios Nestoras and Laia Comerma

The future is faster than you think. If we could give a title to the first two decades of the twenty-first century, this would be it. Twenty years ago, there were no smartphones, no social media giants, and no disinformation. We were still living in the ‘end of history’, European integration was a one-way street, and the democratisation of the world was still a distinct possibility. We did not have a global financial crisis, a Euro-crisis, a migration crisis, Brexit, Trump, or rising populism. Technology, economics, and international

politics have turned our world upside down. And this calls for changes in our institutions, practices, and policies.

Since the beginning of the European project, “delivering EU external relations policy” and promoting “European Union interests and values around the world” has always been a complicated practice.¹ At the turn of the century, the ambition was to coordinate hundreds of EU delegations, staffed by both EU officials and seconded diplomats with a wide set of competences in aid, trade, and

development, in order to create coherence, effectiveness, and visibility—in short, to develop and consolidate the EU’s status as a global actor.²

This was easier said than done. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) involved a level of internal negotiations among Member States, traditional diplomatic negotiations with third countries, and ‘structural diplomacy’ with other regions of the world.³ This intricate nature of EU decision-making was reflected in the peculiar,

1 European Commission, *Taking Europe to the World: 50 Years of the European Commission’s External Service* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004), pp. 3-4.

2 European Commission, *Europe in the World—Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility*, COM(2006) 278 final (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2006).

3 Keukeleire, Stephen, “The European Union as a diplomatic actor: internal, traditional, and structural diplomacy”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 14, no. 3 (2003), pp. 31–56.

multilevel game that was the EU's external action as well as Europe's ventures on the world stage.

In addition, being "embassies without a state" and "diplomats without a flag", EU delegations and their staff were operating in a grey-zone of international diplomatic practices.⁴ The hope was for this transition or evolution of EU institutional practices to also have far-reaching implications for international affairs. Perhaps for this reason, the initial focus was on training and preparing EU diplomats for this new state of diplomatic affairs and, most importantly for the completion of the project, including a coherent and effective EU external action.⁵

The promise of an EU that would be able to project its values and interests in the world as an independent global actor was carried out successively by the European Security Strategy, the Lisbon Treaty, the creation of the High Representation of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and eventually the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010. Mandated by Article 13 A(III) of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EEAS was welcome

as the last step in the creation of an effective, multilateral, and coherent EU diplomacy.⁶

Again, the expectation did not only concern the emergence of the EU as a global actor but also its impact on the development of new international diplomatic practices.⁷ The first years of the EEAS were difficult on both accounts, with questions about resources, staffing practices, and the perceived lack of strategy within the Service.⁸ The emergence of a consistent culture of EU diplomacy was once again linked to the proper training of EU diplomats;⁹ but it also depended on the institutional architecture underlying the EEAS, a perplexing legal basis and an intense internal balancing act with deep roots in the variety of perceived interests across European capitals.¹⁰

Evaluating the impact of EU diplomacy in Europe and abroad was difficult in itself because of the peculiarities of the Union.¹¹ Even in this context, it quickly became clear that there were limits to the potential of institutional, legal, and budgetary means to bring about the anticipated change—establishing an effective and coherent EU diplomacy was mostly a matter of aligning interests and preferences among EU Member

-
- 4 Bruter, Michael, "Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission", *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 2 (1999), pp. 183–205.; Dimier, Véronique and Mike McGeever, «Diplomats without a flag: the institutionalization of the delegations of the Commission in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries», *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, no. 3 (2006), pp. 483–505.
 - 5 Duke, Simon W., "Preparing for European diplomacy?", *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 5 (2002), pp. 849–870.
 - 6 Gsthöhl, Sieglinde. "EU Diplomacy After Lisbon: More Effective Multilateralism?." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 17, no. 2 (2011): 181-191; Zwolski, K. (2012). The EU as an international security actor after Lisbon: Finally a green light for a holistic approach?. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(1), 68-87.
 - 7 Benson-Rea, Maureen, and Cris Shore. "Representing Europe: the emerging 'culture' of EU diplomacy." *Public Administration* 90, no. 2 (2012): 480-496.
 - 8 Duke, Simon. "Now We Are One... A Rough Start for the EEAS." *EIPAScope* 2012, no. 1 (2012): 25-29; Whitman, R. «The rise of the European external action service: Putting the strategy into EU diplomacy.» In *12th biennial conference of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA)*, Boston, March, pp. 3-5, 2011.
 - 9 Lloveras Soler, and Josep M., *The New EU Diplomacy: Learning to Add Value*, EUI RSCAS, 2011/05, Global Governance Programme-02, European, Transnational and Global Governance
 - 10 Ramopoulos, Thomas, and Jed Odermatt. "EU diplomacy: measuring success in light of the post-Lisbon institutional framework." In *Global Power Europe-Vol. 1*, pp. 19-35. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013.
 - 11 Kleistra, Yvonne, and Niels van Willigen. "Evaluating the Impact of EU Diplomacy: Pitfalls and Challenges." In *The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor*, pp. 52-68. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015.

States about the scope, roles, and powers of the External Action Service.¹² In the end, the emergence of a coherent EU diplomacy became equivalent to dampening internal contestation and establishing legitimacy for the EEAS.¹³

In 2016, this quest for internal balance and legitimacy culminated in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). Building on the 2013 European Security Strategy, the EUGS defined common principles and values, as well as the priorities of EU diplomacy and an action plan to implement them.¹⁴ Already from its title (“Shared Vision, Common Action”) and structure, it was obvious that the EUGS focused first and foremost on building internal consensus and relevance for the EEAS.¹⁵ The making of the EUGS involved a long and multi-layered process of negotiating the EU’s strategic vision between Member States, EU institutions, and other players;¹⁶ and, in this sense, it has been rightfully called an “exercise of diplomacy in its own right”.¹⁷

If the EUGS represented a delicate, diplomatic equilibrium both inside the EU and in relation to

international dynamics, this was upended even before the official publication of the document in 2016. Right off the bat, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as US President threatened to shatter the hard-earned consensus on Europe’s strategic vision.¹⁸ The loss of an extremely influential Member State with global outreach raised doubts over the EU’s capacity to achieve “strategic autonomy”;¹⁹ meanwhile, Trump’s US administration foreshadowed the loss of strategic consensus in the West and called for a recalibration of the EU Global Strategy.

As if this were not enough, the migration crisis piled more pressure on the EU’s external borders and internal cohesion;²⁰ the rise of an ever-assertive China posed a significant challenge to the EU in a divided West;²¹ the conflict in Ukraine ushered in another chapter of intense EU–Russia confrontation;²² and disinformation in cyberspace was already transforming the very nature of public diplomacy into a permanent state of political warfare and undue foreign influence.²³ In this context, the resilience of EU diplomacy—a buzzword throughout the EUGS

12 Duke, Simon. “Reflections on the EEAS Review.” *European foreign affairs review* 19, no. 1 (2014).

13 Maurer, Heidi, and Jost-Henrik Morgenstern-Pomorski. “The quest for throughput legitimacy: the EEAS, EU delegations and the contested structures of European diplomacy.” *Global Affairs* 4, no. 2-3 (2018): 305-316.

14 European External Action Service. 2016. *Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe : a global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy*.

15 Mälksoo, Maria. «From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy, internal purpose», *Contemporary security policy* 37, no. 3 (2016), pp. 374–388.

16 Tocci, Nathalie. “The making of the EU Global Strategy”, *Contemporary security policy* 37, no. 3 (2016), pp. 461–472.

17 Cross, Mai’A K. Davis. “The EU global strategy and diplomacy” *Contemporary Security Policy* 37, no. 3 (2016), p. 402.

18 Larik, Joris. “The EU’s Global Strategy, Brexit and ‘America First’”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 23, no. 3 (2018).

19 Biscop, Sven. “All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit”, *Contemporary Security Policy* 37, no. 3 (2016), pp. 431–445.

20 Ceccorulli, M. & Lucarelli, S. “Migration and the EU Global Strategy: narratives and dilemmas” *The International Spectator*, 52(3) (2017), pp. 83–102.

21 Christiansen, Thomas and Richard Maher. “The rise of China—challenges and opportunities for the European Union”, *Asia Europe Journal* 15, no. 2 (2017), pp. 121–131.

22 Haukkala, Hiski. “From cooperative to contested Europe? The conflict in Ukraine as a culmination of a long-term crisis in EU–Russia relations”, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23, no. 1 (2015), pp. 25–40.

23 Nestoras, Antonios. “Political Warfare: Competition in the Cyber Era”, *European View* 18 (2) (2019), p. 258.

text²⁴—was immediately put to the test, and it is still very much being tested today.

Understanding resilience as the capacity of the EU to adapt to its environment, reform, and withstand and recover from difficulties, the young authors of this collective volume consider various necessary changes in order for EU diplomacy to be fit for the future.

In the first section, entitled 'Institutions and Values', Christopher Jefferies begins by asking what is the point of the European External Action Service, discussing the reality of the competing policy objectives of Member States that lie at the root of the EU's inability to act as a unitary actor. His policy recommendation is to reform the requirement for unanimity in foreign policy decision-making processes. Actorness, this time though effective mediation in conflicts, is also the topic of Eleni Siapikoudi, whereas Oriol Marín Subirà tackles the issue of EU–NATO relations and its implications for EU diplomacy. To end the section, Ioana Pavel reminds us of the importance of consistency between internal policies and external actions.

In the second section, entitled 'Partners and Regions', the authors deal with potential partners and systemic EU rivals in the context of various topics. Jēcabs Kārlis Rasnačs examines EU foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq in the context of LGBT rights, Kasper Langelund Jakobsen focuses on the EU–China rivalry in Africa, and Rhea Csordas examines EU relations with ASEAN as a benchmark for security and free trade in the region of South-East Asia. Christine Khomyk rethinks EU–Russia relations, while George Meneshian discusses the EU Neighbourhood Policy in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region.


In the third and final section, entitled 'Topics and Tools', Felix Sebastian Schulz elaborates on the geopolitical dimensions of renewable hydrogen policy, Anna Komziuk focuses on Asylum policies, and Ahmed Mehmedov discusses the EEAS' role as an effective crisis management and peacebuilding institution. Ulla Lovcalic does the same for counterterrorism practices, and Sascha Lucas examines the concept of strategic partnerships as the centrepiece of the EU's social purpose in upholding liberal values in the world. Finally, Marina Sedlo offers her thoughts on the authors' policy recommendations to conclude the collective volume.

The discussions about the institutions, values, and tools of EU diplomacy in this book are by no means exhaustive. The authors' contributions come in the form of ideas submitted at a critical juncture for EU diplomacy and for the Union in general. Nevertheless, given the fact that the Conference on the Future of Europe called for increased young citizen involvement in EU policymaking, this book should also be seen as an exercise in brainstorming: a coherent and coordinated effort to bring forth youthful ideas on how to make EU diplomacy more fit for a future which is already upon us.

Dr Antonios Nestoras,
Policy and Research Coordinator, European
Liberal Forum

Laia Comerma,
LYMEC Bureau Member

24 Wagner, Wolfgang and Rosanne Anholt, "Resilience as the EU Global Strategy's new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising?", *Contemporary security policy* 37, no. 3 (2016), pp. 414–430.



Institutions and Values

The European External Action Service: What is the point?

Christopher Jefferies

The European External Action Service was set up to serve as the EU's foreign service that would promote common EU foreign policy worldwide. However, due to differing (and sometimes competing) policy objectives among Member States, agreeing on shared policies has often proven too difficult—leaving the EEAS without the power to be effective. This paper explains the purpose of the EEAS, where it has struggled, and how it can improve its reputation and effectiveness going forward.

In February 2021, Josep Borrell (HR Borrell)²⁵ stood on a stage smiling with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov as the Russian called the European Union (EU) an “unreliable partner”²⁶. Then, the Russian government ordered the

expulsion of three European national diplomats.²⁷ HR Borrell's visit to Moscow was described as a “humiliation”.²⁸ The month before, it had been reported that, post-Brexit, the United Kingdom (UK) would not give full diplomatic status to the

EU's proposed top diplomat to the country.²⁹

Humiliating. Powerless. An “easy mark”.³⁰ These words were aimed at HR Borrell and the European External Action Service (EEAS) that he

25 Mr Borrell is the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

26 M. Karnitschnig, “EU Foreign Policy RIP”, *POLITICO* (13 Feb. 2021), <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-foreign-policy-rip/>.

27 A. Rettman, “Russia Humiliates Borrell in Moscow”, *EUobserver* (5 Feb. 2021), <https://euobserver.com/foreign/150844>.

28 Ibid.

29 J. Landale, “UK and EU in Row over Bloc's Diplomatic Status”, *BBC News* (21 Jan. 2021), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-55742664>. The UK said that it believed, contrary to the views of 142 other countries, that the EU should be treated as an international organisation, giving representatives in the UK less than full protection under the Vienna Convention.

30 M. Karnitschnig, “EU Foreign Policy”...

represents. The question must be asked: What is the point of the EEAS?

Origins of the EEAS

The EEAS mandate³¹ is to assist the High Representative in conducting the Common Foreign and Security Policy³² and to coordinate all aspects of European foreign policy. The current institution was shaped through a series of negotiations between Member States, the European Parliament, and the European Commission.^{33,34} The EEAS has also established EU delegations (akin to embassies) in third countries.³⁵ Joao Vale de Almeida,³⁶ when he was appointed EU Ambassador to the United States in 2010, explained the function of the EEAS in this way: "Where we have a common position, I am the one leading the show. Bilateral matters

are the mandate of the 27 [EU Member State] ambassadors".³⁷ In addition to this coordination role, there is also an important symbolic role for the EEAS³⁸ because it answers former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's age-old question about whom he should telephone if he ever wanted to speak to the EU.³⁹

The Role of the EEAS today

The point of the EEAS as an institution was therefore quite clear when it was set up. However, after ten years of existence, the twenty-seven sovereign Member States in the EU have unsurprisingly had differing foreign policy objectives. Especially in times of crisis, Member States are left on their own to defend and promote critical national interests and values.⁴⁰ There is also an element of a "turf-war", wherein Member

31 Article 27(3), Treaty on European Union.

32 The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the agreed-upon foreign policy of the EU. To be approved, decisions require unanimity among Member States; once taken, some aspects can be further decided by qualified majority voting. The CFSP was created by Article J.1 of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty: "The foreign and security policy of the European Union aims to enable the [27] member countries to carry more weight on the world stage than if they were to act alone. As well as preserving peace and bolstering international security, the policy seeks to promote democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and freedoms around the world." European Union Publications Office, "Foreign and security policy", https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/foreign_and_security_policy.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED%3D256&locale=en.

33 The compromise came in June 2010 Madrid, and the legal basis for the EEAS was found in Council Decision 427/2010 on 26 July 2010. The EEAS was not to be linked either to the European Commission or the European Council, but it was to be an institution in its own right. However, the High Representative would also be a Vice President of the European Commission and preside over the EU Foreign Minister's meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council, thus connecting the High Representative to both the Commission and the Council. The EEAS does not have complete control over *all* European foreign policy positions—only common positions. It has units concerned with crisis management as well as military expertise in the EU Military Staff, which is based within the EEAS, neither of which would be traditionally found within a nation state's foreign ministry.

34 Wientzek, Olaf, "The European External Action Service: A Difficult Start of an Innovative Institution", *Tradition and Justice, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung International Reports* (2013).

35 J. Gaspers, "European Diplomatic Service: Putting Europe First", Royal Institute of International Affairs: *The World Today* (Jan. 2010), pp. 20–22.

36 Mr Vale de Almeida, now the EU Ambassador to the UK, has been denied full diplomatic status.

37 A. Rettman, "EU Envoy to US Flaunts New Powers", *EUobserver* (11 Aug. 2010), <https://euobserver.com/news/30607>.

38 R. Adler-Nissen, "Symbolic Power in European Diplomacy: The Struggle between National Foreign Services and the EU's External Action Service", Cambridge University Press: *Review of International Studies* no. 4 (Oct. 2013), pp. 657–81.

39 A. Rettman, "EU Envoy to US"...

40 B. Tonra, "Irish Diplomacy in a Time of Crisis and the Evolution of a 'European' Diplomatic Service", *Royal Irish Academy: Irish Studies in International Affairs* (2017) pp. 117–131.

States do not want to give up more responsibility than they must.⁴¹

At its core, diplomacy is the practice of foreign policy through “the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.”⁴² The EEAS slightly upends this traditional conception, as its official agents are not agents of a nation state. They are agents of a “quasi-supranational diplomatic corps”⁴³ which challenges the settled diplomatic consensus (as illustrated by the UK government’s treatment of the EU delegation). But the development of non-nation-state actors should not be questioned. It should be welcomed, even celebrated. The modern world (of instantaneous news, social media, and global connectivity) makes it necessary to redefine what diplomacy is and how it is done. The idea of an ambassador sitting in an embassy in a third country, sending out cables to their capital with updates from within that third country “[...] appear[s] quaint, even anachronistic”.⁴⁴

This is the crux of the issue. Member States are used to having the power to conduct their foreign policy in their own interest. Now, they have acknowledged that the world (and the nature of the EU) is changing, so they have set up the EEAS. Unfortunately, doing so did not magically mean that all twenty-seven States would suddenly agree on everything and always be able to coordinate mutually beneficial policy positions.

The most famous example of this lack of coordination at work is, again, Russia. Germany is

often criticised for refusing to use its participation in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as leverage against Russian acts. Many other Member States believe that this refusal to use all levers at their disposal undermines the EU’s condemnations of various Russian acts, most recently its treatment of Alexei Navalny.⁴⁵ To Germany, however, it is merely fighting for its own interests.

In this situation, HR Borrell did not only play his hand badly—he also had a bad hand dealt to him. He and the EEAS were undermined by competing Member State interests that trumped EU interests. This is what happens when there is no common position: the High Representative stands on a stage in a third-country capital and has to grin as that country calls the EU unreliable, with no tools to fight back.

41 N. Fracchini, “The Inter-Institutional Relations of the European External Action Service”, Rubbettino Editore: *Il Politico* (May 2013).

42 B. Tonra, “Irish Diplomacy”...

43 R. Adler-Nissen, “Symbolic Power”...

44 J. Batora & B. Hocking, “EU-Oriented bilateralism: evaluating the role of member state embassies in the European Union”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22 (1) (2009), pp. 163–182.

