In many ways, ASEAN countries are caught in the same cycle as the European Union. They are trapped in the geopolitical struggle between the US and China. China exhibits the same ‘divide and conquer’ strategy in the region as it does with EU Member States
By Alva Finn, Executive Director of the European Liberal Forum
At the beginning of April, I had an eye-opening trip to Manila for the 50th Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats Executive Committee Meeting on South China Sea Disputes under Trump 2.0.
I was there to present our work on the EU-ASEAN relationship, talk about the ALDE positioning on EU-China and South China Sea, and the work of our recent Hans van Ballen Scholar (you can check out our Liberal Europe podcast episode on EU-Taiwan with Associate ELF Fellow Dr Laia Comerma here). Apart from a new network, the most valuable thing I got from the trip was a new perspective.
A Front-Row Seat to Asia’s Geopolitical Chessboard
These days, Europe is all doom and gloom about the death of the transatlantic relationship. Not so in Asia. My trip was preceded by an official visit from US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, who reaffirmed “an ironclad alliance” with the Philippines and Japan. This is the other side of the coin regarding the United States’ departure from Europe.
On my panel, I had several Philippine scholars who tracked the so-called Maga reprioritisation of US defence. The theory goes that in order to fight back the Red Dragon’s dominance, the US must recalibrate and focus the might of its defence in the Indo-Pacific while leaving Europe to defend itself.
They were unbelievably optimistic about the relationship with the US, despite the chaos and the unpredictability of the Trump administration. This unpredictability was showcased on the very day of the conference, as it happened to coincide with ‘Liberation Day’. And Trump did not spare Asian partners from tariffs: Thailand (36 per cent), Indonesia (32 per cent), Brunei (24 per cent), Malaysia (24 per cent), the Philippines (17 per cent), and Singapore (10 per cent) were all affected.
In many ways, the region is caught in the same cycle as the European Union. It is trapped in the geopolitical struggle between the US and China. China exhibits the same ‘divide and conquer’ strategy in the region as it does with EU Member States, leading to a lack of unity on important issues like the South China Sea or the West Philippine Sea. Some countries, like Vietnam, align more with China, while others, like Taiwan, are firmly dependent on the US for their own security and trade.
The perspective of Taiwan was particularly interesting given that there was a lack of clarity about whether Taiwan would face the same treatment as Ukraine if invaded by an increasingly antagonistic China. Despite continued ‘strategic ambiguity’ from Trump on whether he would defend Taiwan in such a scenario, encouragements for Taiwan to increase its defence spending and the transactional approach to Taiwan’s semiconductor sector, Taiwanese colleagues seemed similarly optimistic given prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific by the 2nd Trump administration.
The EU’s “Open Strategic Autonomy”: A Potential Playbook for ASEAN?
Given this political tightrope, I told the audience about the growing attraction of the EU towards the concept of open strategic autonomy. For ASEAN countries, strategic autonomy might look quite different. Still, my recommendation was to start charting areas and partners to establish strategic autonomy and dependencies so they are not caught off guard when another sudden geopolitical shift hits. The EU can be a partner in this journey if we move beyond our narrow focus on the economy and trade.
For example, the EU has made small steps in terms of supporting free navigation and enforcement of the Law of the Sea in the region based on a coordinated approach and the interests and naval capacities of particular Member States. Indeed, those present were not aware of these efforts and focused predominately on the role of the US.
Perhaps a new defence boost within the EU can strengthen our defence partnerships with Indo-Pacific partners and strengthen our hard power in the process.