45 M. Karnitschnig, “EU Foreign Policy”...

Proposals

- » Reform the requirement for unanimity in foreign policy decision-making: Qualified majority voting ("QMV") should be permitted for some policies. While acknowledging that some topics are too important to Member States to give up their de facto veto, QMV could overcome the lack of a common position in some circumstances. The lack of a common position is the biggest critique of the EEAS, which should overcome this flaw and improve the EEAS' "bite" when it comes to interactions with third countries. With a common position to defend, other tools to fight back (e.g., sanctions, like-minded third-country coalitions) would be more readily available.
- » Improve the crisis management/defence coordination: The EEAS is unique in having these capabilities within its organisation. Although the EU will not always be able to have a common position, the EEAS could maximise its usefulness to Member States by improving on its role as "eyes and ears" on the ground for (especially smaller) Member States that have no diplomatic representation in some countries and be ready with fast responses to crises as they arise. The speed at which it responds could make the EEAS invaluable to both Member States and third countries, thus enhancing its reputation.
- » Add consular services to EU delegations: Most EU citizens have likely never heard of the EEAS. How can an EU citizen care about EU foreign policy? By making it personal. EU delegations in third countries should be given a tangible role in supporting citizens abroad so that they feel like they have a stake in the EU as it operates with third countries, improving EU foreign policy solidarity and allowing the EEAS to take on a bigger role.

Conceptualizing EU actorness through mediation: The Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue

Eleni Siapikoudi

Only recently has the European Union emerged as a relatively new player in the field of conflict mediation, acting both as a mediator itself and as a member of collective coordination mechanisms to support peace processes. Throughout the years, the EU has attempted many times to resolve conflicts or disputes with no significant success. The case of Serbia–Kosovo negotiations is a crucial issue for the region, with geostrategic importance for EU expansion, and it is also a good area in which the EU may prove it can play a role as a global power. This essay will seek to examine two main issues: firstly, the basic role of the EU as a mediator; and, secondly, the case of Kosovo and Serbia and the EU’s facilitating role. The essay will conclude with some policy recommendations to promote the EU’s efficiency as a global actor.

Introduction

During the past 15 years, the European Union has increased its role in resolving conflicts and building peace in its neighbouring countries and beyond. The role of mediator

or facilitator will play a significant role in the general recognition and authority of the EU as a global actor. The recent attempt to facilitate dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina proves the positive steps taken as well as the weaknesses in this policy area.

The EU as a Mediator

International peace mediation has been receiving increasing policy attention in the past few decades. It seems to be a cost-effective and useful tool

for solving conflicts, and the EU has gradually commenced considering its potential mediation role in world politics.⁴⁶ However, analysis of EU peacebuilding practices has found it to be positioned almost entirely within traditional instruments of security governance, such as conflict prevention and mediation, crisis management, post-conflict stabilisation, and normative frameworks like human rights, human security, and civilian protection.⁴⁷

Arguably, the 2009 EU Concept of Mediation proves the will of the Union to expand its policies towards this direction and its attempts for a more coordinated and focused approach. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the European Union has been increasingly involved in directly mediating processes and supporting peace negotiations in inter- and intra-state conflicts by taking the role of a third-party mediator.⁴⁸ However, in spite of the EU's growing interest and maturing practical engagement in the field (the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, the Aceh Peace Process, the Geneva International Discussions on Georgia's territorial conflicts, etc.), the role of the EU as a mediator has not gained the appropriate attention among academics or within political processes.⁴⁹

As stated in an EU Council document,⁵⁰ while mediation has been an integral part of EU external action, this tool has been used in an ad-hoc way up until now. So, the document

emphasises a general aim to develop a more systematic approach to mediation and strengthen its mediation support capacity, which will allow for the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

But what are the main obstacles to an efficient mediating policy? In order to analyze the effectiveness of EU mediation, it is crucial to focus on four elements: conflict context, mediator leverage, mediation strategy, and coherence.⁵¹ Needless to say, the most elusive element of mediation is the leverage that the EU has as a mediator. Observing the various case studies, it is clear that the EU's leverage changes depending on the respective conflicting countries. Moreover, a structured and coherent strategy needs to be planned and followed as a general practice of the mediation. Lastly, the more vital obstacle for the EU is the need for a common European approach.⁵² A lack of unity among EU Member States worsens the situation.

The case of the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue

A good example where the EU has been attempting to implement its role as mediator/facilitator is the Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue. The EU initiated this mediation process after the International Court of Justice concluded that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence

46 S. Blockmans, J. Wouters & T. Ruys, *The European Union and Peacebuilding: Policy and Legal Aspects* (The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 2010).

47 M. Merlingen & R. Ostraukaite, *European Union Peacebuilding and Policing* (London: Routledge, 2006).

48 J. Bergmann & A. Niemann, "The European Union as an Effective Mediator in Peace Negotiations? Conceptual Framework and Plausibility Probe", *Institut für Politikwissenschaft* no. 5 (2013), p. 1.

49 T. Coibion, "How Effective Is the EU as a Mediator? The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", *College of Europe: EU Diplomacy Paper* 01/2017, p. 4.

50 Council of the European Union, *Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities* (Brussels, 10 November 2009), p. 4.

51 T. Coibion, "EU as a Mediator"..., pp. 7–9.

52 Ibid.

in 2008 had not violated international law. Starting in 2011, an EU-led mediation between both sides has brought halting progress on technical issues but floundered on the questions at the core of the political dispute. In the first mediation phase, from March 2011 to February 2012, EEAS senior official Robert Cooper and his mediation team brokered nine agreements between the conflicting parties. Since October 2012, these mediation efforts have continued at the highest political level under the auspices of EU High Representatives Ashton (2012–2014) and Mogherini (since 2014).⁵³

The EU's mediation efforts have resulted in a series of agreements between the two sides—the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations (2013) being the most prominent one. More precisely, this agreement provided greater autonomy for majority-Serb parts of northern Kosovo, while Serbia accepted the authority of Pristina's law enforcement and judicial entities in Kosovar territory. In fact, however, relations between the two states have arguably deteriorated since it was signed. Kosovo has not only refused to implement its end of the bargain but it also imposed a 100-percent tariff on goods imported from Serbia in 2018. Meanwhile, Belgrade has redoubled its diplomatic offensive, resulting in multiple countries withdrawing their recognition of Kosovo's independence. Brussels has tried to incentivise both sides to compromise

by offering the promise of eventual EU accession unsuccessfully.⁵⁴

The talks had reached a deadlock by 2018, following a proposal for the exchange of territory.⁵⁵ In July 2020, dialogue was revived, and Washington launched a parallel effort. Although both leaders are interested in a deal, the trial of Thaçi for war crimes is currently delaying procedures.⁵⁶

Generally, the role of the EU in the Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue provides a practical way to promote the EU's actorness in international politics and mediation.⁵⁷ Naming the procedure "normalization of relations" provides the image of neutrality and cultivates confidence.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the EU strategy focuses more on playing a structural role during these talks. Lastly, timing has played a crucial role in the non-politicization of the talks. Importantly, positive steps can be identified in the EU's great leverage vis-à-vis the conflicting parties, due to their aspirations for EU membership, and its strategy of combined formulation and "manipulation" that draws on this leverage to move both parties toward agreement through the use of positive incentives. However, the main obstacles remain to be limited EU coherence and the lack of internal cohesiveness in Kosovo and Serbia.⁵⁹

53 J. Bergmann, *The European Union as International Mediator Brokering Stability and Peace in the Neighbourhood* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 18.

54 M. Ushkovska, "The EU's Rivalry with the U.S. Is Complicating Serbia-Kosovo Talks", *World Politics Review* (19 March 2021), <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29200/the-eu-s-rivalry-with-the-u-s-is-complicating-serbia-kosovo-talks>.

55 EURACTIVE, "Kosovo and Serbia agree to resume talks after Macron, Merkel push" (30 April 2019), <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-and-kosovo-agree-to-resume-talks-after-macron-merkel-push/>.

56 International Crisis Group, *Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue*, report no. 262 (25 January 2021), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/262-relaunching-kosovo-serbia-dialogue>.

57 L. Greiçevci, "EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 12(3) (2011), p. 285.

58 K. Gashi, "Simulated Power and the Power of Simulations: The European Union in the Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2020), p. 6.

59 Bergmann, J. & A. Niemann, "Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an Effective Peacemaker" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53(5) (2015), pp. 967–969.

Recommendations

Taking all these into consideration, it is crucial to highlight that the EU has a lot to offer as a mediating facilitator. It brings in added value and creates new entry points for peace initiatives through its political and financial as well as its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and resolution. Some recommendations to improve the EU's role as mediator would be:

- » Adopt a truly common foreign and security policy, based on European liberal values, that would be effectively aligned around the same objectives so that all available resources could be channeled into their realisation.
- » Acquire an organised and structural strategy for sufficient institutional practices. A group of experts in each specific case will work within the scope of general EU foreign policy while testing and constantly evaluating the mediating process.
- » Focus on communication and engagement with local political and civil society actors in activities of a mediating and confidence-building nature. A long-lasting peace needs to be accepted by both parties, not forced by external actors.
- » Transform the EU's presence in geopolitical disputes into actorness, with established and emerging institutions to prevent disputes or to handle their consequences.

NATO's Five Threats: Internal and external diplomacy implications

Oriol Marín Subirà

Lord Ismay,⁶⁰ NATO's first secretary general, said that the alliance had been created "to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." Since the creation of NATO, it has adapted according to changes in global geopolitics. But this famous quote by its first secretary general reveals that the original nature of this organisation differs from the reality of it today—when the Soviet Union no longer exists, the United States questions the organisation's usefulness, and Germany has an important role in European geopolitics—and we must analyze the uncertainties that this situation entails.

NATO is an organisation which has been shaped by many of the major political and historical events which have occurred throughout its history. Examples of some of these threatening events include: the Cold War, the fall of the USSR, the Balkan war, etc. Each of them has put the Alliance to the test and resulted in relevant turning points that

have led to the NATO we know now.⁶¹ Currently, the threats the organisation is facing are: 1) the questioning of the commitment of the USA to the defense of Europe and the demand for burden-sharing on the part of Europeans; 2) the division among its members on common objectives, the role of the Alliance, and the values it defends; 3) the flexible

expansion policy of the Alliance that has increased the territorial space of Article 5's application; 4) the stabilisation of EU–NATO relations; and, finally, 5) the new balance of global power due to the rise of China.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has no longer been the strategic stage of the world; it is losing magnitude

60 NATO, "Lord Ismay, 1952–1957", https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_137930.htm.

61 NATO, "NATO Time-Line", <https://www.nato.int/docu/posters/timeline-eng.pdf>.

in global geopolitics while other spaces where the United States has focused more attention are gaining it. This manifests itself in the reduction of the US military presence in Europe.⁶² At the Wales Summit in 2014, a (non-binding) political commitment of NATO members to 2% defense spending was agreed upon to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence capabilities, under the American argument that the burden of Euro-Atlantic security had to be more equitable and that a bigger share should be contributed by the European allies.⁶³ However, the 2% commitment has not been an effective measure. If we look today, only the US (with 3.5%), the UK (2.10%), Poland (2%), Greece (2.78%), and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have reached the agreed-upon 2% figure.⁶⁴

The Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept provided the foundation for NATO to go global.⁶⁵ In a colloquial way, we could say that it then put on the uniform to intervene in humanitarian conflicts in the Balkans, in Afghanistan to fight against terrorism while helping to rebuild conflict zones, and, more recently, to fight hybrid threats and misinformation. After the conflicts in the Balkans, differences arose regarding European defense policy, and after the great enlargement of the Alliance and the new global context, the objectives began to diverge.⁶⁶ On the one hand,

several Eastern European countries now see NATO as the vital guarantee of their security against re-established Russian power. On the other hand, the internationalism advocated⁶⁷ by US-led Western partners that have led the Alliance from the Balkans to Libya via Iraq and Afghanistan differs from the main goal of Article 5. These countries have demonstrated their preference for the projection of security and crisis management as NATO's main objectives since the end of the Cold War. In other words, they prefer a NATO based on the Strategic Concept of 1991. Furthermore, a discordant note within the Alliance is Turkey, whose nationalist foreign policy very often clashes with its European partners and generates tensions within the Alliance. Today, Turkey⁶⁸ has already reaffirmed itself as a Mediterranean regional power, not a Western ally, preferring a NATO of protection by Article 5 with support for its own self-interests but without assuming major commitments.

Since 1999, the Alliance has almost doubled its membership, from 16 to 30 today,⁶⁹ welcoming in the latest incorporations especially small states in both economic and military terms. The result has been the expansion of the territorial area for Article 5's application without an increase in strategic or military capabilities, thus raising the potential cost of territorial defense. The

-
- 62 Larres, K., "The United States and the 'Demilitarization' of Europe: Myth or Reality?", *Politique Étrangère* 1 (2014), pp. 117–130, <https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-politique-etrangere-2014-1-page-117.htm>.
- 63 Brooke-Holland, L., & Mills, C., *NATO Wales Summit 2014: Outcomes* (SN06981) (UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 12 September 2014), <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06981/>.
- 64 NATO, "Defence expenditure of NATO Countries (2013–2020)" [press release] (21 October 2020), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_178975.htm.
- 65 Wittmann, K. *Towards a New Strategic Concept for NATO* (Rome: NATO Defense College, September 2009), DOI: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/108701/fp_10.pdf.
- 66 Warren, P. T., Colonel, *Alliance History and the Future NATO* (Brookings: 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0630_nato_alliance_warren.pdf.
- 67 Gheciu, A., "NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community", *International Journal* 74(1) (2019), pp. 32–46, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020702019834645>.
- 68 van Dijk, R., & Sloan, S. R., "NATO's inherent dilemma: strategic imperatives vs. value foundations" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43(6–7) (2020), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1824869>.
- 69 NATO, "Enlargement" (5 May 2020), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm.

objective was to extend the Alliance's security umbrella to almost the entire continent, but this has been done without considering the strategic and military contributions of these countries to the Alliance as a whole.

Another very divisive issue within NATO is its relationship with the European Union. These two organisations are so very different in nature yet are two sides of the same coin. The origin of this division is intrinsically linked to the dynamics of transatlantic relations. Two events can be attributed as both cause and consequence: the outsourcing of Western European security and defense to NATO; and the decision to build up defenses for Europe outside of NATO. In addition, there is a relevant element that conditions this relationship: the dependence and centrality of the United States in European security. Thus, the question of EU–NATO relations has gone from being a strategic and military question to one adopting a political dimension.⁷⁰

Current geopolitical trends further complicate the conditions under which NATO has to operate, but, above all, the implicit positioning of China as a reviewing power of the liberal international order is changing the balance of global power.⁷¹ The rise of China and its implications are manifested in that it is already the second largest economy in the world, it has strategic interests in Asia and Africa, and it is rapidly establishing itself in Latin America.⁷² In addition, it has the second-largest defense budget in the world today, which can be seen in its acquisition of large strategic-military capabilities. China is promoting its illiberal development model: being an economic power while remaining a political autocracy, since China best promotes its interests within a pro-Western

liberal order in anarchy. This is the main risk of the rise of China for Europe and America, and for NATO—being a result of the world in 1945 which functions more effectively in a world based on that international order.

70 Smith, S. J. & Gebhard, C., "EU–NATO relations: running on the fumes of informed deconfliction", *European Security* 26(3) (2017), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2017.1352581>.

71 Sullivan, J., & Brands, H., "China has two paths to global domination", *Foreign Policy* (22 May 2020), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/china-superpower-two-paths-global-domination-cold-war/>.

72 Ibid.

Recommendations

- 1** The EU should increase defense spending, not only to comply with what was agreed upon by Alliance members at the Wales Summit in 2014, and thus abandoning any suspicion of its lack of commitment to the defense of the old continent, but also to increase its military capabilities and autonomy. It is important to strengthen the EU as a political and military actor because this would also make NATO stronger and, as a result of these increased capabilities, the EU would find itself in a better position for leadership.
- 2** Once this leadership position is reached, the EU must engage itself in the task of generating consensus among all Member States to redefine the Alliance's core values. EU leadership is imperative for reaffirming these values and establishing political and military objectives, as well as for better governance of the organisation's ad intra relationships. Dialogue with Turkey from a common US–EU position is essential for reaching consensus about the role and objectives of the Allies and the Turks.
- 3** NATO must adapt the new geopolitical reality to its strategic vision, applying three approaches: internalising the new rise of China and its consequences for global security; reinforcing deterrent capabilities on the new 21st-century front that is cyberspace; and strengthening NATO's international role through partnerships with countries which share its values and visions.

Walking the walk and talking the talk: The #strajkkobiet phenomenon and the case for consistency between internal enforcement and external promotion of EU values

Ioana Pavel

This article tackles the rule of law crisis in Poland and the European Union's reaction to the crisis. While the Commission did trigger Article 7 provisions against Poland in 2017, sanctioning Poland under Article 7 requires a set of conditions which were never met. Since then, the crisis has deepened in Poland. The failure to effectively sanction backsliding on the rule of law within a Member State stands to threaten the legitimacy of the European Union on the international scene, as its external action is based on respect for the rule of law.

The #strajkkobiet phenomenon in Poland is made up of two sides. The first can be broadly defined as the hundreds of thousands of women protesting and demanding unencumbered access to legal abortions, and

the second is represented by the government vehemently trying—and ultimately succeeding—to restrict this particular right. How is the phenomenon unfolding and what is the EU's role?

On 22 October 2020, Poland's Constitutional Tribunal imposed a near-total ban on abortions. The ruling allows for abortions in cases of sexual assault, incest, or when the mother's life is in danger, but they are banned in

cases of fetal abnormalities; whereas around 96% of abortions⁷³ in Poland have been performed in cases of fetal abnormalities. The ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) has been pursuing an agenda of restricting abortions since the beginning of its mandate and has promoted it as a campaign promise. The decision has been in effect since February 2021.

Both sides use human rights rhetoric to justify their positions. The government's rhetoric argues that human life must be protected from the moment of conception until death, citing the right to life as well as the freedom of conscience and religion, as protected by the Polish Constitution. Meanwhile, the protesters speak of women's sexual and reproductive rights, arguing that the ban will not prevent abortions but merely force women to seek them illegally. Beyond the approximate 2,000 abortions carried out legally, women's rights groups estimate that 200,000⁷⁴ Polish women still seek abortions each year. Those who can afford it will seek an abortion abroad. Those who carry out illegal abortions and those who aid women in seeking out illegal abortions risk a sentence of imprisonment for up to three years. About a dozen convictions of this kind take place annually.⁷⁵

A key player on the government's team is the Catholic Church, which supports the ban

wholeheartedly. In 2015,⁷⁶ 92% of the population identified as Catholic and 61% said that religion has a very high or a high importance in their life. Whereas the state and the church are by law supposed to be independent from each other, a Reuters⁷⁷ analysis shows that priests have been known to display election posters on parish property and talk about elections during mass.

Meanwhile, a key player on the protesters' side is the European Union, which, according to its founding Treaty, is founded on the values of respect for, inter alia, the rule of law and human rights. What's more, accession into the European Union is also based on a potential Member State's respect for the rule of law and human rights. Whereas the EU has no competence⁷⁸ to impose laws on reproductive rights, it does have several sanctioning options for Member States which appear to be backsliding on these constitutional principles. One of them is triggering Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which was done against Poland in 2017. Once Article 7 is triggered, the sanction of suspending a country's voting rights in the Council would require "alignment among three EU institutions – European Parliament, European Commission and European Council", as well as "unanimous approval of other governments in the Council".⁷⁹ These conditions have never

73 European Parliament, "Polish de facto ban on abortion puts women's lives at risk, says Parliament" [press release] (26 November 2020), <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20201120IPR92132/polish-de-facto-ban-on-abortion-puts-women-s-lives-at-risk-says-parliament>.

74 "Poland: Thousands protest against abortion law for third straight night", *DW News* (30 January 2021), <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-thousands-protest-against-abortion-law-for-third-straight-night/a-56389158>.

75 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Submission under Rule 9.4 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements in the cases of *Tysiacy v. Poland*, *R. v. Poland*, *P. and S. v. Poland* (Strasbourg: 27 January 2020), <https://rm.coe.int/commdh-2020-3-rule-9-submission-in-3-cases-v-poland-en/16809ba102>.

76 "Infographic – Religiousness of Polish Inhabitants", Central Statistical Office (22 December 2016), <https://stat.gov.pl/en/infographics-and-widgets/infographics/infographic-religiousness-of-polish-inhabitants.4.1.html>.

77 Pawlak, J. & Ptak, A., "As Poland's Church embraces politics, Catholics depart", *Reuters* (3 February 2021), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-church-insight-idUSKBN2A30SN>.

78 "Europe's Underground Abortion Network", *The Economist* (27 February 2021), <https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/02/27/europes-underground-abortion-network>.

79 Soyaltin-Colella, D., "The EU's 'actions-without-sanctions'? The politics of the rule of law crisis in many Europes", *European Politics and Society* (November 2020), pp. 1–17, DOI: [10.1080/23745118.2020.1842698](https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1842698).

Recently the EU was declared an LGBT-safe zone. As heartwarming as such a statement is, what are its tangible, practical results? The European Union must take action. Otherwise, it is not just its internal cohesion that is at stake but the external credibility of the EU as a global actor.

been met, and Poland has never been sanctioned for its backsliding on the rule of law. As recent events in Poland show, none of the sanctioning mechanisms of the European Union have had the effect of deterring the Polish government from its agenda. What impact does the Union's internal affairs have on its external affairs?

According to Article 10 A(I) of the Lisbon Treaty,⁸⁰ "the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law". As such, if the European Union is to be seen as a credible actor on the international scene, it must enforce its constitutional principles in a way that is perceived as firm, clear, and tangible. There are several ways this can be achieved.

As the enforcement of sanctions via Article 7 requires unanimity that is difficult to achieve, one option is to modify the necessity for unanimity with a two-thirds majority instead. Another possible change would state that when two or more States are currently being investigated under Article 7 proceedings, they may not vote on triggering Article 7 against any other Member State. Alternatively, the European Union must find another way to sanction a Member State in such a way that the public can see a tangible impact and its citizens can feel protected and respected.

Meanwhile, in Poland, the #strajkkobiet phenomenon is not about a protest against one particular ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal. The phenomenon is about a system of oppression which was allowed to flourish within a Member State of the European Union, which prides itself on being a defender of human rights and the rule of law. The #strajkkobiet phenomenon is about a system of oppression that has pushed women to break the law in order to have access to the same rights that other EU countries choose to protect. Women who do not have the means to go abroad for an abortion will end up getting an illegal one. The lucky ones will be under some kind of medical supervision. Those without that option will go for an at-home improvisation that will, in some cases, be fatal. The #strajkkobiet phenomenon is about a system of oppression that has left women with no choice but to protest. Ultimately, regardless of the number of mechanisms, dialogues, frameworks, directives, reports, and tweets, what matters is the perception of the public. The European Union risks alienating the pro-European citizens of illiberal countries if it is seen as weak. The EU needs to step up in ways that have tangible results. Recently the EU was declared an LGBT-safe zone. As heartwarming as such a statement is, what are its tangible, practical results? The European Union must take action. Otherwise, it

⁸⁰ European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2007/C 306/01 (Lisbon: 13 December 2007), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT>.

is not just its internal cohesion that is at stake but the external credibility of the EU as a global actor.

We can conclude that our main recommendation is consistency between the internal and external actions of the European Union.



Partners and Regions

LGBTQIA+ Rights in the EU and Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq

Jēkabs Kārlis Rasnačs

The situation of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender rights in the Middle East is one of the worst in the world. The European Union is a close neighbour to the region and has a good reputation for its human rights record and wide protections for LGBTQIA+ people. The EU conducts many cultural exchange programmes with Balkan countries which are not in the Union, and the same could be done with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. To understand what the best way for the EU to exert its influence on the mentioned countries to improve LGBTQIA+ rights could be, this essay will analyse the current situation in those countries. The EU has to implement more strategies through its foreign policy. This essay will analyse them.

When it comes to the Middle East, norms and provisions in law regarding the LGBTQIA+ community are among the most socially and legally conservative and restrictive in the world. Sex between men is

illegal in 10 of the 18 countries that make up the region, and it is punishable by death in six of these countries.⁸¹ Although EU countries have fewer values in common with Middle Eastern countries in comparison with

other regions of the world, we do cooperate economically, for example, by importing crude oil from countries such as Iraq (8.7%), Saudi Arabia (7.4%), and Iran (3.9%).⁸² Through diplomatic relations, the EU

81 Angelo, P. J. & Bocci, D., "The Changing Landscape of Global LGBTQ+ Rights", Council on Foreign Relations (29 January 2021), <https://www.cfr.org/article/changing-landscape-global-lgbtq-rights>.

82 Eurostat, *From where do we import energy and how dependent are we?* [infographic], <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html>.

must strengthen its position and demand better human rights records from the countries with which it shares close relations, as well as become more capable to react when it comes to human rights violations.

From a realist perspective, as the EU has started its 2050 long-term strategy on climate neutrality, we have less to lose with a more aggressive foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. This is because of the increased usage of sustainable energy.⁸³ It is not fair that one of the main oil importers to the EU is Saudi Arabia, which applies fines, incarceration up to life-long terms, and capital punishment to LGBTQIA+ people and is the last country in the world when it comes to women's rights.⁸⁴ In 2015, when the US Supreme Court ruled in favour of same-sex marriage across the country, a private school in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia was fined 100,000 riyals (26,650 dollars) by religious police for displaying a rainbow flag on its building.⁸⁵ From a liberal perspective, the EU is famous for the various cultural exchange programmes it conducts concerning topics that pertain to intersectionality. These also take place with non-EU countries, for example, Serbia and North Macedonia. Through diplomatic meetings, this could be implemented with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, too—so that the youth of these countries could see different cultural perspectives.

Iraq has a better situation regarding gay rights. The same applies to other Middle East countries—Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Palestine (West Bank), Cyprus, and Bahrain—where homosexuality is legal.⁸⁶ The three countries mentioned above have historically taken a more secular position. There is some slightly higher acceptance in Iraqi Kurdistan in the prioritising of issues such as gender equality and fighting LGBTQIA+ discrimination. In 2020, Iraqi politicians and social media users still reacted negatively to an International Day Against Homophobia flag-raising stunt led by Western embassies in Baghdad, which triggered calls for foreigners to “respect Iraqi culture and society”.⁸⁷ In addition, even though homosexuality itself has been legal in Iraq since 2003, LGBTQIA+ people can be charged under public decency laws and can face execution by Sharia courts.⁸⁸

Although Iran carries out more sex reassignment surgeries than any other country in the world, its government is considered one of the most discriminatory towards homosexuals. Thousands of homosexuals have been executed since the Islamic revolution in 1979.⁸⁹ Those accused of sodomy often face summary trials, and judiciary standards are not always met. According to international and local media reports, 30 men suspected of homosexual conduct were arrested by IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) agents in 2017 at a private party in Isfahan

83 European Commission, *Our Vision for A Clean Planet for All: Economic Transition* (November 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/default/files/docs/pages/vision_4_economic_en.pdf.

84 Ibid.

85 Whitaker, B., “Everything you need to know about being gay in Muslim countries”, *The Guardian* (21 June 2016), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/gay-lgbt-muslim-countries-middle-east>.

86 Ibid.

87 “The Iraq Report: LGBT flag sparks outcry as embassy spat rages”, *The New Arab* (22 May 2020), <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2020/5/22/the-iraq-report-raising-of-lgbt-flag-sparks-outcry>.

88 “Baghdad’s persecuted gays have nowhere to hide”, *BBC News* (11 September 2012), <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-19525133>.

89 Parsi, A., “Iranian Queers and Laws: Fighting for Freedom of Expression”, *Harvard International Review* 36, no. 2 (Fall 2014/Winter 2015), pp. 49–53, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43649271>.

Province. Similar measures are carried out in Saudi Arabia.⁹⁰

When it comes to trans rights, Iran is more progressive. It provides up to half the cost for those needing financial assistance for surgery, and a sex change is recognised on the birth certificate.⁹¹ Since 2017, the government has provided transgender people financial assistance in the form of grants up to 5 million toms (400 dollars).⁹² Nevertheless, trans people are subject to employment discrimination and rejection by their families and communities, even with support from government. As a result of such rejections, they often end up as sex-workers or commit suicide.⁹³ In addition, homosexual people who want to have sexual relationships often feel pressured to undergo these operations in order to have their relationship legitimised by the state through marriage because it is a very important institution in Iran.⁹⁴ In fact, transsexual surgery is not clearly legal under Iranian civil law. It has both secular and religious components, and secular jurisprudence says nothing about trans issues. Interestingly, Sharia law and fatwas take on this responsibility.⁹⁵

Policy recommendations

Firstly, the EU must come up with a tighter foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia demanding the decriminalisation of homosexuality and removal of fines for sexual acts. It should also prioritise transgender rights regarding personal documents and changing one's legal gender. Secondly, it is clear that implementing a better social policy in Iraq might be difficult because of recent wars, for example, the Battle of Mosul and the ongoing insurgencies carried out by ISIS. This is why the EU could use "carrots" such as aid programmes for Iraq, with its destroyed infrastructure and poor living conditions. Thirdly, the EU could provide secularist-oriented programmes for youth from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq as incentives to improve relations between the Union and the three countries. These recommendations would furthermore serve as the first steps to improving awareness about human rights, including LGBTQIA+ rights, in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.

90 Weinthal, B., "Shots fired as Iran arrests over 30 gay men in violent raid", *The Jerusalem Post* (20 April 2017), <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Shots-fired-as-Iran-arrests-over-30-gay-men-in-violent-raid-488419>.

91 Barford, V., "Iran's 'diagnosed transsexuals'", *BBC News* (25 February 2008), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7259057.stm>.

92 United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015*, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper>.

93 "Despite Fatwa, Transgender People in Iran Face Harassment", *VOA News* (21 May 2018), <https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/despote-fatwa-transgender-people-iran-face-harassment>.

94 Najmabadi, A., "Transing and Transpassing across Sex-Gender Walls in Iran", *Women's Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3.4 (2008), pp. 23–42, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27649782?seq=1>.

95 Saeidzadeh, Z., "Transsexuality in Contemporary Iran: Legal and Social Misrecognition", *Feminist Legal Studies* 24 (2016), pp. 249–272, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10691-016-9332-x>.

The Battle for Africa: How the EU can prevail over an ambitious China

Kasper Langelund Jakobsen

China is rapidly growing influence in Africa through its economic policies. This is not in the interest of the EU as Africa becomes an increasingly important geopolitical actor. Thus, this paper argues that the EU has to make three policy steps to ensure its influence in Africa. First, the EU has to increase its trade with the continent and decrease agricultural subsidies so that African farmers can compete on the EU market. Secondly, the EU needs to provide cheaper and faster loans directly to African states instead of relying solely on multilateral organisations like the World Bank. Thirdly, the EU needs to create an education programme similar to Erasmus+ for Africans to attract as many students as possible from Africa, which would help promote liberal democracy among the future elite of Africa.

Africa, a region home to 1 billion people, half of whom will be under 25 years old by 2050, is a continent with vast natural resources and the world's

largest free trade area.⁹⁶ To say that Africa has potential would be the understatement of the century, and China has seen this. China currently holds

30% of all debt in Africa,⁹⁷ represents the largest foreign direct investor in Africa,⁹⁸ and has become the most attractive place for Africans to study

96 The World Bank, "The World Bank In Africa" (22 October 2020), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview#1>.

97 Acker, K., Brautigam, D., & Haung, Y., "The pandemic has worsened Africa's debt crisis. China and other countries are stepping in.", *The Washington Post* (26 February 2021), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/02/26/pandemic-has-worsened-africas-debt-crisis-china-other-countries-are-stepping/>.

98 Varrella, S., "Leading countries for FDI in Africa 2014-2018, by investor country", *Statista* (3 November 2020), <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1122389/leading-countries-for-fdi-in-africa-by-investor-country/>.

abroad.⁹⁹ The EU has been sleeping on the job, and this paper argues that it is high time for the EU to wake up because it is currently losing the Battle for Africa.

Before we continue this paper, we must acknowledge that Africa consists of 54 sovereign countries¹⁰⁰ with more varied cultures and languages than any other place in the world. Thus, there are obvious exceptions to any fact or claim made in this paper when talking about Africa as a whole.

China has been investing in Africa since China transitioned to state capitalism in the late 1970s, but it was in the 2000s that these investments started to radically increase.¹⁰¹ The reasons are numerous, but there are arguably two primary ones. The first is to secure access to African countries' natural resources in order to decrease its dependence on the US-dominated world market. This is a wise strategy, considering the current trade war that both political parties in the US want to wage against China.¹⁰² The second is to increase its political influence across the world, a strategy that seems to have worked, as shown in a survey conducted in 2014–15 with

54,000 Africans in 36 African countries. The survey concluded that China is seen as the second most significant external influencer after each country's respective former colonial power.¹⁰³ Furthermore, over 47% of respondents said that China has "a lot of influence" in their country,¹⁰⁴ and 63% said that it is a positive influence.¹⁰⁵

Now, what has the EU been doing during this time? The EU has become the largest donor of development aid, which is around 20 billion euros a year,¹⁰⁶ around 5 billion euros more than China provides in development aid each year.¹⁰⁷ However, as mentioned previously, China has the advantage when it comes to loans to African countries. This is due to the EU mainly relying on the IMF and the World Bank to provide loans, which worked fantastically for the EU's influential position 20 years ago when there were no other lenders. Now, the World Bank accounts for only 9 percent of total African debt while China holds 30%.¹⁰⁸ This is primarily due to low interest rates, lack of reform requirements, and the fact that loans are quickly given with a two-year waiting period—non-Chinese loans have an average waiting period of nine years.¹⁰⁹

99 "Where do Africans study abroad?" *Mail & Guardian* (5 September 2020), <https://mg.co.za/education/2020-09-05-where-do-africans-study-abroad/>.

100 56 countries if counting the disputed areas of Somaliland and Western Sahara.

101 Dahman-Saïdi, M., *Chinese Investment in Africa (part 1)*, BSI Economics (19 November 2013), <http://www.bsi-economics.org/219-chinese-investment-in-africa-part-1>.

102 "US to look at more restrictions on tech exports to China", *Reuters* (11 February 2021), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-biden-trade/u-s-to-look-at-more-restrictions-on-tech-exports-to-china-idUSKBN2AB075>.

103 Acker, K. et al., "Africa's debt crisis"..., p. 10.

104 Lekorwe, M., Chingwete, A., Okuru, M. & Samson, R., "China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews" [dispatch no. 122], *Afrobarometer* (2016), p. 12, <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad122-chinas-growing-presence-africa-wins-largely-positive-popular-reviews>.

105 Acker, K. et al., "Africa's debt crisis"..., p. 15.

106 The Africa-EU Partnership, "Financing the Partnership", <https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/about-us/financing-partnership>.

107 Tjønneland, E., "The changing role of Chinese development aid", *Chr. Michelsen Institute Insight* no. 2 (March 2020), <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/7173-the-changing-role-of-chinese-development-aid.pdf>.

108 The World Bank, "In Africa"...

109 Ryder, H. W., "Are Chinese Loans To Africa Good or Bad? That's The Wrong Question.", *The Diplomat* (5 September 2018), <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/are-chinese-loans-to-africa-good-or-bad-thats-the-wrong-question/>.

Thus, if the EU wants to gain influence in Africa and compete with China, it needs to make some radical foreign policy changes. This paper argues that these are in the EU's vital interest, as Africa is a close neighbour and an increasingly relevant actor in geopolitics. There are three recommendations that the European Union can adopt to help with this:

- 1 It must be mentioned that the EU is still the biggest trading partner with Africa, and China takes up a distant second place.¹¹⁰ This is significant, as the closer trading ties Africa has with the EU, the better relations they enjoy. However, China has been steadily increasing trade,¹¹¹ which means that the EU must encourage further trade agreements and lower its tariffs and agricultural subsidies so that African farmers can compete equally on EU markets.
- 2 As the EU has realised that it needs to provide direct loans to and investments in Africa, it created the EU Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-AITF). Despite its budget of only 813 million euros, it has already leveraged concrete investments worth 11.1 billion euros.¹¹² However, the EU-AITF's efforts cannot compare to the investments that China pours into Africa. Thus, the EU-AITF needs a drastic increase in funds and significantly lowered restraints on projects to make the application process faster and better utilised, therefore making its loans as attractive and beneficial as China's.
- 3 China has rapidly overtaken every other country in providing study abroad opportunities for Africans.¹¹³ This is a significant issue for EU influence, as these Africans will be educated and moulded in the ideals of China, which conflict with those of the EU. This is why the EU needs to make a programme akin to Erasmus+ for Africans to attract more African students to the EU.

Implementing these three measures would have the benefit of limiting China's soft power and, more importantly, improving the lives of people in Africa.

110 Eurostat, "Africa-EU – international trade in goods statistics" (April 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics#Africa.E2.80.99s_main_trade_in_goods_partner_is_the_EU.

111 Shepard, W., "What China Is Really Up To In Africa", *Forbes* (3 October 2019), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/10/03/what-china-is-really-up-to-in-africa/?sh=29d387875930>.

112 European Investment Bank, *EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund Annual Report 2019* (Luxembourg, 31 July 2020), pp. 3, 6, <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/882aedfc-d531-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>.

113 Acker, K. et al., "Africa's debt crisis"...

EU and ASEAN: Pacesetters for Security, Free Trade, and Climate

Rhea Csordas

The European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have maintained a close partnership for over 40 years. This is not surprising, as both organisations promote the peaceful reconciliation of interests and cooperation in their respective regions. In doing so, they are united by the conviction that the major global challenges of our time—whether the shaping of globalisation, climate change, or trade issues—can only be solved together.¹¹⁴ However, the aspect of commonality is still often misunderstood in politics and interpreted to mean that ASEAN must adapt itself to the developments of the EU.¹¹⁵ Instead, it needs greater recognition of its own path and challenges, including those related to China, in order to strengthen regional integration as the cornerstone of successful EU–ASEAN cooperation.

Introduction

Today, the EU is not only a trading partner but also a mediator and sometimes even a role model

for other organisations and states,¹¹⁶ including ASEAN, the Southeast Asian alliance. As an unfortunate consequence, a strong Eurocentric perspective

has been established in politics, which slows down the diversity of ideas and ultimately progress in EU–ASEAN cooperation.

114 German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "EU and ASEAN - Partner für gemeinsames Handeln in Europa und Asien" (21 January 2019), <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/asien/eu-asean-aussenministertreffen-21-01-19/2179170>.

115 Yukawa, T., "European integration through the eyes of ASEAN: Rethinking Eurocentrism in comparative regionalism", *International Area Studies Review* 21(4) (1 December 2018), pp. 323–339.

116 Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (eds.), *European Union Politics* [sixth edition] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

EU and ASEAN in a strong position

Today, the EU represents deep integration on a variety of levels and is considered one of the most important political actors in the international community. Among other things, its common jurisdiction is unique in extent, especially because of the European Parliament.

Comparable success can also be seen in ASEAN. The main driver behind its immense development was the perceived need for economic growth through regional integration, which was seen by the countries' leaders as crucial for nation-building and national and regional political stability. But other factors also played a role: social progress, cultural development, and the promotion of peace, especially between the rival forces of Indonesia and Malaysia, were goals of the new project.¹¹⁷

Eurocentrism: The Elephant in the Room

ASEAN is not only described as the "most successful intergovernmental organisation in the developing world" but also as "a success story surpassed only by the EU".¹¹⁸

All in all, there is a considerable amount of truth in both statements. On the one hand, it is clear that the Southeast Asian alliance shares a number of goals with the EU, including promoting security through post-World-War-II economic agreements, consolidating peace, and

blocking communist expansion. Moreover, recent structural reforms are often reminiscent of or have been explicitly inspired by the EU. On the other hand, one can also observe differences. Above all, ASEAN is often said to be less supranationalised, less institutionalised, and less formalised, but also more intergovernmental and consensual.¹¹⁹ In this context, it is essential to understand that ASEAN—even if it does not want to admit it—is still caught in China's constraints. This is particularly evident in the increasing disputes over the South China Sea, which reinforce previously existent trust deficits. Nevertheless, China has played an active role in promoting regional cooperation and is indispensable for ASEAN today, both from an economic and a diplomatic point of view.¹²⁰

Overall, it is important to be cautious about Eurocentric assumptions that have become prevalent in policy-making. The belief that imitating the European model signals progress, even though there is no rational argument for it in relation to other regions, can hinder the realisation of the goals of other regional projects. Therefore, it requires a neo-functional perspective, which makes clear that the aim of integration is to increase the functionality of states while, at the same time, recognising that this depends on individual nations' and regional needs.¹²¹

World-shaping cooperation

The European Union and ASEAN have now been working together for over 40 years, convinced that the major global challenges of our time can

117 Masala, C. & Sauer, F. (eds.), *Handbuch Internationale Beziehungen* (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag, 2017).

118 Poli, E., "Is the European Model Relevant for ASEAN?", *Istituto Affari Internazionali Working Papers* 14 (13) (10 November 2014).

119 Söderbaum, F., "What's Wrong with Regional Integration? The Problem of Eurocentrism", *European University Institute Working Papers* 64 (1 June 2014).

120 Yunling, Z. & Yuzhu, W., "ASEAN in China's Grand Strategy" in *Building ASEAN Community: Political-Security and Socio-cultural Reflections* [volume 4] (Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2017).

121 Min-hyung, K., "Integration Theory and ASEAN Integration", *Pacific Focus* 29(3) (8 December 2014), pp. 374–394.

only be solved together. The success of both these organisations shows that cooperation pays off.

The most important political progress was achieved in the economic field. ASEAN is fortunate enough to be the third-largest trading partner of the EU, and the Southeast Asian region as a whole is an important trading point. Every day, countless goods from the EU are transported through the Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia, through which a quarter of the world's maritime trade passes. However, the benefits of close economic connectivity for both

sides are far from exhausted. To further facilitate trade between the ASEAN region and Europe, the EU is currently negotiating free trade agreements with several ASEAN Member States.

Beyond that, there is a focus on climate change. In this context, it is necessary to understand that Southeast Asia is particularly affected due to the immense expanse of its coastline and its tens of thousands of islands. Thus, many ASEAN countries have to deal with the consequences of severe storms and tidal waves every year. The EU stands alongside ASEAN as a partner in addressing the threatening consequences of climate change.

Recommendations

In order to ultimately realise the full potential of EU–ASEAN cooperation, it is important to maintain the following objectives:

- » For economic progress, it is crucial to push through negotiations about free trade agreements with several ASEAN Member States. In the long run, it must be the goal that the EU and ASEAN will enable free trade between the two economies as a whole.
- » In order to face climate change, it is important to establish a multidimensional understanding of climate protection, focusing not only on aspects of sustainable financing but also on sustainable strategies to limit environmental damage, e.g., through CO₂ certificate trading. At the same time, we need to ensure the conservation of natural resources, water, and biodiversity, as well as deal with waste management, plastics, and marine waste.
- » Moreover, the “SMART Green ASEAN Cities”¹²² project should continue to enable smart solutions through digitalisation and the use of technologies. These could also serve as models for Europe.

122 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN, EU to enhance cooperation on protection of the Environment and Climate Change” (9 July 2019), <https://asean.org/asean-eu-enhance-cooperation-protection-environment-climate-change>. ASEAN (2019)

EU–Russia Relations: Perspective for the Future

Christine Khomyk

A diplomatic approach in negotiations has become a signature of EU foreign policy; nevertheless, its effectiveness diminishes when dealing with Russia. During the last decade, the relationship between these political actors has deteriorated, leaving the communications gulf of today. Russia's strategic role tempts the EU to rethink its policy towards Russia, leading to the biggest question: How should it look in the future?

One shortcoming among EU diplomats when talking about Russia is that they evaluate Russian foreign policy from their perspective. In Russia, tradition is highly preserved; therefore, the study of its historical aspects is vital to understanding political behaviour. Russian foreign policy does indeed respond to the call of circumstances; however, its core principles

have dictated its plans for centuries. Thus, this article tries to speculate on the EU approach from the perspective of Russian foreign policy.

Five main principles which EU officials may consider while building their communication strategy will be elucidated here. First, depending on the school of thought, Russian attitudes

about neighbouring states range from being concerned to openly identifying them as a threat.¹²³ Russia extends its control across borders as a protection mechanism,¹²⁴ using national security as a legitimate justification of expansionism and interfering with the internal affairs of other states, and will not stop until it is made to.¹²⁵ Secondly, it has a biased or

123 Tsygankov, Andrei P., "From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia", *Mershon International Studies Review* 41(2) (1997), pp. 247–268, <https://doi.org/10.2307/222669>.

124 Khan, Hina, "Russian Expansionism in Central Asia and the Region's Response", *Pakistan Horizon* 49(2), 1996, pp. 33–57, www.jstor.org/stable/41393938 (Accessed 18 Apr. 2021).

125 Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

hostile attitude towards democracies. Building friendships and alliances involves a deeper connection between citizens, while Russia wants to prevent such outside influence.¹²⁶ The country is continuing to follow a historically modified Soviet system of government and is willing to maintain it for as long as possible.¹²⁷ Thirdly, countries should not expect any demonstrated reciprocity of friendly attitudes towards Russia.¹²⁸ Fourthly, Russian officials always bring a long list of demands to the table and take a strong stance in negotiations. They are unwilling to compromise and, if they do so, it is only to cover their weaknesses and gain additional bargaining power.¹²⁹ Finally, its core interests can never be compromised. Moreover, if these are ever left unsecured during the course of negotiations, Russia will use its power to secure them. It does not pay attention to external judgement and will continue its plan while claiming a desire to cooperate.¹³⁰

These principles have remained the basis of Russian diplomacy for centuries. Beginning under

the Russian Empire and maintained throughout the era of the USSR, they were refined to be even more oriented towards the idea of “getting more, giving less”.¹³¹ These principles were developed by US diplomats;¹³² nevertheless, the EU has not incorporated them into their strategy towards Russia,¹³³ according to an EEAS strategy.

Reaching a unified position in the EU is complicated due to the complexity of national interests of EU Member States and their separate relationships with Russia. Russia recognises this “weakness” and exploits it by investing in the positive attitudes of specific Member States¹³⁴ and its network of agents.¹³⁵ As a result, the duality between pro- and anti-Russian States calls for neutrality and the preservation of the status quo.¹³⁶ The EU response to Russian military interference has demonstrated that sanctions have no influence on Russian foreign policy;¹³⁷ nevertheless, they have caused a breach in communication that demands a change in the EU’s strategy towards Russia.

126 Karlsen, G.H., “Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe”, *Palgrave Communications* 5(19) (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0227-8>.

127 Marocchi, Tania, “EU-Russia Relations: Towards An Increasingly Geopolitical Paradigm”, *Vocal Europe* (2017), <https://www.vocaleurope.eu/eu-russia-relations-towards-increasingly-geopolitical-paradigm/>.

128 Ledeneva, Alena V., *How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2006).

129 Ivanov, Igor S., *The New Russian Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

130 Kasparov, Garry, “На поступки Путін не піде, він і доб’є Російську імперію” [“Putin will never agree to compromise and will kill the Russian Empire”], *Espresso TV* (Ukraine, 20 February 2021), <https://espresso.tv/video/280613>.

131 Rönngren, Emma, “Russia’s public diplomacy evolution and practice”, *Global Affairs* 6(3) (2020), pp. 313–314, DOI: [10.1080/23340460.2020.1836670](https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2020.1836670).

132 Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*.

133 European External Action Service, “The European Union and the Russian Federation” (3 March 2021), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35939/european-union-and-russian-federation_en.

134 Schmidt-Felzmann, Anke, “Is the EU’s failed relationship with Russia the member states’ fault?”, *L’Europe en Formation* 374(4) (2014), pp. 40–60, <https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2014-4-page-40.htm>.

135 Groziev, Khristo, “Масштаб російської агентурної мережі колосальний” [“The size of Russian agent network is colossal”], *Espresso TV* (Ukraine, 9 January 2021), <https://espresso.tv/video/279935>.

136 Russell, Martin, *The EU and Russia: Locked into confrontation* [briefing], European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 652.030 (July 2020), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652030/EPRS_BRI\(2020\)652030_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652030/EPRS_BRI(2020)652030_EN.pdf).

137 Duleba, Alexander, “EU-Russia Relations: the State of Affairs” in *Searching for New Momentum in EU-Russia Relations* (Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2009), pp. 9–27, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/slowakei/06939.pdf>.

The EU debate about future opportunities brings us two options: 1) start a dialogue with Russia and determine communication rules; or 2) continue imposing sanctions and wait until Russia gets interested in playing according to the EU's rules.¹³⁸ When analysing them both, taking into account the principles outlined above, it becomes evident that neither option will lead to the expected results. First, Russia would consider an attempt at dialogue as a weakness and take a strong stand, dictating its own rules.¹³⁹ Compromises can be achieved; however, the EU strongly disagrees with Russian activity in Ukraine while Russia refuses to stop. Therefore, this tension will not cease to exist. Secondly, even though Russia suffers economically from sanctions, it is ruled by the "rich few" who invest their personal funds in security, defence, and foreign policy.¹⁴⁰ The required waiting time is higher than the possible gained value in case of success. Therefore, the EU has to evaluate other possibilities before making a choice.

138 Real Instituto Elcano, "Russia, the West, and the rest: between influence and interference" [seminar] (5 March 2020), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/actividad?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/calendario/actividades/seminar-russia-the-west-and-the-rest-between-influence-and-interference.

139 Iakovenko, Ihor, "Кремль рие собі могилу. Керованість зникає" [*Russia is digging out a tomb for itself. The control vanishes*], Espresso TV (Ukraine, 13 February 2021), <https://espreso.tv/video/280593>.

140 Schmitz, Jasmin, "The future of EU – Russia relations case study about the EU as defence actor" [B.Sc. thesis S1730940] (Enschede, Netherlands: University of Twente, 2017), https://essay.utwente.nl/73020/1/Schmitz_BA_BMS.pdf.

Taking into account the above principles of Russian foreign policy, several recommendations can be advanced:

- 1 Instead of a global communication approach, the EU can shift to targeted cooperation. The EU can invoke multilateral negotiations that would cause Russia to lose its strong bargaining position and agree to an offer on the table. At the same time, the EU can strengthen its cooperation with other states and diminish Russia's leverage. This approach has the aim of showing openly that EU diplomacy is founded on good intentions, while it is Russia who in fact needs the EU as a partner.
- 2 The tension between the EU and Russia did not develop overnight; therefore, the new approach should be long term and switch to the current soft diplomacy only when Russia stops acting against EU values.
- 3 Regarding the tensions inside Russia that have started growing recently, the EU should support democratic developments and invest in organisations that oppose the government. The EU should secure partnerships for a future dialogue. Nevertheless, one should remember that decades of communism, oppression, and cutting off access to alternative sources of information have had their impact on how civil society perceives politics and state narratives; therefore, the EU should be prepared to deal with stigma against "the West".
- 4 The EU should insist on a hard-line towards Russia and, at the same time, monitor Moscow's cooperation with China. China does not consider Russia an ally but a resource. It also aims to weaken Russia and annex parts of its territory; therefore, behaving amicably towards Russia because of China would have an even more destructive impact on the EU, in so far as this would weaken its bargaining position, and it would not consider a long-term perspective.
- 5 The EU should focus on the Eastern Partnership and overpower Russia's leverage in the region. The region is strategic for Russia as a buffer zone from NATO; thus, increasing EU influence will act as a signal that its diplomatic power has diminished and the time for compromises has come. EURONEST PA and the Trio strategy can be used as an instrument to deepen this cooperation.

Currently, these recommendations look impossible to implement because of their difference from the chosen guidelines. However, understanding the need to change should serve as motivation. Building a counterpart-based strategy should bring about more tangible results than following a general diplomatic approach. Therefore, further discussion is needed to transform this recommendation into a model acceptable by the majority of Member States.

The EU and its Southern Neighbourhood: The Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa

George Meneshian

This article deals with issues pertaining to the European Union's (EU) policy for the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions. The aim of this paper is to underline the geostrategic importance of the EU's Southern neighbourhood in the context of the discussion held in Europe about reforming the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's diplomatic service. These regions have faced several crises during the past few years which have affected Europe, as well. My study theorises that a common EU foreign policy/strategy based on common principles and multilateralism can contribute to the transition from instability in the region to a more stable and more prosperous Eastern Mediterranean and MENA—and thus to a safer European Southern neighbourhood as a whole. Furthermore, by focusing on its Southern neighbourhood, the EU can reclaim its role as the major transregional political actor and as the main agent of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law there.

The importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and MENA for Europe

The stability of the regions

under examination are of vital importance to Europe's security and prosperity: the Mediterranean is highly important for navigation and international trade, given the

role of the Suez Canal and ports such as Piraeus and Trieste. Furthermore, MENA is of great importance to Europe's energy security for two reasons: first, the role of the Suez Canal is

vital for the oil and gas trade¹⁴¹ and, second, the hydrocarbon findings in the Eastern Mediterranean¹⁴² offer Europe an alternative source to Russian gas.¹⁴³ Trade¹⁴⁴ and energy are not the only crucial factors in the regions' importance, however. Political instability within MENA creates a security problem¹⁴⁵ for the EU, given the presence of terrorism in failed states¹⁴⁶ and the massive influx of migrants from MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa, or South Asia.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the EU is becoming more vulnerable to hybrid attacks¹⁴⁸ by agents intending to encircle Europe from the East and the South. Lastly, the Mediterranean connects the Global North to the Global South, the West to the East, and Christianity to the Islamic world. Stability in the region, therefore, can contribute to inter-regional cooperation and to a dialogue among civilisations.

The present situation

Nowadays, the EU's Southern neighbourhood is unstable; hopes raised by the so-called Arab Spring have been dashed, and the region faces immense problems resulting from the collapse of states,¹⁴⁹ armed conflicts, ethnic or sectarian¹⁵⁰ violence, terrorism, migration, and the violation of fundamental human rights by regimes and non-state actors. In addition to that, the ambition of regional powers like Turkey and Iran¹⁵¹ to emerge as dominant forces in these areas, as well as Russia's return to the MENA region,¹⁵² further destabilises the region and undermines the role of the EU¹⁵³ and its values.

Regarding Turkey, its intervention in Iraq¹⁵⁴ and the

-
- 141 Dunn, Candace & Kempkey, Natalie, "The Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline are critical chokepoints for oil and natural gas trade", The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2019), <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40152> (Accessed: 16 March 2021).
- 142 Cingoli, Janiki, "The New Energy Resources in the Centre-East Mediterranean: Potential Current and Future Geo-Strategic Consequences", *Istituto Affari Internazionali Working Papers* 16(32) (23 November 2016), <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/new-energy-resources-centre-east-mediterranean>.
- 143 Mathioulakis, Michalis (ed.), *Aspects of the Energy Union: Application and Effects of European Energy Policies in SE Europe and Eastern Mediterranean* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2021), p. 6.
- 144 Filis, Konstantinos, "The Strategic Value of the Eastern Mediterranean", *Stratfor* (21 March 2017), <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/strategic-value-eastern-mediterranean> (Accessed: 17 March 2021).
- 145 Lesser, Ian O., *Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean* (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2005), p. 6.
- 146 Kamrava, Mehran, "Weak States in the Middle East" in *Weak States in the Greater Middle East* (Working Group, The Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar: 2014), p. 1.
- 147 In the 2014–2020 period, more than two million refugees and immigrants arrived in Europe via the Mediterranean, according to the UN Refugee Agency. UNHCR, "Mediterranean Situation", <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>.
- 148 Serrano de Haro, Pedro A., "Working Together for a Safer World" in Martin Westlake (ed.), *The European Union's New Foreign Policy* (Springer International Publishing; Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), pp. 59–90.
- 149 Cordesman, Anthony H., *The Greater Middle East: From the "Arab Spring" to the "Axis of Failed States"* [working draft] (Center for Strategic & International Studies: 2020), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states> (Accessed: 23 September 2020).
- 150 Potter, Lawrence G., "Sectorialism in the Middle East", *Great Decisions* (2015), pp. 29–40.
- 151 Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Barry, James, "Iran and Turkey: not quite enemies but less than friends", *Third World Quarterly* 38(4) (2017), pp. 980–995.
- 152 Penkova, Tomislava, "Russia's Strategy of Forging Spaces Around Itself" in Serena Giusti & Irina Mirkina (eds.), *The EU in a Trans-European Space: External Relations across Europe, Asia and the Middle East* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2019), pp. 43–63.
- 153 "Challenges of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy", German Institute for International and Security Affairs, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/dossiers/common-foreign-and-security-policy/> (Accessed: 19 March 2021).
- 154 "Turkey's PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer", The International Crisis Group, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer>.

Syrian¹⁵⁵ and Libyan¹⁵⁶ civil wars, its longstanding occupation of Northern Cyprus, its irredentist agenda (e.g., 'Blue Homeland'),¹⁵⁷ its support for Islamist militant groups,¹⁵⁸ and its violation of international law—such as the UN arms embargo on Libya¹⁵⁹—all oblige the EU to start applying a common foreign policy for the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey. We should not forget that this situation creates serious security issues for two EU Member States: Greece and Cyprus.

Europe's response

In order to effectively address the issues mentioned above, the European External Action Service (EEAS) must be reshaped.

The EEAS was established in 2010 following the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). It is the diplomatic branch of the EU¹⁶⁰ and is functionally connected with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).¹⁶¹ As we speak, there are European missions in the Palestinian Territories (EUBAM

Rafah; EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories), in Iraq (EUAM Iraq), and in Libya (EUBAM Libya; EUNAVFOR MED IRINI).¹⁶²

The EU's Mediterranean policy has been best reflected in its effort to build the Union for the Mediterranean. This was launched in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and is described as "an inter-governmental partnership that promotes cooperation and dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region through projects and initiatives addressing the three strategic objectives of regional stability, human development and economic regional integration".¹⁶³

Regarding MENA, EU policy has two main objectives: 1) the encouragement of political and economic reform; and 2) regional cooperation via the Union for the Mediterranean. Furthermore, EU foreign policy is focused on finding a permanent solution for the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict through the Middle East Peace Process as well as cooperating with regional organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the League of Arab States, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.¹⁶⁴

-
- 155 Murariu, Mihai & Anglițoiu, George, "Anatolian Security and Neo-Ottomanism: Turkey's Intervention in Syria", *Middle East Policy* 27(2) (2020), pp. 132–147.
- 156 Quamar, Md. Muddasir, "Turkey and the Regional Flashpoint in Libya", *Strategic Analysis* 44(6) (2020), pp. 597–602.
- 157 Fahim, Kareem, "Amid Mediterranean tensions, retired Turkish admiral grabs the spotlight touting supremacy at sea", *The Washington Post* (26 September 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-greece-blue-homeland/2020/09/26/15cf7afe-fc3b-11ea-830c-a160b331ca62_story.html (Accessed: 17 March 2021).
- 158 Antonopoulos, Paul, "Turkey's interests in the Syrian war: from neo-Ottomanism to counterinsurgency", *Global Affairs* 3(4-5) (2017), pp. 405–419.
- 159 "UN report finds Jordan, Turkey, UAE violated Libya arms embargo", *France 24* (7 November 2019), <https://www.france24.com/en/20191107-un-report-finds-jordan-turkey-uae-violated-libya-arms-embargo%2%A0>.
- 160 Koops, Joachim A. & Tercovich, Giulia, "Shaping the European External Action Service and its post-Lisbon crisis management structures: an assessment of The EU High Representatives' political leadership", *European Security* 29(3) (2020), pp. 275–300.
- 161 Gatti, Mauro, *European External Action Service: Promoting Coherence through Autonomy and Coordination* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), p. 94.
- 162 European Union: External Action Service, "EU in the World", https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/area/geo_en (Accessed: 16 March 2021).
- 163 European Union: External Action Service, "Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)", https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/329/union-for-the-mediterranean-ufm_en (Accessed: 16 March 2021).
- 164 European Union: External Action Service, "Middle East and North Africa (MENA)", https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/middle-east-north-africa-mena/336/middle-east-and-north-africa-mena_en (Accessed: 16 March 2021).

Following the Arab Uprisings, the EU attempted to revise the ENP with democracy-related and MENA-centred initiatives. These efforts, however, have been met with little or no success.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the EU tried to reform its foreign policy with the 2016 Global Strategy, the 2017 activation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and upgrading the European Parliament in matters of foreign policy.¹⁶⁶

EU policy towards the Mediterranean and MENA, however, has in fact failed: the consequences of the Arab Uprisings have led to the emergence of revisionist regional powers that challenge the role of the EU in the region. The EU has also failed to protect human rights there. Furthermore, some

of its missions, such as Operation Irini, have essentially broken down. Moreover, the Union for the Mediterranean has lost its political value. Despite rather ambitious European efforts, the region has become even more unstable, resulting in a mass migration towards Europe that has led to the rise of far-right powers on the continent.

The absence of a unifying mechanism and the lack of a European grand strategy make a common EU foreign policy ineffective. Besides, European foreign policy is only nominally common; EU Member States have different views¹⁶⁷ regarding important issues in the region such as the Libyan Crisis¹⁶⁸ or relations with Turkey.

Conclusion: The future of EU foreign policy

The EU has indeed tried to reshape its foreign policy, particularly the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) following the so-called Arab Spring. Despite these efforts, Europe's Southern neighbourhood continues to be in crisis. This is why I think Europe should proceed with the following:

- 1 Give more powers and autonomy to the EEAS. Today, the EEAS does not propose or implement policies of its own but simply prepares the ground for decisions to be adopted by the High Representative, the European Commission, or the Council.¹⁶⁹ The role of the Commission and the Council must become less prominent, and the EEAS should increase its cooperation with the European Parliament, the foremost elected institution of the Union. To upgrade the role of the EEAS, the EU should also eliminate the unanimity requirement of the CFSP.

165 Abbott, Pamela, Teti, Andrea et al., *Democratisation against Democracy: How EU Foreign Policy Fails the Middle East* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), pp. 108–122.

166 Westlake, Martin (ed.), *The European Union's New Foreign Policy* (Springer International Publishing; Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), p. 2.

167 Puglierin, Jana, "Priorities for the EU's New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024: Unleashing the Potential of the Common Foreign and Security Policy", *German Council on Foreign Relations* (2019), p. 6.

168 Meneshian, George, "The Situation in Libya And Europe's Failure to Intervene", *Libertas* (2021), https://www.lymec.eu/2021/03/15/the-situation-in-libya-and-europes-failure-to-intervene/?fbclid=IwAR2GJLADj4esHqErI4nA4eyWoY7G_H_1LWwcyIR8zX0TX5uAhRrLaBQad6g.

168 Gatti, Mauro, *External Action Service...*

- 2 The EU must revitalise the Barcelona Process and give new life to the Union for the Mediterranean. If the 2007–2008 treaties had been implemented, this Organisation would be able to deal with the ongoing issues and the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue would remain alive. Regionalism and multilateralism based on democracy and the rule of law should be priorities for the EU.
- 3 The EU, and more specifically the EEAS, must strongly support regional partnerships such as the EU Med Group, EastMed Gas, and the Philia Forum¹⁷⁰ or the Greece–Cyprus–Israel¹⁷¹ and the Greece–Cyprus–Egypt¹⁷² trilateral partnerships. The EU should also encourage other countries to join these existing or future partnerships.
- 4 It is necessary for the European Union to agree on a concrete framework for its relationship with Turkey based on rules and principles; Turkey is an important actor in the Mediterranean and MENA. The EU, therefore, should negotiate an agreement with this country as it has already done with the United Kingdom following Brexit. This agreement should include economic relations and the migration crisis but also political issues, such as respect for human rights, minorities, adherence to international law, and loosening travel restrictions for Turks in case of compliance. This would probably facilitate talks between Greece and Turkey and a possible resolution of the Cyprus Dispute.¹⁷³
- 5 Finally, the EU should probably create an *ad-hoc* platform for the implementation of a common foreign policy, if ever a crisis should break out in these areas. This special platform could deter Member States from acting unilaterally. Such a platform would, for instance, help in avoiding the fragmented EU-State policies in the Libyan Civil War or Turkish drilling in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone. European foreign policy needs to be more unified, more assertive, and ready to immediately respond to crises and external threats.

170 Baker, Rauf, "The EastMed Gas and Philia Forums: Reimagining Cooperation in the Mediterranean", *Fikra Forum* (18 March 2021), <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/eastmed-gas-and-philia-forums-reimagining-cooperation-mediterranean> (Accessed: 19 March 2021).

171 Tzogopoulos, George N., "Thinking Beyond the EastMed Pipeline", *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Perspectives* No. 1,605 (14 June 2020), <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-greece-cyprus-cooperation/> (Accessed: 18 March 2021).

172 Shama, Nael, "Between Alliance and Entente: The Egyptian-Greek-Cypriot Partnership" in Zenonas Tziarras (ed.), *The New Geopolitics of The Eastern Mediterranean: Trilateral Partnerships and Regional Security* (Nicosia: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2019), pp. 95–111.

173 Bakoyannis, Dora, "The EU-Turkey special framework and the path toward The Hague", *Kathimerini* (3 January 2020), <https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/248057/the-eu-turkey-special-framework-and-the-path-toward-the-hague/> (Accessed: 17 March 2021).



Topics and tools

Renewable Hydrogen in 2050: Between sustainable necessities and geopolitical challenges

Felix Sebastian Schulz

The current European Commission sets the way for a carbon-free continent and aims to be a geopolitical leader. When it comes to the introduction of a hydrogen economy, both policy realms clash. In this paper, we analyze how they can be achieved at the same time and how the European External Action Service (EEAS) can help to achieve this objective. We find that it should coordinate activities related to the external dimension of hydrogen between all the various EU foreign policy actors. Furthermore, it should target the Eastern European and MENA regions as strategic partners and start evaluating their will regarding hydrogen production projects. Lastly, the EEAS should commence multilateral initiatives on hydrogen production and distribution.

In July 2020, the European Commission presented its hydrogen strategy. It is an additional pillar of the so-called Energy Union and is supposed to create a domestic hydrogen economy as part of the European Green Deal for

decades to come. Nevertheless, we already know that the EU is not going to meet its demand with solely domestic hydrogen production in the future. So, where will this clean and renewable hydrogen come from, how will it change the

geopolitical landscape, and which partnerships should the European External Action Service (EEAS) forge today in order to secure future supplies?

First of all, what does the European Green Deal say

about hydrogen, and to what extent is actual EU hydrogen strategy linked to this endeavour? The Green Deal, which was introduced in 2019, is aiming to reach carbon neutrality in the EU by 2050. It covers many different sectors, including construction, biodiversity, energy, transport, and food. Through partnerships with industry and Member States, it will support research and innovation—including in clean hydrogen. Additionally, it seeks to set up the necessary distribution infrastructure and create ‘climate and resource frontrunners’. More importantly, it also tries to develop the first commercial applications of breakthrough technologies in key industrial sectors by 2030, such as clean hydrogen and fuel cells.¹⁷⁴

In this context, the EU hydrogen strategy goes one step further. It will explore actions to support the production and use of clean hydrogen, focusing on the market readiness of renewable hydrogen in particular. Since many appliances will rely on combustible fuels, electrification is not going to be enough in a future carbon-neutral economy. However, the timeframe is quite ambitious. Within three phases, starting in the chemical sector, hydrogen technology is supposed to reach market maturity after 2030 and should by then be widely deployed. Furthermore, the strategy has an integral external dimension. According to the Commission, it offers the opportunity to redesign Europe’s energy partnerships and increase supply diversification as well as create

secure supply chains—especially with the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbours.¹⁷⁵

This is exactly where the EEAS comes in. We know already that we are not going to meet renewable hydrogen demand through domestic production. Depending on the scenario, it is considered that hydrogen and derived fuels will add up to 10–23% of the 2050 final energy consumption in the EU.¹⁷⁶ But only 40 gigawatts of renewable hydrogen electrolyzers will be deployed by 2030 in the EU. In comparison to 2050, this is still a very small amount. Therefore, we have to turn towards regions where renewable energy sources are abundant, and the EEAS can help to forge new networks in these regions with governments, investors, and companies.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has attractive locations for wind and solar energy production. Its global horizontal irradiance is about double that of Central Europe.¹⁷⁷ Direct EU neighbours also offer great potential for renewable hydrogen production. Norway and Great Britain should be first-choice partners. They are already embedded within the EU energy infrastructure and have advanced hydrogen technologies.¹⁷⁸ Lastly, Eastern Europe and Ukraine are interesting to look at because they are also integrated into the EU energy market and are able to use the supply infrastructure already in place.¹⁷⁹

174 European Commission, *The European Green Deal*, COM(2019) 640 final (Brussels, 11 December 2019), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

175 European Commission, *A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe*, COM(2020) 301 final (Brussels, 8 July 2020), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0301&from=EN>.

176 European Commission Joint Research Centre, “Hydrogen use in EU decarbonisation scenarios.” (17 April 2019). https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/final_insights_into_hydrogen_use_public_version.pdf

177 German Energy Agency, *The potential of electricity-based fuels for low-emission transport in the EU* (November 2017), https://www.dena.de/fileadmin/dena/Dokumente/Pdf/9219_E-FUELS-STUDY_The_potential_of_electricity_based_fuels_for_low_emission_transport_in_the_EU.pdf.

178 Westphal, K., “The International Dimensions of Germany’s Hydrogen Policy”, SWP Comment 2020/C 32 (June 2020), <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-international-dimensions-of-germanys-hydrogen-policy/>.

179 Ibid.

Ursula von der Leyen addressed the EU's external energy relations in her nomination letter to Josep Borrell.¹⁸⁰ She stressed that the current Commission aims to be a global leader with a geopolitical focus. One of these aspects involves linking the external and internal dimensions of our energy policies better and making external actions more strategic and coherent. At the same time, Russian and Chinese influence has increased in Africa over the years. These two players have boosted their investments in infrastructure and technological partnerships.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, with the Green Deal and EU hydrogen strategy, we already have the tools to build long-lasting strategic partnerships, meet future energy demands, and support a sustainable shift from fossil-fuel to renewable energy.

In this context, the EEAS can play a decisive role. As the diplomatic service of the EU, it is supposed to coordinate between all the EU foreign policy actors. Herein lies the chance of finding a minimum consensus regarding external hydrogen relations. Once a consensus on a strategic region has been found, the EEAS needs to build networks with local governments, investors, and companies. Therefore, EU Delegations, which are run by the EEAS, play an important role. They represent the EU as a whole and can demonstrate concrete investment interests in geopolitically important regions.¹⁸²

Within the EU, the EEAS is a hybrid institution. It is neither an EU institution nor an outside organisation.¹⁸³ It is constrained by Member States and can act independently in its area of responsibility. Hence, it should take a more self-confident role and function as a platform for hydrogen production and bring together public institutions, research institutes, and private investors. In so doing, it would be able to steer the grand strategy for the necessary production of renewable hydrogen outside the EU. One concrete step is to start examining hydrogen corridors and building networks on the ground with interested parties. These corridors offer the possibility of coping with energy resource limitations for hydrogen production that may exist in the future.¹⁸⁴ Thereby, the EEAS would also function as an advocate for multilateralism and pose a counter model to Russian and Chinese investors.¹⁸⁵

In the end, the EEAS has to enhance the EU's role as a geopolitical leader in its direct neighbourhood (Eastern Europe) and possibly in the MENA region. Up to now, China and Russia have been engaged in these regions and increased their influence over the years¹⁸⁶ while the EU has stood by. Funding in green technologies deployed in these regions related to the European Green Deal will offer an opportunity to create meaningful partnerships on equal terms.

180 von der Leyen, Ursula, "Mission letter [to Josep Borrell]" (Brussels, 1 December 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/comm-cwt2019/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-letter-josep-borrell-2019_en.pdf.

181 Turse, N., "U.S. Generals Worry about Rising Russian and Chinese Influence in Africa, Documents Show", *The Intercept* (13 August 2019), <https://theintercept.com/2019/08/13/russia-china-military-africa/>.

182 European External Action Service, "About the EEAS" (25 November 2019), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/82/about-european-external-action-service-eeas_en.

183 Batora, J., "The 'Mitrailleuse Effect': The EEAS as an interstitial organization and the dynamics of innovation in diplomacy", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(4) (2013), 598–613.

184 Wietschel, M., & Hasenauer, U., "Feasibility of hydrogen corridors between the EU and its neighbouring countries", *Renewable Energy* 32(13) (2007), pp. 2129–2146.

185 Borrell, J., "Building multilateralism for the 21st Century", EEAS (2021). https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/93360/building-multilateralism-21st-century_en.

186 Westphal, K., "Germany's Hydrogen Policy"...

Policy recommendations:

- » The EEAS needs to coordinate activities between all EU foreign policy actors in terms of the external dimension of hydrogen and find a minimum consensus on where to invest in the future.
- » The EEAS should target geopolitically important regions such as Eastern Europe and the MENA region and establish strategic partnerships there. With platforms and EU Delegations, it should be able to evaluate these nations' will regarding hydrogen production projects.
- » The EEAS should start multilateral initiatives on hydrogen production and distribution.

Right to Asylum: Procedures and Obstacles in the European Union

Anna Komziuk

This essay examines the problem of access to the asylum procedure in the European Union, reveals the main problems of the existing system receiving asylum seekers, considers the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and makes recommendations.

According to the UNHCR, 79.5 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide in 2019 as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations, or events seriously disturbing public order.¹⁸⁷ The problem of refugees and their special status in the history of human civilization has existed for a long time. Migration flows have always coexisted with conflicts, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes. The problem of

forced displacement is closely intertwined with the history of human development, the development of democratic processes of state building, and the development of human rights.

Following Article 2 of the TEU, the European Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights, including the rights of

persons belonging to minority groups.¹⁸⁸ These values shall be followed in exercising all the competences of the European Union.

Therefore, the European Union should comply with the basic values and principles of its functioning when establishing asylum procedure. How does reality match up to these ideals?

According to the Dublin III Regulation,¹⁸⁹ only the country

187 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2019 (2019), <https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf>.

188 European Parliament, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, *Official Journal* C 326/15 (26 October 2012), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6_0023_02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

189 European Parliament, Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of The European Parliament and of The Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), *Official Journal* L 180/31 (29 June 2013), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:en:PDF>.

that has received and registered a refugee is responsible for exercising his/her right to asylum. In this way, the European Union means to avoid abuses of the system so that immigrants cannot seek asylum in different countries at the same time. Thus, a state that registers a refugee using the Eurodac database, which collects the fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, has the right to decide about the provision of international protection to a person.

What does this mean for a person who—due to well-founded fears of being persecuted on the grounds of race, religion or nationality or belonging to a particular social group or political opinion—is outside the country of his or her nationality and unable to be protected by it, or does not wish to enjoy such protection, and is forced to flee and seek asylum in the European Union?

In my point of view, this amounts to a partial violation of a person's right to asylum and the exercise of his or her right to revise the decision by the State which he or she first entered.

Firstly, by applying such a mechanism, contradictions would arise between Member States. For example, a person has crossed the EU border in one country and seeks asylum there, but based on the results of examining that person's application, the country decides to refuse to grant them asylum. If such a person decides to go to another Member State, that country will no longer be able to consider the person's application for asylum.

Secondly, the total workload of the countries to which asylum-seekers first enter leads

to an overload of migration authorities and, consequently, a lack of resources to support a full and independent examination of the application for asylum. The European Court of Human Rights highlighted the importance of the careful consideration of each case in its landmark *M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece*: "The decisions are taken on an individual basis, after careful, objective and impartial examination. The authorities gather and assess precise, detailed information from reliable sources, such as that supplied by the UNHCR on the general situation in the country of origin".¹⁹⁰

Thus, while a person may have access to the asylum procedure, in reality, the effectiveness of such access is questionable.

August 2020 was a turning point for neighbouring Belarus. Alexander Lukashenko declared himself president, although Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya protested the election results and many independent election observers have called them fraudulent. The OSCE, which was banned from observing the election, noted credible reports of mass violations and serious administrative violations. Protests against the election and its results quickly spread throughout Belarus and were largely peaceful, despite repression by the authorities. Persons believed to be the leaders of these public protests were quickly arrested or forcibly deported. The international community immediately expressed its concern about the situation, but, in fact, only Poland responded immediately, abolishing consular fees for Belarusian citizens.¹⁹¹

In September 2020, the European Commission presented a New Pact on Migration and Asylum¹⁹²

190 European Court of Human Rights, Case of *M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece*, Application no. 30696/09, Judgement (Strasbourg, 21 January 2011), https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/legislation-and-case-law/case-law/case-mss-v-belgium-and-greece-application-no-3069609_en.

191 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "ROZPORZĄDZENIE MINISTRA SPRAW ZAGRANICZNYCH zmieniające rozporządzenie w sprawie obniżonych opłat konsularnych" (22 December 2020), http://g.ekspert.infor.pl/pl/_dane/akty_pdf/DZU/2020/270/2402.pdf.

192 European Commission, *New Pact on Migration and Asylum* (September 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-package_1.pdf.

aimed at strengthening the EU's borders and introducing an accelerated procedure for asylum seekers, as well as the possibility of sharing responsibilities between Member States.

Such a proposal is seen as a very positive and effective one. The basic EU principles of solidarity and proportionality must be effectively disclosed through fairly shared responsibility. In addition, asylum seekers will be able to have their applications for protection processed quickly, clearly, and fully, and they will not be left in the dark indefinitely.

In Europe, the need to re-examine traditional conceptions of the relationship between migration and foreign policy is becoming ever more urgent. The large-scale international migration events of the past decade have revealed the extent to which foreign policy affects migration and vice-versa: moreover, the attendant humanitarian concerns are increasingly prevalent in the minds of both citizens and policy-makers. As the Earth's

population increases and conflict, resource scarcity, and climate change render parts of the planet uninhabitable, the issue of migration will only continue to grow in importance and urgency. The examination and incorporation of new perspectives on migration and foreign policy is important for any global power wishing to retain influence in the coming decades. For a body such as the EU, which relies heavily on its 'soft' power and the promotion of progressive values, including respect for human rights, adopting these new perspectives is crucial: a failure to incorporate them or deal humanely and successfully with migration risks undermining much of the Union's credibility on humanitarian and foreign policy issues. Whether the New Pact on Migration and Asylum will truly prove to be a fresh start for the EU remains to be seen, but what is certain is that the Union's previous responses to mass migration events have fallen woefully short. A new approach is needed, and the EEAS should be at the forefront of any new strategy.

In order to achieve this, the main recommendations are:

- » to properly implement the proposed Pact and enhance the political will of institutions at the European Union and Member State levels to launch the new mechanism;
- » to support refugee relocation programmes, subject to fair distribution among Member States;
- » to adhere to the principles of good administration when considering applications for refugee status or the status of a person in need of complementary protection;
- » given the rapid changes in the neighbouring countries on which people's lives and safety depend, the European Union must respond quickly to them by providing a simplified entry regime.

Can the EEAS be an effective force for crisis management and peacebuilding?

Ahmed Mehmedov

The EU is currently facing difficulties in performing its intended peacebuilding and crisis mitigation role. This paper aims to highlight the main issues faced by the EEAS and determine potential approaches for improving the position of the EU in the rapidly-changing global landscape. Specifically, it will focus on the funding difficulties faced by the European External Action Service and investigate how better budgeting implementations could help.

In order for the EU to continue serving its role as an effective crisis mitigator and peacebuilder, the introduction of a more modern budgeting solution is required. An EFP would serve to bolster the defensive and peacekeeping capabilities of the Union by enabling a more effective way to plan, deploy and execute CSDP missions while also providing financial backing for international peace sup-

port operations and capacity-building activities. The successful implementation of such a fund would enable the EEAS to expand upon the Union's functions and act as a global peace and security provider.

Thus far, one of the main roadblocks faced by the EU's crisis management and peacebuilding efforts can be found in Article 41(2) of the

Treaty on European Union, which prohibits expenditures arising from operations having military or defence implications.¹⁹³

In order to circumvent the issue, the EU has had to rely on two funds to finance its military operations: the Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility. Since neither of the two have been included

193 European Parliament, Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union (ex Article 28 TEU)

in the EU budget, they present a reliable way of financing peace and security efforts.

However, they too come with their respective limitations. The following paragraphs will briefly touch upon the specific properties of these funds in order to better illustrate how the EU can work to improve its position.

The Athena mechanism is an intergovernmental system that is funded by its members. Participation is voluntary and open to countries outside of the Union, but only Member States have the ability to vote. The Athena mechanism is governed by a dedicated committee appointed by the Council. The main goal in creating the Athena mechanism was to allow the EU to source and allocate more funds for its peace efforts with the help of Member States. In previous years, the Athena Mechanism has demonstrated the ability to distribute an annual total of 60 to 70 million euros.¹⁹⁴

The African Peace Facility (APF) was created with the goal of tackling peace and security challenges in Africa. Funding for the APF is provided by the European Development Fund, which positions it outside the EU budget, therefore allowing it to remain unconstrained by the CSDP. The funds are sourced from all contributing states and are based on a list of common costs.

For 2004–2017, the APF utilised a total of 2.7 billion euros in support of the AU to facilitate an “African solutions to African problems” approach.¹⁹⁵

The majority (91%) of the APF budget during that time went towards African-led PSOs (Peace Support Operations). 7% was spent on capacity building and institutional development, and 1.2% was reserved for Early Response mechanisms.¹⁹⁶

The APF does not fund the provision of weapons and ammunition, parts for weapons, soldier salaries, or training costs.¹⁹⁷

Furthermore, while the work done by the APF on a local scale is undoubtedly commendable, it is meant to only operate within the AU, which provides yet another restriction to the implementation of a more global crisis management and peacebuilding solution on the part of the EU. Therefore, despite its significantly larger operational budget, the results delivered by the APF are still not in line with the needs of the EU on a global scale, and there is definitely room for improvement.

194 Council of the EU, Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP of 19 December 2011 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena), *Official Journal* L 343/35 (23 December 2011), Annexes I, II, III, and IV, pp. 16–19, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:343:0035:0053:EN:PDF>.

195 European Commission, *African Peace Facility (APF) Annual Report 2017* (Luxembourg, 2018), p. 10, https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/apf-ar-2017-180711_en.pdf.

196 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

197 European Commission, *APF Annual Report...*, p. 9.

In order to better tackle its ever-increasing peacebuilding and security needs, the EU might need to consider:

- » The ability to act on a more global level—currently, the APF is geographically restricted to the African continent, directly inhibiting the stated goal of implementing a more flexible global solution.
- » A more flexible fund—the currently available options are far too restricted by legislation which, while peaceful and protective in nature, only serve to inhibit ongoing peacebuilding efforts. As the global landscape continues to evolve in a challenging direction, such a change would most certainly be within the Union's best interests looking forward.
- » An improved assessment system—this would ensure that potentially problematic situations would be noticed ahead of time and be provided with the necessary headway to prevent a crisis from taking place.
- » An increase in operational budget—this would be necessary to cover the broader spectrum of operations which the fund would need to support. The proposed changes would require increased funding from all members.
- » The ability to provide military assistance on a broader scale—in order to provide more thorough and conclusive responses to critical situations and better protect the population, the EU needs to be able to take the appropriate measures when necessary.
- » Moving towards the implementation of the aforementioned suggestions would, of course, give rise to a number of new challenges which would need to be tackled by the Union and the appropriate Council members. The analysis and discussion of said challenges, however, falls outside the scope of this paper.

Strengthening the External Dimension of the EU's Counterterrorism Approach

Ulla Lovcalic

This essay takes an inventory of the EU's role and competences in the field of counterterrorism and argues for a comprehensive set of common capabilities within: detection, sense-making, decision-making, coordination, meaning-making, communication, and accountability. Moreover, it argues for improvements within the external dimension of the EU's counterterrorism approach, specifically by focusing on the PNR-directive and terrorism alert systems. In order to have a holistic counterterrorism approach, the EU must revise some of its existing tools, making sure that they are used properly and also extending their reach to new areas.

Introduction

Terrorism is not a new threat to Europe, but the recent rise of attacks on our continent illustrates, firstly, that it remains a danger to our free and democratic societies, and, secondly, that it has become more transboundary in nature. In order to successfully deal with these challenges, it is

up to the European Union to continue developing a strong and collective approach that both is efficient—in terms of security outcomes, coherence, and resources—and safeguards our fundamental rights, particularly the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom from discrimination. In this report, I will outline some recent

counterterrorism capacities which have been initiated at the EU level over the last two decades, including the external dimension, set them within a crisis management context, and suggest further improvements within the external dimension—with reference to both efficiency and the aforementioned nexus between security and civil rights.

Conceptualizing Counterterrorism Strategies

Counterterrorism strategies come in many forms and, as such, can be analytically compartmentalized in different ways. They can, for example, be differentiated by their strategic aim, e.g., “prevention” and “reaction”, by their level of coerciveness, i.e., “hard power” and “soft power”, or by their central security actor, e.g., “military” and “judicial”. Yet another, more nuanced categorization emphasises critical tasks for crisis leadership, dividing them into seven activities: detection (recognising an emerging threat), sense-making (creating a situational awareness), decision-making (formulating strategy and protocols), coordination (harmonising responses among Member States), meaning-making (formulating crisis messages), communication (crisis messaging to the public), and accountability (procedures and forums for explaining crisis measures).¹⁹⁸ A comprehensive counterterrorism approach implies engaging with all seven critical activities.

Counterterrorism Capacities at the EU level

Although it is primarily Member States who are responsible for combating crime and terrorism, intergovernmental security cooperation in the field has led to rapid growth of supranational organs, such as the European police agency (Europol), the EU Agency for the Operational

Management of Large-Scale IT Systems (eu-LISA), and the EU agency for criminal justice cooperation (Eurojust). Furthermore, increased capacities have developed that range from harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions to discussing online radicalisation through the private-public EU Internet Forum, using tools like SIENA and EIS for the sensitive exchange of counterterrorism intelligence information, countering terrorist financing through Europol’s intelligence platform FIU.net, and coordinating responses to terrorist attacks through the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC), as well as regulating firearms and transfers of Passenger Name Register (PNR) data from airlines.¹⁹⁹ To summarise the EU’s counterterrorism capacities, most of them are within the analytical categories of “detection” and “sense-making”, while capacities within “decision-making” and “coordination” are less well-developed—most likely because they have a greater impact on national sovereignty and autonomy.²⁰⁰ Moreover, the EU can generally be said to promote a criminal justice approach on counterterrorism while protecting human rights.

The EU’s list of counterterrorism instruments increases by the day; in the European Commission’s counterterrorism agenda from December 2021, it emphasises a focus on strengthening its existing organs and capacities as well as on better anticipating threats, countering radicalisation, and reducing vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and public spaces.²⁰¹ Most notably, a new “decision-making” capacity has been proposed: the investigation and prosecution

198 Backman, Sarah & Rhinard, Mark, “The European Union’s Capacities for Managing Crises”, *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 26(2) (24 August 2017), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12190> (Accessed: 20 March 2021).

199 European Parliament, “Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy” (2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/sv/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282021%29659446 (Accessed: 21 March 2021), pp. 5–7.

200 Backman, Sarah & Rhinard, Mark, “EU Crisis Capacities”..., p. 268.

201 European Commission, *A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond*, COM(2020) 795 final (Brussels, 9 December 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/pdf/09122020_communication_commission_european_parliament_the_council_eu_agenda_counter_terrorism_po-2020-9031_com-2020_795_en.pdf (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

of terrorist crimes at EU level through an extended mandate for the recently established European Public Prosecutor's Office.²⁰² Within the external dimension, Europol is enabled to issue alerts in the Schengen Information System (SIS) on the basis of third-country-sourced information, in particular, to detect foreign terrorist fighters.²⁰³

Strengthening the External Dimension of Counterterrorism

The EU's counterterrorism tools can be further strengthened, not least within the external dimension. Two examples are the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive and Europol's cooperation with Interpol and third countries. The former was adopted in 2016 for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crimes. It regulates the collection of PNR data—unverified information provided by passengers and collected by air carriers to enable the reservation and check-in processes—and allows authorities to detect suspicious travel patterns as well as identify the associates of criminals and terrorists, in particular those previously unknown to law enforcement. The EU also has PNR agreements with third countries, currently only Australia and the United States. However, there are ongoing negotiations with Canada and Japan. According to the Commission, the processing of PNR data has become “a widely used essential law enforcement tool, to prevent and fight terrorism

and other forms of serious crime”.²⁰⁴ Arguably, to increase the tool's efficiency at home and abroad, the EU should firstly aim to negotiate with more countries for an agreement and, secondly, it should broaden the directive's area of use to encompass other types of transportation. The latter could imply extending the PNR directive to include travel by boat and train. Thereby, the EU could increase its own and third countries' security at a low cost to both citizens' freedom and authorities' budgets.

The other example deals with the consequences of the use of Interpol's Red Notices and similar alerts in Europol. A “Red Notice” is a request to law enforcement worldwide “to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action”.²⁰⁵ It is, however, up to each individual country to determine what will happen to persons who are subjected to this mechanism. The important aspect here is that this tool can be used by all of Interpol's 194 member countries, including all EU Member States.²⁰⁶ According to Interpol, every Red Notice request is checked by a specialised task force within the Interpol General Secretariat in order to ensure that it is compliant with their rules. One of these rules, laid out in their Constitution, stipulates that “[i]t is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character”.²⁰⁷ However, there have been instances where this rule has been breached. One notable example is when Tumso Abdurakhmanov, a Chechen blogger and critic of the Russian region's leader, was

202 European Parliament, “EU counter-terrorism policy”...

203 European Commission, “Schengen Information System” (2021), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system_en (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

204 European Commission, “Passenger Name Record (PNR)” (2021), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/law-enforcement-cooperation/information-exchange/pnr_en (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

205 Interpol, “Red Notices” (2021), <https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/Red-Notices> (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

206 Interpol, “Member countries” (2021), <https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Member-countries> (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

207 Interpol, “Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL” (2017), file:///Users/ullalovcalic/Downloads/Constitution%20of%20the%20ICPO-INTERPOL-EN%20(1).pdf (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

wrongfully subjected to a Red Notice by Russia. He was, unbeknownst to him, wanted for Islamic terrorism and was as such arrested and denied asylum in Poland.²⁰⁸ It turns out that he was not only on the Interpol Red Notice list but also in the Schengen Information System (SIS). In light of this event, and also considering that Europol has been enabled to issue alerts in the SIS on

the basis of third-country-sourced information, in particular, to detect foreign terrorist fighters since December 2020,²⁰⁹ it is important that the EU implements more rigorous checks when wanted persons are applying for asylum in the Union in order to prohibit authoritarian countries from misusing the mechanism to silence the opposition or limit their freedom of movement.

Policy recommendations:

- » The EU should establish PNR Agreements with more countries in order to strengthen its external counterterrorism cooperation.
- » The EU should broaden the PNR directive to include other forms of travel, such as by boat and train, in order to increase the scope and efficiency of intelligence sharing, both within the EU and with its PNR partners.
- » The EU should implement rigorous checks of third-country-sourced information on terrorist alerts when the subjected person is applying for asylum in a Member State. These checks should be strengthened both when information is being processed by Europol or the SIS directly and when it is provided by Interpol.

208 Wyrwał, Marcin & Żmudka, Matgorzata, "I'd prefer to die in Poland": Chechnya's most famous YouTuber in exile faces deportation to Russia", *Open Democracy* (5 November 2018), <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tumso-abdurakhmanov/> (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

209 European Commission, "Schengen"...

What's the Social Purpose of it all? Strategic Partnerships fit to shape the future of the EU's liberal engagement

Sascha Lucas

The EU maintains several so-called 'strategic partnerships' with a diverse group of countries and institutions. There is, however, no clearly defined nature of what such a partnership is. Taking a look at the EU's strategic partnerships with Japan and China, this essay outlines the adjustments made in the application of the term in order to facilitate the endurance of a reformed liberal international order. A Strategic Partnership must therefore centre a deep social purpose around shared values and ambitious goals of a global scope. Strategic Partnerships pursuing a liberal international order are what can create the basis for EU global relations fit for the problems of modernity in a world that is still safe for democracies. Existing partnerships need to be revised; new partnerships with emerging democracies need to be advanced. As the guiding partnership in pursuit of a liberal order for both the Union and its Members, the EEAS is a suitable coordinator to ensure a coherent and global European presence.

The liberal international order needs strong and dedicated democracies to

promote it. In turn, this order provides the tools to master the interdependencies of

modernity. It is the order in which democracy itself can survive.²¹⁰ The EU must promote

²¹⁰ Ikenberry, John, *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crisis of Global Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), p. 287.

liberal internationalism with its *Strategic Partners* around a thick social purpose of shared values and dense agreements.

The liberal international order is open to ideas, goods, services, and people; it is rules-based and multilateral; it entails solidarity and security cooperation; it allows for reform; and it moves all its participants in a progressive direction. Following this concept, the liberal order can take various forms, of globalism, institutional organisations, and (in)dependence on hegemony. The most important variant can be found in the density of the *social purpose* of both the order itself and groups of participants that try to shape it. A *thin social purpose* provides for limited rules, institutions, and cooperation which may only have regional vision. A *thick social purpose* means solidarity within a dense set of agreements, shared values, and commitments to ambitious goals, integration, and cooperative security on a global scope.²¹¹

Today, the manifestation of the liberal international order may be in crisis, facing challenges from nationalists, xenophobes, and autocrats, but it is not lost. A reformed liberal order appeals not just to democracies but is accepted well beyond this group. It does, nonetheless, require

democratic leadership.²¹² The European Union has the capacity to pursue its own liberal grand strategy²¹³ and can most credibly rebuild coalitions around a thick social purpose that demonstrates democratic solidarity and also recommit itself to global progressivity.

The EU's strategic partnerships were created to fulfill its ambition to be an active player for a liberal internationalist order. Acknowledged very generally in the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Global Strategy (2016), Strategic Partnerships (SP) play an important role in EU foreign policy.²¹⁴ Today, the EU loosely labels as "strategic" partnerships with a number of very heterogeneous countries and organisations.²¹⁵ It is disappointing to see that they lack coherence or clear principles in terms of what a Strategic Partnership means and what it takes to qualify as one.²¹⁶ Ex-post academic categorizations²¹⁷ cannot replace determined policies or bring them to life.²¹⁸ Looking at the SPs with Japan and China, it is clear that not every "partnership" bearing the name "strategic" deserves either label. In the quest to maintain a liberal order, strategic partnerships are most conducive through a thick social purpose that allows for joint leadership.

211 Ikenberry, John, "The end of liberal international order?", *Foreign Affairs* 94(1) (1 January 2018), p. 12.

212 Ikenberry, John, "The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of Liberal Order", *Foreign Affairs* 93(3) (May/June 2014), pp. 80–90; Nye, Joseph, "Will the Liberal Order Survive? The History of an Idea", *Foreign Affairs* 96(1) (January–February 2017), pp. 10–16.

213 Fiott, Daniel & Simón, Luis, "The European Union" in Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski & Simon Reich (eds.), *Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 262, 269.

214 Ferreira-Pereira, L. & Vieira, A., "The European Union's strategic partnerships: conceptual approaches, debates and experiences", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29(1), pp. 3–17 (6 February 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1130341>.

215 Grevi, Giovanni, "Making EU strategic partnerships effective", *FRIDE Working Papers* no. 105 (2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130706/WP105_Making_EU_Strategic_ENG_dic10.pdf.

216 Cihelková, E., Nguyen, H. P., Fabuš, M. & Cimová, K., "The EU Concept of the 'Strategic Partnership': Identifying the 'unifying' criteria for the differentiation of Strategic Partners", *Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues* 7(3) (30 March 2020), pp. 1723–1739, [http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2020.7.3\(19\)](http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2020.7.3(19)); Ferreira-Pereira & Vieira, A., "EU strategic partnerships"...

217 See various concepts cited in Ferreira-Pereira & Vieira, A., "EU strategic partnerships" ...; Cihelková et al., "EU Concept" ...; Schmidt, Anne, "Strategic Partnerships: A contested policy concept", *SWP Working Papers* FG 1 2010/ 07 (December 2010), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/FG%201%20discussion%20paper_Anne%20Schmidt.pdf.

218 Grevi, Giovanni, "Making partnerships effective"...

The *EU–Japan Strategic Partnership* is an exemplary case of a SP built around a thick social purpose, dating back to the first bilateral EU–Japan summit in The Hague in 1991. Democracy, the rule of law, human rights, open markets and free trade, and a commitment to peace and a multilateral world order characterised the informal declaration following the summit. At the height of the liberal order’s expansion, the EU–Japan Joint Action Plan of 2001 identified over 100 goals in what can probably be described as an overambitious project.²¹⁹ To address today’s complex problems of modernity, the more pragmatic EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2018 names “promoting peace and security, democracy, rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, regional and interregional cooperation and reform of the United Nations”²²⁰ as key elements. With 40 defined goals, the Agreement is still considered ambitious, but it reflects a thick social purpose and promises, through its pragmatic implementation, tangible benefits in the joint quest for a liberal internationalist order.²²¹ The EU–Japan SP is complemented by a free trade agreement and ever-increasing cooperation between these “natural allies”.²²² Considering that a strategic partnership should facilitate both partners to substantially pursue their shared vision of global order, the EU–Japan SP can truly be regarded as conducive. It must be executed in conjunction with similar SPs (see Canada or South Korea) that form the basis of the global democratic coalition.

The *EU–China Strategic Partnership* is substantially less ambitious in scope and commitment than a SP should warrant. The EU’s pursuit of a SP with China symbolised its ambition to be an independent global player. China had a similar goal as it eyed its global ascension. The SPA of 2003 embodies a limited form of instrumentalized cooperation to advance individual aspiration. Since then, the political differences between the EU and China over questions of political values have taken centre stage in questions regarding global trade as well as international peace and security.²²³ Regarding rules-based multilateralism, the Chinese understanding makes it a tool to achieve multipolarity instead.²²⁴ At the same time, a coherent EU policy is absent as the result of disunity over, for example, human rights violations and economic affairs. China actively exploits this disunity and nurtures it, e.g., through the 17+1 initiative.²²⁵

This is not intended to deny cooperation with China. On the contrary, cooperation with China will be vital to uphold the liberal international order. The label “strategic”, however, is misfitting, as the liberal order that accommodates an ever-bolder China will likely be thinner in its purpose. The strategic quest to keep the global order consistently open and rules-based, not just where it suits the applicants, must entail the courage to deny status-enhancing formalisation.

219 Berkofsky, Axel, “The EU and Japan: a partnership in the making”, European Policy Centre Issue Papers no. 52 (February 2007), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30653/EPC%20Issue%20Paper%20No%2052.pdf>, p. 10.

220 European Union, “EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement” (14 December 2018), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A4359401> (last accessed: 6 April 2021).

221 Berkofsky, Axel, “The EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – Responding to the Crisis of the Liberal World Order”, *Asia Policy Brief* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2017), http://aei.pitt.edu/93191/1/Asia_Policy_Brief_DA_2017_03_engl.pdf; Berkofsky, Axel, “Moving Beyond Rhetoric? The EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)” [policy brief], *Institute for Security & Development Policy* (April 2020), <https://isd.eu/publication/the-eu-japan-strategic-partnership-agreement/>.

222 Cihelková et al., “EU Concept”..., p. 1734.

223 Maher, Richard, “The Elusive EU–China Strategic Partnership”, *International Affairs* 92(4) (20 June 2016), p. 961.

224 Cihelková et al., “EU Concept”..., p. 1735.

225 Berkofsky, Axel, “China and the EU: ‘Strategic Partners’ no more” [policy brief], *Institute for Security & Development Policy* (December 2019), <https://isd.eu/publication/china-and-the-eu-strategic-partners-no-more/>, p. 2.

Recommendations: Strategic Partnerships fit for liberal engagement and modernity

- 1** The EU must fill the policy void and adopt a clear definition of “strategic partnerships” with the prerequisite of a thick social purpose that facilitates or promises joint leadership towards the maintenance of a liberal international order and separates other forms of cooperation based on thinner purposes.
- 2** The EU should pursue strategic partnerships with emerging democracies, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia, that promote a liberal order by providing the tangible benefits of openness and progressivity.
- 3** A revised set of strategic partnerships should become the cornerstone of EU global relations. Member States’ global relations should closely follow their principles for a real, coherent, and global European presence.
- 4** The EU must equip its diplomatic service with the capabilities to coordinate and enact these partnerships. This includes clear guidance and negotiating positions, flexibility and (dis)incentives for cooperation, as well as political reinforcement both at home and abroad.



Conclusions

Conclusions

Marina Sedlo

Diplomacy isn't easy, and it certainly isn't any easier for an entity consisting of 27 countries, each one with a different foreign policy. Speaking with one voice on an international level is still a challenge for the European Union (EU).

However, a Europe showing strong internal unity to the rest of the world is of great importance. In terms of diplomacy, NATO has taken some hits in the last decade, especially since the Trump administration in the United States; the European Union needs to demonstrate its diplomatic strength on the international stage, independently from our American friends.

In 2010, a first step towards a more structured European foreign policy was taken with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS): a diplomatic service and combined foreign and defence ministry of the European Union.

As good as that idea was 11 years ago, and even though the EEAS was set up with clear goals and structures, the diplomatic service only makes sense when all Member States of the EU have a common position on external matters, which has been quite difficult to achieve in times of crisis.

As mentioned in one of the essays you have just read, the relationship between Member States and Russia is one of the main examples for the EEAS' malfunctioning at the moment: Germany refusing to use North Stream 2 as leverage against Russian actions towards the EU. The best way to tackle these attacks would be having a common position, and acting accordingly, to support democratic movements that oppose the government or cooperating with other non-European states (e.g., in the Eastern Partnership) to diminish Russia's leverage.

But Russia is not the only important diplomatic topic for the European Union.

The different essays in this publication have shown that it is also crucial to find diplomatic means to deal with China. The EU has already been pursuing a strategic partnership with the country to show its ambition as an independent global player, but it has failed to use this partnership to bring forward the fight against human rights violations. The Union also needs to be careful and tackle Chinese influence on the African continent. There, more strategic partnerships with emerging democracies should be pursued to promote liberal values.

However, diplomacy isn't always about strategic partnerships. In the case of the EU, diplomacy is also expressed in internal and external mediation. Building peace in its neighbouring countries has been an increasing role of the EU in recent decades. However, to implement it in the best way possible, a structured and coherent strategy needs to be planned and followed as a general practice.

Diplomacy in Europe still has some capacity for improvement, but we are on the right path. With the COFOE, the right reforms can be tackled so that the EU will have a stronger stance on the international stage.

In line with that, the EU must first tackle internal challenges within the Union itself before engaging in the external promotion of its values through diplomacy. In this publication, we have had the chance to have a closer look at these topics—from the #strajkkobiet phenomenon in Poland to the role LGBTQIA+ rights are taking in the EU's foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.

In this structured and coherent strategy, it is also fundamental to follow internal goals—just like the climate and green targets, addressed in this book through the lens of renewable hydrogen. The establishment of strategic partnerships outside of the EU is essential in this regard.

Diplomacy in Europe still has some capacity for improve-

ment, but we are on the right path. With the COFOE, the right reforms can be tackled so that the EU will have a stronger stance on the international stage. I hope this publication and its different contributions have brought you relevant new ideas regarding this future potential. Please contribute and nurture this ongoing debate with your proposals!

Marina Sedlo,
LYMEC Policy Officer

Bibliography

SECTION 1 Institutions and Values

The European External Action Service: What is the point? – Christopher Jefferies

Adkins, William, "UK Accused of 'Silly Spat' with EU over Post-Brexit Diplomatic", *POLITICO* (21 January 2021), <https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-diplomatic-status-eu-delegation/>.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, "Symbolic Power in European Diplomacy: The Struggle between National Foreign Services and the EU's External Action Service", Cambridge University Press: *Review of International Studies* no. 4 (October 2013).

Batora, Jozef & Hocking, Brian, "EU-Oriented bilateralism: evaluating the role of member state embassies in the European Union", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22 (1) (2009).

European Union Publications Office, "Foreign and security policy", https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/foreign_and_security_policy.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED%3D25&locale=en.

Fraschini, Niccolo, "The Inter-Institutional Relations of the European External Action Service", Rubbettino Editore: *Il Politico* (May 2013).

Gaspers, Jan, "European Diplomatic Service: Putting Europe First", Royal Institute of International Affairs: *The World Today* (January 2010).

Karnitschnig, Matthew, "EU Foreign Policy RIP", *POLITICO* (13 February 2021), <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-foreign-policy-rip/>.

Landale, James, "UK and EU in Row over Bloc's Diplomatic Status", *BBC News* (21 January 2021), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-55742664>.

Rettman, Andrew, "EU Envoy to US Flaunts New Powers", *EUobserver* (11 August 2010), <https://euobserver.com/news/30667>.

Rettman, Andrew, "Russia Humiliates Borrell in Moscow", *EUobserver* (5 February 2021), <https://euobserver.com/foreign/150844>.

The Treaty on European Union, Article 27(3), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:en:PDF>

Tonra, Ben, "Irish Diplomacy in a Time of Crisis and the Evolution of a 'European' Diplomatic Service", Royal Irish Academy: *Irish Studies in International Affairs* (2017).

Wientzek, Olaf, "The European External Action Service: A Difficult Start of an Innovative Institution", *Tradition and Justice, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung International Reports* (2013).

Conceptualizing EU actorness through mediation: The Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue – Eleni Siapikoudi

Bergmann, J., *The European Union as International Mediator Brokering Stability and Peace in the Neighbourhood* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

Bergmann, J., "Same Table, Different Menus? A Comparison of UN and EU Mediation Practice in the Kosovo-Serbia Conflict", *International Negotiations* 23 (2018).

Bergmann, J. & Niemann, A., "The European Union as an Effective Mediator in Peace Negotiations? Conceptual Framework and Plausibility Probe", *Institut für Politikwissenschaft*, Paper No. 5 (2013).

Bergmann, J. & Niemann, A., "Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an Effective Peacemaker", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53(5) (2015).

Blockmans, S., Wouters, J. & Ruys, T., *The European Union and Peacebuilding: Policy and Legal Aspects* (The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 2010).

Coibion, T., "How Effective Is the EU as a Mediator? The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", College of Europe: *EU Diplomacy Paper* 01/2017 (2017).

Council of the European Union, *Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities* (Brussels, 10 November 2009).

EURACTIVE, "Kosovo and Serbia agree to resume talks after Macron, Merkel push" (30 April 2019), <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-and-kosovo-agree->

[to-resume-talks-after-macron-merkel-push/](#).

Gashi, K., "Simulated Power and the Power of Simulations: The European Union in the Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2020).

Greiçevci, L., "EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 12(3) (2011).

International Crisis Group, *Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue* [report no. 262] (25 January 2021), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/262-relaunching-kosovo-serbia-dialogue>.

Merlingen, M. & Ostraukaite, R., *European Union Peacebuilding and Policing* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Ushkovska, M., "The EU's Rivalry with the U.S. Is Complicating Serbia-Kosovo Talks", *World Politics Review* (March 19 2021), <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29200/the-eu-s-rivalry-with-the-u-s-is-complicating-serbia-kosovo-talks>.

NATO's Five Threats: Internal and external diplomacy implications – Oriol Marín Subirà

Brooke-Holland, L., & Mills, C., *NATO Wales Summit 2014: Outcomes* (SN06981) (UK Parliament: House of Commons Library, 12 September 2014), <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06981/>.

Gheciu, A., "NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community", *International Journal* 74(1) (2019), pp. 32–46, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020702019834645>.

Larres, K., "The United States and the 'Demilitarization' of Europe: Myth or Reality?", *Politique Étrangère* 1 (2014), pp. 117–130, https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_PE_141_0117--demilitarized-europe-a-us-perspective.htm.

NATO, "Defence expenditure of NATO Countries (2013–2020)" [press release] (21 October 2020), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_178975.htm.

NATO, "Enlargement" (5 May 2020), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm.

NATO, "Lord Ismay, 1952–1957", https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_137930.htm.

NATO, "NATO Time-Line", <https://www.nato.int/docu/posters/timeline-eng.pdf>.

Smith, S. J. & Gebhard, C., "EU–NATO relations: running on the fumes of informed deconfliction", *European Security* 26(3) (2017), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2017.1352581>.

Sullivan, J., & Brands, H., "China has two paths to global domination", *Foreign Policy* (22 May 2020), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/china-superpower-two-paths-global-domination-cold-war/>.

van Dijk, R., & Sloan, S. R., "NATO's inherent dilemma: strategic imperatives vs. value foundations" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43(6–7) (2020), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1824869>.

Warren, P. T., Colonel, *Alliance History and the Future NATO* (Brookings: 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0630_nato_alliance_warren.pdf.

Wittmann, K., *Towards a New Strategic Concept for NATO* (Rome: NATO Defense College, September 2009), DOI: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/108701/fp_10.pdf.

Walking the walk and talking the talk: The #strajkkobiet phenomenon and the case for consistency between internal enforcement and external promotion of EU values – Ioana Pavel

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Submission under Rule 9.4 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements in the cases of *Tysiąc v. Poland*, *R. R. v. Poland*, *P. and S. v. Poland* (Strasbourg: 27 January 2020), <https://rm.coe.int/commhdh-2020-3-rule-9-submission-in-3-cases-v-poland-en/16809ba102>.

"Europe's Underground Abortion Network", *The Economist* (27 February 2021), 6, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/02/27/europes-underground-abortion-network>.

European Parliament, "Polish de facto ban on abortion puts women's lives at risk, says Parliament" [press release] (26 November 2020), <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20201120IPR92132/polish-de-facto-ban-on-abortion-puts-women-s-lives-at-risk-says-parliament>.

European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2007/C 306/01 (Lisbon: 13 December 2007), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT>.

"Infographic – Religiousness of Polish Inhabitants", Central Statistical Office (22 December 2016), <https://stat.gov.pl/en/infographics-and-widgets/infographics/infographic-religiousness-of-polish-inhabitants.4.1.html>.

Pawlak, J. & Ptak, A., "As Poland's Church embraces politics, Catholics depart", *Reuters* (3 February 2021), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-church-insight-idUSKBN2A30SN>.

"Poland: Thousands protest against abortion law for third straight night", *DW News* (30 January 2021), <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-thousands-protest-against-abortion-law-for-third-straight-night/a-56389158>.

Soyaltin-Colella, D., "The EU's 'actions-without-sanctions'? The politics of the rule of law crisis in many Europes", *European Politics and Society* (November 2020), DOI: [10.1080/23745118.2020.1842698](https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1842698).

SECTION 2 Partners and Regions

LGBTQIA+ Rights in the EU and Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq – Jēkabs Kārlis Rasnačs

Angelo, P. J. & Bocci, D., "The Changing Landscape of Global LGBTQ+ Rights", Council on Foreign Relations (29 January 2021), <https://www.cfr.org/article/changing-landscape-global-lgbtq-rights>.

"Baghdad's persecuted gays have nowhere to hide", *BBC News* (11 September 2012), <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-19525133>.

Barford, V., "Iran's 'diagnosed transsexuals'", *BBC News* (25 February 2008), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7259057.stm>.

"Despite Fatwa, Transgender People in Iran Face Harassment", *VOA News* (21 May 2018), <https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/despite-fatwa-transgender-people-iran-face-harassment>.

European Commission, *Our Vision for A Clean Planet for All: Economic Transition* (November 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/default/files/docs/pages/vision_4_economic_en.pdf.

Eurostat, "From where do we import energy and how dependent are we?" (infographic), <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html>.

"The Iraq Report: LGBT flag sparks outcry as embassy spat rages", *The New Arab* (22 May 2020), <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2020/5/22/the-iraq-report-raising-of-lgbt-flag-sparks-outcry>.

Najmabadi, A., "Transing and Transpassing across Sex-Gender Walls in Iran", *Women's Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3.4 (2008), pp. 23–42, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27649782?seq=1>.

Parsi, A., "Iranian Queers and Laws: Fighting for Freedom of Expression", *Harvard International Review* 36, no. 2 (Fall 2014/Winter 2015), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43649271>.

Saeidzadeh, Z., "Transsexuality in Contemporary Iran: Legal and Social Misrecognition", *Feminist Legal Studies* 24 (2016), pp. 249–272, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10691-016-9332-x>.

United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015*, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper>.

Weinthal, B., "Shots fired as Iran arrests over 30 gay men in violent raid", *The Jerusalem Post* (20 April 2017), <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Shots-fired-as-Iran-arrests-over-30-gay-men-in-violent-raid-488419>.

Whitaker, B., "Everything you need to know about being gay in Muslim countries", *The Guardian* (21 June 2016), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/gay-lgbt-muslim-countries-middle-east>.

The Battle for Africa: How the EU can prevail over an ambitious China – Kasper Langelund Jakobsen

Acker, K., Brautigam, D., & Haung, Y., "The pandemic has worsened Africa's debt crisis. China and other countries are stepping in.", *The Washington Post* (26 February 2021), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/02/26/pandemic-has-worsened-africas-debt-crisis-china-other-countries-are-stepping/>.

The Africa-EU Partnership, "Financing the Partnership", <https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/about-us/financing-partnership>.

Dahman-Saidi, M., *Chinese Investment in Africa (part 1)*, BSI Economics (19 November 2013), <http://www.bsi-economics.org/219-chinese-investment-in-africa-part-1>.

European Investment Bank, *EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund Annual Report 2019* (Luxembourg, 31 July 2020), <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/882aedfc-d531-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>.

Eurostat, "Africa-EU – international trade in goods statistics" (April 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics#Africa.E2.80.99s_main_trade_in_goods_partner_is_the_EU.

"Forty-four African countries sign a free-trade deal", *The Economist* (22 March 2018), <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/03/22/forty-four-african-countries-sign-a-free-trade-deal>.

Lekorwe, M., Chingwete, A., Okuru, M. & Samson, R., "China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews" [dispatch no. 122], *Afrobarometer* (2016), <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad122-chinas-growing-presence-africa-wins-largely-positive-popular-reviews>.

Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Constraints Analysis", <https://www.mcc.gov/our-impact/constraints-analysis>.

Ryder, H. W., "Are Chinese Loans To Africa Good or Bad? That's The Wrong Question.", *The Diplomat* (5 September 2018), <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/are-chinese-loans-to-africa-good-or-bad-thats-the-wrong-question/>.

Shepard, W., "What China Is Really Up To In Africa", *Forbes* (3 October 2019), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/10/03/what-china-is-really-up-to-in-africa/?sh=29d387875930>.

Tjønneland, E., "The changing role of Chinese development aid", *Chr. Michelsen Institute Insight* no. 2 (March 2020), <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/7173-the-changing-role-of-chinese-development-aid.pdf>.

"US to look at more restrictions on tech exports to China", *Reuters* (11 February 2021), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-biden-trade/u-s-to-look-at-more-restrictions-on-tech-exports-to-china-idUSKBN2AB075>.

Varrella, S., "Leading countries for FDI in Africa 2014-2018, by investor country", *Statista* (3 November 2020), <https://www>.

statista.com/statistics/1122389/leading-countries-for-fdi-in-africa-by-investor-country/.

"Where do Africans study abroad?" *Mail & Guardian* (5 September 2020), <https://mg.co.za/education/2020-09-05-where-do-africans-study-abroad/>.

The World Bank, "The World Bank In Africa" (22 October 2020), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview#1>.

EU and ASEAN: Pacesetters for Security, Free Trade, and Climate – Rhea Csordas

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "ASEAN, EU to enhance cooperation on protection of the Environment and Climate Change" (9 July 2019), <https://asean.org/asean-eu-enhance-cooperation-protection-environment-climate-change>.

Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borrágán, N. (eds.), *European Union Politics* (sixth edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "EU und ASEAN - Partner für gemeinsames Handeln in Europa und Asien" (21 January 2019), <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/asien/eu-asean-aussenministertreff-en-21-01-19/2179170>.

Masala, C. & Sauer, F. (eds.), *Handbuch Internationale Beziehungen* (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag, 2017).

Min-hyung, K., "Integration Theory and ASEAN Integration", *Pacific Focus* 29(3) (8 December 2014), pp. 374–394.

Poli, E., "Is the European Model Relevant for ASEAN?", *Istituto Affari Internazionali Working Papers* 14 (13) (10 November 2014).

Söderbaum, F., "What's Wrong with Regional Integration? The Problem of Eurocentrism", *European University Institute Working Papers* 64 (1 June 2014).

Yukawa, T., "European integration through the eyes of ASEAN: Rethinking Eurocentrism in comparative regionalism", *International Area Studies Review* 21(4) (1 December 2018), pp. 323–339.

Yunling, Z. & Yuzhu, W., "ASEAN in China's Grand Strategy" in *Building ASEAN Community: Political-Security and Socio-cultural Reflections* [volume 4] (Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2017).

EU–Russia Relations: Perspective for the Future – Christine Khomyk

Duleba, Alexander, "EU-Russia Relations: the State of Affairs" in *Searching for New Momentum in EU-Russia Relations* (Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2009), <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/slowakei/06939.pdf>.

European External Action Service, "The European Union and the Russian Federation" (3 March 2021), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35939/european-union-and-russian-federation_en.

Groziev, Khristo, "Масштаб російської агентурної мережі колосальний" ["The size of Russian agent network is colossal"], *Espresso TV* (Ukraine, 9 January 2021), <https://espresso.tv/video/279935>.

Iakovenko, Ihor, "Кремль рие собі могилу. Керованість зникає" ["Russia is digging out a tomb for itself. The control vanishes"], *Espresso TV* (Ukraine, 13 February 2021), <https://espresso.tv/video/280593>. Ivanov, Igor S. "The New Russian Diplomacy". *Brookings Institution Press*, 2004.

Karlsen, G.H., "Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe", *Palgrave Communications* 5(19) (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0227-8>.

Kasparov, Garry, "На поступки Путін не піде, він і доб'є Російську імперію" ["Putin will never agree to compromise and will kill the Russian Empire"], *Espresso TV* (Ukraine, 20 February 2021), <https://espresso.tv/video/280613>.

Khan, Hina, "Russian Expansionism in Central Asia and the Region's Response", *Pakistan Horizon* 49(2), 1996, pp. 33–57, www.jstor.org/stable/41393938.

Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Ledeneva, Alena V., *How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2006).

Marocchi, Tania, "EU-Russia Relations: Towards An Increasingly Geopolitical Paradigm", *Vocal Europe* (2017), <https://www.vocaleurope.eu/eu-russia-relations-towards-increasingly-geopolitical-paradigm/>.

Real Instituto Elcano, "Russia, the West, and the rest: between influence and interference" [seminar] (5 March 2020), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/actividad?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/calendario/actividades/seminar-russia-the-west-and-the-rest-between-influence-and-interference.

Rönngren, Emma, "Russia's public diplomacy evolution and practice", *Global Affairs* 6(3) (2020), pp. 313–314, DOI: [10.1080/23340460.2020.1836670](https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2020.1836670).

Russell, Martin, "The EU and Russia: Locked into confrontation" [briefing], European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 652.030 (July 2020), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652030/EPRS_BRI\(2020\)652030_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652030/EPRS_BRI(2020)652030_EN.pdf).

Schmidt-Felzmann, Anke, "Is the EU's failed relationship with Russia the member states' fault?", *L'Europe en Formation* 374(4) (2014), <https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2014-4-page-40.htm>.

Schmitz, Jasmin, "The future of EU – Russia relations case study about the EU as defence actor" [B.Sc. thesis S1730940] (Enschede, Netherlands: University of Twente, 2017), https://essay.utwente.nl/73020/1/Schmitz_BA_BMS.pdf.

Tsygankov, Andrei P., "From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia", *Mershon International Studies Review* 41(2) (1997), pp. 247–268, <https://doi.org/10.2307/222669>.

The EU and its Southern Neighbourhood: The Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa – George Meneshian

Abbott, Pamela, Teti, Andrea et al., *Democratisation against Democracy: How EU Foreign Policy Fails the Middle East* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), pp. 108–122.

Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Barry, James, "Iran and Turkey: not quite enemies but less than friends", *Third World Quarterly* 38(4) (2017), pp. 980–995.

Antonopoulos, Paul, "Turkey's interests in the Syrian war: from neo-Ottomanism to counterinsurgency", *Global Affairs* 3(4-5) (2017), pp. 405–419.

Baker, Rauf, "The EastMed Gas and Philia Forums: Reimagining Cooperation in the Mediterranean", *Fikra Forum* (18 March 2021), <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/eastmed-gas-and-philia-forums-reimagining-cooperation-mediterranean> (Accessed: 19 March 2021).

Bakoyannis, Dora, "The EU-Turkey special framework and the path toward The Hague", *Kathimerini* (3 January 2020), <https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/248057/the-eu-turkey-special-framework-and-the-path-toward-the-hague/> (Accessed: 17 March 2021).

"Challenges of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy", German Institute for International and Security Affairs, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/dossiers/common-foreign-and-security-policy/> (Accessed: 19 March 2021).

Cingoli, Janiki, "The New Energy Resources in the Centre-East Mediterranean: Potential Current and Future Geo-Strategic Consequences", *Istituto Affari Internazionali Working Papers* 16(32) (23 November 2016), <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/new-energy-resources-centre-east-mediterranean>.

Cordesman, Anthony H., *The Greater Middle East: From the 'Arab Spring' to the 'Axis of Failed States'* [working draft] (Center for Strategic & International Studies: 2020), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states> (Accessed: 23 September 2020).

Dunn, Candace & Kempkey, Natalie, "The Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline are critical chokepoints for oil and natural gas trade", The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2019), <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40152> (Accessed: 16 March 2021).

European Union: External Action Service, "EU in the World", https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/area/geo_en (Accessed: 16 March 2021).

European Union: External Action Service, "Middle East and North Africa (MENA)", https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/middle-east-north-africa-mena/336/middle-east-and-north-africa-mena_en (Accessed: 16 March 2021).

European Union: External Action Service, "Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)", https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/329/union-for-the-mediterranean-ufm_en (Accessed: 16 March 2021).

Fahim, Kareem, "Amid Mediterranean tensions, retired Turkish admiral grabs the spotlight touting supremacy at sea", *The Washington Post* (26 September 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/turkey-greece-blue-homeland/2020/09/26/15cf7afe-fc3b-11ea-830c-a160b331ca62_story.html (Accessed: 17 March 2021).

Filis, Konstantinos, "The Strategic Value of the Eastern Mediterranean", *Stratfor* (21 March 2017), <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/strategic-value-eastern-mediterranean> (Accessed: 17 March 2021).

Gatti, Mauro, *European External Action Service: Promoting Coherence through Autonomy and Coordination* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), p. 94.

Kamrava, Mehran, "Weak States in the Middle East" in *Weak States in the Greater Middle East* (Working Group, The Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar: 2014), p. 1.

Koops, Joachim A. & Tercovich, Giulia, "Shaping the European External Action Service and its post-Lisbon crisis management structures: an assessment of The EU High Representatives' political leadership", *European Security* 29(3) (2020), pp. 275–300. Lesser, Ian O., *Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean* (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2005), p. 6.

Mathioulakis, Michalis (ed.), *Aspects of the Energy Union: Application and Effects of European Energy Policies in SE Europe and Eastern Mediterranean* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2021), p. 6. Meneshian, George, "The Situation in Libya And Europe's Failure to Intervene", *Libertas* (2021), https://www.lymec.eu/2021/03/15/the-situation-in-libya-and-europes-failure-to-intervene/?fbclid=IwAR2GJLADj4esHqErI4nA4eyWoY7G_H_1LWwcyIR8zX0TX5uAhRrLaBQad6g.

Murariu, Mihai & Anglițoiu, George, "Anatolian Security and Neo-Ottomanism: Turkey's Intervention in Syria", *Middle East Policy* 27(2) (2020), pp. 132–147.

Penkova, Tomislava, "Russia's Strategy of Forging Spaces Around Itself" in Serena Giusti & Irina Mirkina (eds.), *The EU in a Trans-European Space: External Relations across Europe, Asia and the Middle East* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2019), pp. 43–63.

Potter, Lawrence G., "Sectarianism in the Middle East", *Great Decisions* (2015), pp. 29–40.

Puglierin, Jana, "Priorities for the EU's New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024: Unleashing the Potential of the Common Foreign and Security Policy", *German Council on Foreign Relations* (2019), p. 6. Quamar, Md. Muddassir, "Turkey and the Regional Flashpoint in Libya", *Strategic Analysis* 44(6) (2020), pp. 597–602.

Serrano de Haro, Pedro A., "Working Together for a Safer World" in Martin Westlake (ed.), *The European Union's New Foreign Policy* (Springer International Publishing; Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), pp. 59–90.

Shama, Nael, "Between Alliance and Entente: The Egyptian-Greek-Cypriot Partnership" in Zenonas Tziarras (ed.), *The New Geopolitics of The Eastern Mediterranean: Trilateral Partnerships and Regional Security* (Nicosia: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2019), pp. 95–111.

"Turkey's PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer", The International Crisis Group, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer>.

Tzogopoulos, George N., "Thinking Beyond the EastMed Pipeline", *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Perspectives* No. 1,605 (14 June 2020), <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-greece-cyprus-cooperation/> (Accessed: 18 March 2021).

"UN report finds Jordan, Turkey, UAE violated Libya arms embargo", *France 24* (7 November 2019), <https://www.france24.com/en/20191107-un-report-finds-jordan-turkey-uae-violated-libya-arms-embargo%C2%A0>.

UNHCR, "Mediterranean Situation", <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>.

Westlake, Martin (ed.), *The European Union's New Foreign Policy* (Springer International Publishing; Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), p. 2.

SECTION 3 Topics and tools

Renewable Hydrogen in 2050: Between sustainable necessities and geopolitical challenges – Felix Sebastian Schulz

Bátora, J., "The 'Mitrailleuse Effect': The EEAS as an interstitial organization and the dynamics of innovation in diplomacy", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(4) (2013), 598–613.

Borrell, J., "Building multilateralism for the 21st Century", EEAS (2021). https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/93360/building-multilateralism-21st%C2%A0century_en.

European Commission, *The European Green Deal*, COM(2019) 640 final (Brussels, 11 December 2019), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

European Commission, *A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe*, COM(2020) 301 final (Brussels, 8 July 2020), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0301&from=EN>.

European Commission Joint Research Centre, "Hydrogen use in EU decarbonisation scenarios" (17 April 2019). [https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/final_insights_into_hydrogen](https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/final_insights_into_hydrogen_use_public_version.pdf)

[use_public_version.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/final_insights_into_hydrogen_use_public_version.pdf)

European External Action Service, "About the EEAS" (25 November 2019), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/82/about-european-external-action-service-eeas_en.

German Energy Agency, *The potential of electricity-based fuels for low-emission transport in the EU* (November 2017),

https://www.dena.de/fileadmin/dena/Dokumente/Pdf/9219_E-FUELS-STUDY_The_potential_of_electricity_based_fuels_for_low_emission_transport_in_the_EU.pdf

Scholten, D. (ed.), *The Geopolitics of Renewables* (New York: Springer, 2018).

Turse, N., "U.S. Generals Worry about Rising Russian and Chinese Influence in Africa, Documents Show", *The Intercept* (13 August 2019), <https://theintercept.com/2019/08/13/russia-china-military-africa/>.

von der Leyen, Ursula, "Mission letter [to Josep Borrell]" (Brussels, 1 December 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/comm-cwt2019/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-letter-josep-borrell-2019_en.pdf.

Westphal, K., "The International Dimensions of Germany's Hydrogen Policy", *SWP Comment* 2020/C 32 (June 2020), <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-international-dimensions-of-germanys-hydrogen-policy/>.

Wietschel, M., & Hasenauer, U., "Feasibility of hydrogen corridors between the EU and its neighbouring countries", *Renewable Energy* 32(13) (2007), pp. 2129–2146.

Right to Asylum: Procedures and Obstacles in the European Union – Anna Komziuk

European Commission, *New Pact on Migration and Asylum* (September 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-package_1.pdf.

European Court of Human Rights, Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Judgement (Strasbourg, 21 January 2011), https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/legislation-and-case-law-case-law/case-mss-v-belgium-and-greece-application-no-3069609_en.

European Parliament, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, *Official Journal* C 326/15 (26 October 2012), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

European Parliament, Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of The European Parliament and of The Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), *Official Journal* L 180/31 (29 June 2013), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:en:PDF>.

Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "ROZPORZĄDZENIE MINISTRA

Interpol, "Red Notices" (2021), <https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/Red-Notices> (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

Wyrwał, Marcin & Żmudka, Matgorzata, "I'd prefer to die in Poland": Chechnya's most famous YouTuber in exile faces deportation to Russia", *Open Democracy* (5 November 2018), <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tumszo-abdurakhmanov/> (Accessed: 21 March 2021).

What's the Social Purpose of it all? Strategic Partnerships fit to shape the future of the EU's liberal engagement – Sascha Lucas

Berkofsky, Axel, "China and the EU: 'Strategic Partners' no more" [policy brief], *Institute for Security & Development Policy* (December 2019), <https://isdp.eu/publication/china-and-the-eu-strategic-partners-no-more/>.

Berkofsky, Axel, "The EU and Japan: a partnership in the making", *European Policy Centre Issue Papers* no. 52 (February 2007), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30653/EPC%20Issue%20Paper%20No%2052.pdf>.

Berkofsky, Axel, "The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – Responding to the Crisis of the Liberal World Order", *Asia Policy Brief* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2017), http://aei.pitt.edu/93191/1/Asia_Policy_Brief_DA_2017_03_engl.pdf.

Berkofsky, Axel, "Moving Beyond Rhetoric? The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)" [policy brief], *Institute for Security & Development Policy* (April 2020), <https://isdp.eu/publication/the-eu-japan-strategic-partnership-agreement/>.

Cihelková, E., Nguyen, H. P., Fabuš, M. & Cimová, K., "The EU Concept of the 'Strategic Partnership': Identifying the 'unifying' criteria for the differentiation of Strategic Partners", *Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues* 7(3) (30 March 2020), pp. 1723–1739, [http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2020.7.3\(19\)](http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2020.7.3(19)).

European Union, "EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement" (14 December 2018), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A4359401> (last accessed: 6 April 2021).

Ferreira-Pereira, L. & Vieira, A., "The European Union's strategic partnerships: conceptual approaches, debates and experiences", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29(1), pp. 3–17 (6 February 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1130341>.

Fiott, Daniel & Simón, Luis, "The European Union" in Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski & Simon Reich (eds.), *Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 262–283.

Grevi, Giovanni, "Making EU strategic partnerships effective", *FRIDE Working Papers* no. 105 (2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130706/WP105_Making_EU_Strategic_ENG_dic10.pdf.

Ikenberry, John, "The end of liberal international order?", *Foreign Affairs* 94(1) (1 January 2018), pp. 7–23.

Ikenberry, John, "The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of Liberal Order", *Foreign Affairs* 93(3) (May/June 2014), pp. 80–90.

Ikenberry, John, *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crisis of Global Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020).

Maher, Richard, "The Elusive EU–China Strategic Partnership", *International Affairs* 92(4) (20 June 2016), pp. 959–976.

Nye, Joseph, "Will the Liberal Order Survive? The History of an Idea", *Foreign Affairs* 96(1) (January–February 2017), pp. 10–16.

Schmidt, Anne, "Strategic Partnerships: A contested policy concept", *SWP Working Papers FG 1 2010/ 07* (December 2010), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/FG%201%20discussion%20paper_Anne%20Schmidt.pdf.



EUROPEAN LIBERAL YOUTH
LYME

